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Résumé et mots clés 
 
Résumé 
 
Élaborée à partir d’une étude de cas extensive focalisant sur les perspectives 
multiples et concurrentes ayant émergé lors des négociations sur la gouvernance de 
l’Internet, thématique ayant dominé l’agenda politique du Sommet mondial sur la société 
de l’information (SMSI), cette thèse examine les manières avec lesquelles les débats 
mondiaux sur la gouvernance de l’Internet influencent la notion d’intérêt public en 
communication. 
 
Établie sur la base d’une observation participante extensive, d’entrevues semi-
structurées et de l’analyse d’une documentation formelle et informelle associée au SMSI, 
cette thèse fait état de l’émergence des enjeux associés à la gouvernance de l’Internet au 
SMSI et présente une analyse approfondie des négociations ayant porté sur cet enjeu. Le 
cadre théorique développé par Lawrence Lessig au travers duquel « le code est la loi »  
est appliqué afin d’expliquer comment les différents acteurs ont débattu et ultimement 
atteint un consensus sur les frontières venant séparer les enjeux normatifs de politique 
publique et les questions techniques de régulation et de gestion du réseau. Cette thèse 
discute également de l’évolution des débats autour de la gouvernance mondiale de 
l’Internet ayant pris place à la suite de la conclusion du SMSI. Sur la base de cette étude 
de cas, un ensemble de conclusions sont formulées sur les acteurs et les caractéristiques 
institutionnelles ayant influencé les négociations sur la gouvernance de l’internet.   
 
 Il est également suggéré que le SMSI a redéfini une discussion étroite sur la 
gestion d’un ensemble de fonctions techniques de l’Internet en un domaine de politique 
publique plus large de gouvernance mondiale de l’Internet. Il est également défendu que 
la notion d’intérêt public dans la gouvernance mondiale de l’Internet est conceptualisée 
autour des processus de participation et d’intégration des différentes parties prenantes au 
processus politique. Les implications directes et indirectes qui découlent de ce constat 
pour comprendre plus largement la notion d’intérêt public dans le domaine de la 
communication sont également présentées et discutées. En conclusion, cette thèse 
s’interroge sur les implications programmatiques des éléments ayant été précédemment 
soulevées pour la recherche médiatique et communicationnelle.   
 
 
Mots clés: 
 
Gouvernance mondiale de l’Internet; régulation de l’Internet, mondialisation; 
gouvernance mondiale; politique de communication; économie politique de la 
communication; Sommet mondial sur la société de l’information; intérêt public. 
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 Abstract and Key Words 
 
Abstract: 
 
Centred on an extensive case study of the multiple and competing perspectives 
that emerged over the course of the controversial internet governance negotiations that 
dominated the United Nation’s World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), this 
thesis examines how the global debate on internet governance influences the public 
interest in communication. 
 
On the basis of extensive participant observation, targeted semi-structured 
interviews and analyses of a range of formal and informal documents associated with the 
WSIS, this thesis reviews the emergence of the issue of internet governance at the WSIS 
and provides an in-depth accounting of the negotiations that followed. Lawrence Lessig’s 
theory of “code is law” is applied in explaining how various actors debated and 
ultimately reached conclusions about the boundaries between normative public policy 
issues and questions of technical regulation and management. The evolution of the debate 
over global internet governance since the conclusion of the WSIS is also discussed. On 
the basis of this case study, a series of conclusions are drawn about the actors and 
institutional characteristics that influenced the WSIS negotiations on internet governance.  
 
It is suggested that the WSIS redefined a narrow debate over the management of a 
series of internet technical functions as a more broad public policy field of global internet 
governance. It is argued that the public interest in global internet governance however is 
process-focused and preoccupied with the political welfare of various stakeholders. The 
direct and indirect implications for understanding the larger public interest in 
communication are considered. In conclusion, this thesis reflects on the programmatic 
implications for the media and communication studies research agenda.  
 
 
Keywords: 
 
global internet governance; internet regulation; globalization; global governance; digital 
technology; communication policy; political economy of communication; World Summit 
on the Information Society; public interest 
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-PREFACE- 
From e-Democracy to More Democratic Electronic Networks 
 
 
My Entry Points into the Subject 
Chances are that some of you entirely rejected or merely ignored the hype about 
how the internet was going to lead to a revitalization of democracy. Most of us didn’t. 
Then again, in our defense, “most of us haven’t got a clue about how networks work”, 
Lawrence Lessig- someone who has more insight than most about how networks work- 
offers by way of absolution in his 2006 revision of his 1999 book Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace. (Lessig 2006, 32; see also Lessig 1999). I would like to think that I was a 
bit skeptical, but I am certain that I had little clue about how networks worked around the 
turn of the century. I went off to cyberspace looking for democracy regardless. 
Darin Barney wrote in 2000 (20-21) about how governments of the day were 
“hoping to catch the wave and trying to avoid being stigmatized as anti-democratic” by 
engaging in what he called “online discussion groups and electronic plebiscites, and the 
provision of a variety of information resources”. I saw the emerging e-democracy or e-
citizen engagement practices described by Barney as the most promising place to find the 
internet democracy I was hearing so much about. 
Between 2001 and 2003 I worked on, and researched, e-democracy projects in the 
United Kingdom and in Canada. These included national online policy consultations, 
smaller local online consultations and a variety of assessments of how internet 
technologies like email and the world wide web were contributing more generally to the 
dialogue between citizens and governments (cf. Coleman 2002). I had various roles in 
these projects.  
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In my role as moderator I was responsible for exercising the internet’s celebrated 
practice of informal community governance or netizenship. Indeed, one episode in which 
I intervened (as an anonymous moderator) into a discussion forum to caution participants 
about the importance of maintaining civility has even found its way into the academic 
literature on the subject (Hurrell 2005). 
In my role as analyst and researcher, I came across many instances where citizens 
engaged in deep, rich, fundamentally democratic discussion with strangers from around 
the country. If not for the convenience of internet mediated communication they might 
not have otherwise been able or willing to participate. Echoing the classic cartoon in 
which a dog waxes that “the best thing about the internet is that nobody knows you’re a 
dog”, I watched a drycleaner with little formal education express her gratitude for a 
forum in which she could have her opinions treated seriously because nobody knew that 
they were coming from a drycleaner with little formal education. I was gratified to read 
that victims of flooding in the UK found enough cathartic value in the opportunity to 
discuss flood prevention and response with others who had experienced flooding, that 
they would have been glad to have participated even if the consultation failed to influence 
government policy. A well-conceived and attentively managed e-democracy project 
could facilitate instances where citizens engaged in informed debate and occasionally 
deliberation over issues of general concern.  
But, these were small victories and hardly the flood of democracy that had been 
promised and that I was expecting. For one thing, this public sphere was accessible to 
only those with access to the technologies required to connect and the literacy required to 
participate in dense, text-intensive discussion that was restricted to officially recognized 
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languages (English in the UK, French and English in Canada).  There is nothing intrinsic 
to internet technology that addresses these sorts of democratic divides.   
I was also involved in the direction of e-democracy projects, interacting with both 
the software developers and the political partners. One of the e-democracy projects on 
which I worked was an online consultation that was staged as part of a general effort to 
consult the Canadian public on Canada’s foreign policy. While the entire process was 
planned prior to the events of 9/11/2001, the online consultation component was 
launched in January 2003 at a time when it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
United States was going to invade Iraq. The consultation was structured around a series 
of general, more conceptual questions about Canada’s foreign policy principles.  But, the 
war in Iraq and Canada’s possible roles in it, became an obvious lighting-rod issue for 
anyone interested in discussing Canada’s place in the world at the time. 
 This project was called “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy”. The choice of the word 
dialogue reflected very specific ambitions that it would be a deliberative space in which 
informed citizens exchanged ideas and the discussion built upon previous contributions. 
In contrast to the idea that citizens simply deposit their own opinions and leave it at that, 
a dialogue presupposes that the participants engage the perspectives of others and 
reconsider and evolve their own views accordingly.  
These ambitions were built into the technical and informational infrastructure of 
the e-democracy project. For instance, though the dialogue idea required that participants 
build on the responses of others, it was unreasonable to expect that participants in the 
dialogue were going to be able to read the hundreds of responses submitted by their 
fellow citizens before considering their own answers. As a compromise, the website 
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would feature frequent summaries to be written by moderators like me. The site was set 
up in a way that these summaries were unavoidable, so that participants had to read them 
(or make an equally strenuous effort not to) before giving their own opinions. A 
democratic bias towards deliberation was embedded into this particular technology. But it 
did not have to be.  
“An overwhelming majority of participants in the Foreign Policy Dialogue 
expressed the view that Canada should not support the United States in an invasion of 
Iraq”. I wrote this in one of my summaries. Despite the fact that  “Should Canada support 
the US in an invasion of Iraq?” was not one of the questions being asked by the foreign 
policy dialogue, it was one of the subjects being discussed most frequently in the 
submissions. This caused problems and debate. The problem was that Canada had not yet 
adopted a public position on the war in Iraq and our governmental partners felt that, if 
Canada did eventually join the war effort, having such statements visible on the internet 
and under Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade letterhead could be 
highly problematic in defending that decision. The debate ended up being about whether 
summaries were appropriate and, in the end, over whether the site was going to be a 
highly deliberative forum for democratic discussion or something else. 
To our government partners, the summaries constituted a subjective take that 
necessarily involved editorializing and thus compromised the neutrality of the civil 
service. They argued that the war in Iraq was not a question and thus that the views on it 
were not relevant to summarizing the answers to the questions that were actually being 
asked. “No more summaries”, they pronounced. “That would mean no more 
deliberations”, we fought back. But, just as easily as a democratic bias towards 
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deliberative discussion rather than mere opinion-giving had been embedded into the 
technology, it was undermined by politics and coded out by software developers. 
Participants were still advised that they should consider all of the hundreds of answers of 
their fellow citizens before giving their own opinion. But, with a bit of coding, there was 
suddenly nothing in either the informational or technological architectures of the Foreign 
Policy Dialogue that made it likely that they would. Code and politics, governments and 
technologists. That was it. The technologies of the internet can be democratic, but they do 
not have to be.  
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-CHAPTER 1- 
Internet Governance: States, Technology and the Public Interest 
 
“Internet time” meets “UN time” 
 The timetable would, Ambassador Khan re-assured the increasingly restless 
crowd of national delegations and business and civil society interlocutors assembled in 
one of the secondary amphitheatres of the Palais des Nations in Geneva, be “aggressive”. 
Masoud Khan, a Pakistani diplomat was speaking in his role as Chair of Subcommittee A 
of the third preparatory committee meeting (PrepCom) of the second phase of the United 
Nations (UN) World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and he was speaking in 
response to concerns raised in consecutive interventions made by the delegations of 
Brazil and the United Kingdom (UK). The UK was speaking in its role as president of the 
European Union (EU).  
Subcommittee A, under Ambassador Khan’s chairmanship, was charged with 
negotiating an agreement on the issues related to internet governance that had to be 
accepted unanimously by all UN country delegations. Internet governance had emerged 
during the first phase of the WSIS as both the most important and most controversial of 
all of the issues treated by the Summit. Were it not for a desperate 11th hour compromise 
brokered on the eve of the first phase of the WSIS by the government of Switzerland, 
internet governance could have taken the entire process off the rails in 2003 (see Furrer 
2005). Since it seemed impossible to arrive at a resolution to the debate over global 
internet governance by the end of phase I of the WSIS, a working group was instead 
created to study the issue.  The seemingly intractable task of negotiating an agreement on 
internet governance was pushed back to some future point during the 2nd phase.  
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By the time Ambassador Khan found himself addressing the Brazilian and EU 
concerns that things were not going fast enough on Thursday September 22, 2005, not 
only had the working group been convened, met and delivered its report, but the first 
week of the PrepCom was winding down. Some future point, in other words, was now. 
Discussion of the heart of the issue, the question of what sort of institutional framework 
should exist for governing internet technologies and internet-mediated communication 
and the crucial question of the role of the international community in that framework, had 
already been put off by at least two years in the hope that some combination of further 
study, informal negotiation and the passage of time would somehow diminish the level of 
disaccord between the divergent, competing and often mutually exclusive positions of 
various delegations to the WSIS. And now the fourth of the ten remaining negotiation 
days scheduled for phase II, PrepCom III was concluding and the real controversial issues 
were still not being discussed.  The possibility that time was, for once and for all, running 
out must have crossed the minds of everyone and the concern of the Brazilian and EU 
delegations that things were not moving quite fast enough was certainly understandable.  
Brazil had, in most diplomatic terms of course, suggested that, after four days of 
preliminary, general discussions, perhaps more explicit focus on the controversial issues 
of substance was now required. The list of delegations awaiting the floor was already 
long and Ambassador Khan had let this point of order pass without comment, instead 
immediately granting the floor to the UK/EU delegation. The intervention of the EU 
touched on a number of important issues of substance but also pointed out that there was 
much work to be done in order to build on common ground, and asked the chair directly 
about the timetable for the completion of negotiations and about when he- Ambassador 
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Khan- envisioned text for negotiation being tabled.  It was at this point that Khan felt 
obliged to pre-empt the next delegation on his list of scheduled speakers and intervene 
with his own comments about an aggressive timetable. Aggressive, in timetable terms, 
included the promise that the hitherto one-a-day negotiating sessions would shortly 
evolve into two-a-day negotiating sessions and that exact deadlines for progress would be 
discussed soon.  
If the message of the Brazilian and EU delegations was that a sense of urgency 
seemed lacking, then either the message was only partially received by the other WSIS 
delegations, or the very concept of a sense of urgency is incompatible with the culture 
and processes of global governance, at least within the UN system. 
After Ambassador Khan’s intervention, a series of delegations took the floor. One 
after another, various country delegations from around the globe waived their country 
name plates, waited to be acknowledged by the chair, thanked and passed along their best 
wishes to all of their colleagues and congratulated Ambassador Khan on his appointment 
as chair (in the case of delegations who were taking the floor to speak for the first time in 
PrepCom III), all as prologue to stating the same essential point: “we agree with Brazil 
and the EU that time is running out and that we need to speed things up”. So many 
countries in fact, felt the need to go on record in their agreement with Brazil and the EU 
that time was running out and that things needed to be sped up that, by the time each had 
performed the required rituals and made their point in the not always succinct language of 
international diplomacy, the Thursday session was effectively over. The principle that 
time was running out and that things needed to be sped up having firmly been established 
as more or less “the world’s view” and not just the view of Brazil and the EU, getting on 
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with the business of speeding things up to avoid running out of time would have to wait 
for another day.  
As we shall see in discussing the case study at the centre of this research, this 
episode was hardly a watershed moment in the outcome of the WSIS process, much less 
in the broader trajectory of global internet governance.1 But the object of negotiation at 
WSIS phase II, PrepCom III was not usual inter-governmental fare.  It was, after all, the 
internet- the same internet whose alleged immunity to regulatory efforts was supposed to 
make it the standard bearer for globalization, libertarian politics and free market 
enthusiasm. While regulation of media and communication at both the national and 
intergovernmental levels is commonplace, the tendency has been to treat the internet as 
neither requiring nor tolerating regulation- certainly not from the sort of system wherein 
even registering the point that time is wasting, wastes time. 
 
Statement of Research Question 
This thesis examines the global debate on internet governance, its topic is the 
reconstitution of the public interest in communication in the context of globalization and 
digital technologies.  
 
                                                
1 Indeed, there is every indication that such grandstanding about the speed of negotiation progress is both a 
commonplace and strategic move in inter-governmental negotiations. For instance, when I mentioned my 
fondness for the irony of this moment in an interview with one veteran of such processes, he responded: 
“that’s the way that international negotiations work” and it was clear that he had seen too much of it to find 
it amusing.  (interview subject in discussion with author, July 2007). Strategically, the Brazilian delegation 
subsequently pointed out the extent to which the amount of time available to negotiate impacts the possible 
outcomes of negotiation, arguing that the status quo requires little time to negotiate whereas major changes 
require significant amounts of time to work out and thus, by seeking to maximize the amount of time 
available to negotiate, whatever else Brazil hoped to accomplish with its intervention, it was certainly 
additionally attempting to structure the process around the optimal terms for its own interests.  
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The internet has emerged as a mainstream mass medium and as a legitimate 
subject for consideration within debates over the regulation of communication. This 
thesis asks how does the global debate on internet governance influence the public 
interest in communication? 
 
The Public Interest 
Drawing on Napoli (2001, 72) the public interest can be defined as “the primary 
decision-making guidepost for policymakers” and “the primary criterion against which 
policies are assessed”.  
Even the earliest reflections on human beings as social creatures were 
accompanied by efforts to discern what decisions should be taken on behalf of their 
collective. Influential contributions to this intellectual project have included notions such 
as Aristotle’s “common interest”, Locke’s “public good of the people” and Rousseau’s 
“common good” (Pal and Maxwell 2004). McQuail (1992, 3) defines public interest 
claims as the supposed benefits to wider society that go beyond immediate, particular and 
individual interests. They are used to justify regulatory action in a variety of sectors 
including the entire range of media and communication regulation issues (Feintuck and 
Varney 2006, 74). In questions of media and communication regulation, such claims are 
typically linked to a complex of supposed informational, cultural and social benefits and 
are said to reflect the wider interests of both senders and receivers of public 
communication (McQuail 1992, 3).  
Over the course of its long march through history, the public interest has become 
a fragmented and contested term. Some argue that the concept of the public interest has 
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become so fluid and prone to manipulation and misuse over the years that it is largely 
devoid of meaning (Schubert 1960; Sorauf 1957; see Napoli 2001) or should be 
abandoned entirely (Barry 1965; see McQuail 1992).  
Despite its lack of precision, the idea of the public interest contains undeniable 
normative dimensions and is crucial to understanding how power is exercised in 
communication policy making. If the concept were simply abandoned as too problematic, 
whatever new discursive formation was adopted in its place to justify how society 
benefits from the decisions made in the management of communication systems would 
inevitably confront much the same set of complexities and controversies (V. Held 1970; 
McQuail 1992).  
The literature recognizes a series of different approaches to defining the public 
interest2:  
• Preponderance theory of the public interest is a majoritarian approach wherein 
the public interest is argued to lie with the will of the majority of the people; 
• Common interest theory of the public interest implies that certain interests are 
common to all and thus that certain courses of action are in society’s best interest, 
regardless of whether or not those decisions are demanded or supported by a 
majority; 
• Unitary theory of the public interest is defined as an assertion of some absolute 
normative principle;  
                                                
2 The typology that follows draws on a synthesis of the following models: Downs (1962) describes three 
main schools of thought on the public interest which are further refined in V. Held (1970) under the 
headings of the  “Preponderance”; “Common Interest” and “Unitary” theories of the public sphere. V. 
Held’s model forms the basis of a similar discussion by McQuail (1992) which in turn is featured in 
Feintuck and Varney (2006). See also Pal and Maxwell (2004) for discussion of these and separate and 
distinct criteria that have been invoked as benchmarks for defining the public interest. 
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• Results-focused approach to the public interest reflects the view that the public 
interest is whatever those charged with making decisions in the public interest 
decide3;  
• Process approach to the public interest focuses on the procedures used in arriving 
at decisions, such as concern for representativity; legality; transparency etc; 
• Utilitarian value approach to the public interest considers solutions that 
maximize benefits for society as a whole but also compromise between different 
interests represented in the process. 
On another analytical plane, van Cuilenberg and McQuail (2003) suggest that the 
public interest has historically fluctuated based on a continuous renegotiation between 
three sub-goals: political welfare, social welfare and economic welfare. These we could 
usefully label as the different ‘interests’. When focused on political welfare, the public 
interest is defined by goals which support or advance democratic institutions. A social 
welfare approach to the public interest places a premium on social order and cohesion 
through the promotion of social and cultural objectives as well as the prevention of harm 
and offense in public communication. When the public interest focuses on economic 
welfare, relevant values include efficiency, employment and profitability, and the focus is 
on infrastructure provisions that enable the economy to function in “production and 
market terms” (p. 184). 
 
 
 
                                                
3 The results-focused approach is alternatively labeled as processional approach to the public interest; 
(Cochran 1974; see also Napoli 2001) and as the pragmatic approach (Downs1962; see also McQuail 1992. 
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Public interest in communication: The Critical Media Studies Research Agenda 
Much of the research agenda for critical social science on the public interest in the 
governance of communication is influenced by the political economy of communication 
research programme  (PEC) (Mosco 1996). The PEC shapes the perspective of this thesis. 
PEC research adopts a realist epistemological stance that no division should be made 
between research and action that, at its best, stimulates a highly interventionist dialogue 
on issues such as how public interest concerns regarding communication should be 
promoted by governments and regulatory agencies (Mosco and Reddick 1997). PEC 
research addresses the relationship between media and communication systems and the 
broader structure of society and involves a commitment to a particular moral philosophy, 
an interest in the values that constitute social behavior and those moral principles that 
should lead efforts to change it. Finally, PEC research insists on the power of capital and 
of the role of communication industries and the decisions made in the allocation of 
communication and information resources in the accumulation of capital (Mosco 1996; 
McChesney, Wood and Foster 1998; Mosco and Reddick 1997). 
For the PEC, the emergence of global internet governance challenges the linkage 
between the realist epistemological commitment to intervention and the desire to 
manifest social change that, in the words of Robert McChesney (2008, 17) “transcend[s] 
the status quo of really existing capitalism with something better”. In particular, the 
emergence of globalization and digital technologies and their impact upon the 
governance of communication destabilizes the linkages between nation states and control 
of communication and, in the process, the normative and epistemological foundations of 
the PEC programme.  
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Globalization 
Globalization is a catchword for describing a particular contemporary political, 
economic and social process. As defined by David Held (1998, 13)  
globalization today implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, it suggests that 
many chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming interregional 
or intercontinental in scope and, secondly, it suggests that there has been an 
intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between 
states and societies.  
Held argues that digital technologies have been one of the defining portents and 
instigators of the highly globalized condition of contemporary international relations: 
“What is noteworthy about the modern global system is the stretching of social relations 
in and through new dimensions of activity and the chronic intensification of patterns of 
interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as modern communications networks 
and new information technology” (D. Held 1998, 13). 
 Globalization directly challenges the existing nation state-based system of 
communication governance by problematizing the definition and jurisdiction of national 
sovereignty. Furthermore, globalization extends the co-ordination role of international 
organizations active in communication governance. Above all, globalization stresses this 
patchwork system and its basis on the primacy of national sovereignty. 
 For example, in support of increased liberalization in trade and the accompanying 
emergence of international markets for commerce, global flows of people and goods have 
formed the basis for the emergence, within nation states, of both heterogeneous multi-
culturalism and homogeneous diasporas- populations in one jurisdiction that have a group 
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and community identity which is, at least in part, taken from another. This tendency 
fundamentally challenges the national basis of media regulation, both when nations look 
inwards from their own borders and when they look outwards towards their globally 
dispersed native populations.  In one of the defining works on the cultural impact of 
globalization, Appadurai (1996, 306) argues that “because of the disjunctive and unstable 
interplay of commerce, media, national policies and consumer fantasies, ethnicity, once a 
genie contained in the bottle of some sort of locality however large, has now become a 
global force, forever slipping through the cracks between states and borders”. Yet, it is 
precisely within these borders- which are argued to align less and less with any ‘national’ 
identity- where media regulation lays claim to sovereignty on behalf of its own 
conception of ‘the nation’. In this sense, globalization problematizes communication 
governance by highlighting the artificiality of the notion of citizenship in the modern, 
heterogeneous nation state, by pulling the curtain back on what Anderson (1983) 
describes as the ‘imagined community’. Furthermore, globalization creates international 
constituencies for media contents which national regulatory frameworks are ill-equipped 
to deal with. Anderson suggests that the nation state is, by definition, unable to function 
as a source of good governance to an international constituency. The nation state is, in his 
terms,  “an imagined political community- imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign…no nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind” (Anderson 1983, 6-7).  
 In addition, globalization challenges communication governance through the 
increasing reach and power of multi-national media conglomerates whose interests are 
best served through access to, and standardization across, global markets. As such, they 
have become powerful actors and, supported by increasingly liberal trade agreements, 
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represent a formidable lobby for global economies of scale. Global networks of non 
governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society activists have organized as a form 
of counter power (c.f. Diebert 2002; Raboy and Landry 2005; Sassen 2006).  These 
increasingly organized and professionalized stakeholder networks bypass the 
representative apparatus of the national government and further undermine the idea of 
national sovereignty over communication regulation.  
 
Digital Technologies 
In addition to their transnational scope, digital technologies challenge 
communication governance by virtue of the following attributes: the convergence of 
broadcasting, telecommunications and computing technologies; the reconstitution of the 
relationship between users and producers; a technical architecture that minimizes choking 
points; and the perception that internet technologies are inherently democratic.   
 Digital technologies are said to represent a convergence of technologies in that 
virtually all forms of existing media content are accessible through the internet. Thus, 
while the world wide web diffuses its own unique forms of media content, it also acts as 
carriage to the contents of what have been traditionally thought of as the specific sectors 
of telecommunications, broadcasting, radio, film, music and computing (including, for 
example, software and videogames). Furthermore, the internet supports both point-to-
mass communication, following the model of broadcasting, and point-to-point 
communication, as does telecommunications (Raboy and Shtern 2005). This juxtaposes, 
and often brings into conflict, differing traditions of media regulation. This form of 
mediated communication does not meet any of the existing sector-specific governance 
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criteria. At the same time, any attempt to combine together the distinct governance 
regimes that apply to different existing forms of technology mediated communication 
inevitably results in conflicts and contradictions. This makes it difficult to develop an 
overarching approach to the governance of converged or ‘everything over internet 
protocol (IP)’ communication. 
Digital technologies challenge communication governance by virtue of their 
reconstitution of the user/producer relationship. A common perception is that the 
interactive attributes and relatively low barriers to entry (in comparison to broadcast 
media, for example) empower users as producers and create a form of communication 
which, rather than hierarchal, can be described as ‘flat’ or ‘open’. This challenge to the 
gate-keeping role of institutional production is argued to undermine the possibility that 
communication mediated by digital technologies can be ‘controlled’ to the same extent as 
analog communication technologies such as broadcasting.  
The end-to-end principle of the internet- the idea that intelligence is built into the 
end devices rather than the network itself- has been argued to leave few choke points at 
which gate keeping could even occur. “Information wants to be free” (c.f. Brand 1987),  
it is often put. Packet-switched communication across distributed networks allows 
information to seamlessly adjust the route it takes to arrive at its destination when 
obstructions are encountered (Barney 2000). Communication would thus, only be routed 
around control, leading many to determine that internet technologies are unregulatable.  
Furthermore, internet technologies have tended to be seen as self-governing. The 
end-to-end principle, after all, meant that values such as untrammeled free expression, 
community and democracy were embedded into the technology itself. Descriptions of the 
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internet from the 1990s and early 21st century often adopted the form of anthropological 
field notes (Goldsmith and Wu 2006) and were thickly laced with territorial, particularly 
frontier metaphors (Barney 2000; c.f. Reinhold 1993). In cyberspace- a term imported 
from the novels of the science fiction writer William Gibson to describe life online- such 
commentators saw the possibility of a libertarian utopia. The values embedded into 
internet technology were argued to be, in the words of one infamous proponent, “more 
humane and fair than the world your governments have made before” (Barlow 1996). 
 
Cyberspaces?: Internet and Global Governance 
The incompatibility of digital technologies with the very idea of government 
sovereignty was a preoccupation- most often expressed in terms of the decline of the 
nation state and the emergence of new post-territorial forms of global governance- that 
overlapped the work of globalization and internet regulation scholars in the late 1990s 
and early 21st century.  
One American jurist characterized the internet as “insensitive to geographic 
distinctions”.4 In the landmark ACLU v. Reno case the American Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stevens wrote that because it is “located in no particular geographical location 
but available to anyone, everywhere […] no single organization controls any membership 
on the web, nor is there any centralized point”.5 In light of the impacts of globalization 
and digital technologies, many came to the same conclusion as Nicholas Negroponte, co-
                                                
4 969 F. Supp 170-171 (SDNY 1997). 
5 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
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founder of MIT’s Media Lab, that the ‘borderless’ type of communication facilitated by 
the internet means that “the internet cannot be regulated” .6 
Backed by the premise that networked digital communication technologies were 
central protagonists in the incubation of a new social, economic and political order (c.f. 
Castells 1996) Negroponte rejoined other technologists such as Esther Dyson (1997) and 
various globalization scholars (cf. Strange 1996; Ohmae 1995) in concluding that the 
nation state had become “irrelevant”.7 “This new revolution in information and 
communications technologies destroys the idea of territorial sovereignty”, French author 
and diplomat Jean-Marie Guehenno wrote in 1997. 
American jurists Johnson and Post agreed and proposed in 1996 that “any effort 
to map local regulation and physical boundaries onto cyberspace are likely to prove 
futile” (p. 1372). They argued instead for recognition of a new form of sovereignty 
decoupled from territorial claims: “a new boundary, made up of screens and passwords 
that separate the virtual world from the ‘real world’ of atoms” (p. 1367). The shared 
values and self-governing ethos of “cyberspace” led to a great deal of enthusiasm for the 
idea that virtual communities could be endowed with sovereignty rights in the same way 
that territorially defined communities are. 
Subsequent policy developments arguably reified these claims. The Clinton 
Administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce and the European Union 
                                                
6 Negroponte’s comments cited from Higgins and Azhar (1996), but see generally Negroponte (1995). See  
also Goldmsith and Wu (2006);  Barney (2000) and Geist (2003) for discussion of the juridical, political 
and populist foundations of the view that internet regulation would be impossible. See Wellman’s (2004) 
programmatic reflection on 10 years of internet research for discussion of the extent to which what he calls 
the  ‘first age’ of internet research was similarly “often unsullied by data and informed only by conjecture 
and anecdotal evidence” (124), with the result being mainly utopian but occasionally dystopian treatments 
that either way tended to lack perspective and succumb to “presentism” and “parochialism”. 
7 As above Negroponte comments cited from Higgins and Azhar (1996). See also Negroponte 1995. On the 
globalization and global governance literature that weighs in on the question of “are states still important?” 
see Raboy and Mawani (forthcoming) See also Calabrese 1999.   
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Ministerial Declaration on Global Information Networks, both released in 1997, as well 
as the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) 1999 
New Media Decision, all opposed government regulation of the internet (see Clinton and 
Gore 1997; EU 1997; CRTC 1999). 
Against this backdrop, a series of standards-making bodies, populated by 
engineers and technologists and orchestrated by a core group of internet “founding 
fathers”, were meanwhile making decisions about the functioning and development of the 
internet.8  In this sense, the internet was less unregulated than it was self-regulated 
through this ‘private technical management’. The view that the internet was somehow 
immune to control by governments was thus premised on ignorance of the fact that self-
regulation “rarely exists without some relationship to the state” (Verhulst 2003, 144; see 
also Price and Verhulst 2005) and indeed of the extent to which the US Government in 
particular, but also the European Commission, became embroiled in controversies that 
were emerging in the “private technical management” of the internet in the late 1990s.9  
Such arguments about unregulatibilty of the internet and about its role in the 
decline of the state overlooked (or else intentionally drew attention away from) the fact 
that the internet is a built environment. The democratic values that were argued to be part 
of its essence were embedded into the network through its design and management. 
Regulation of the type identified with government interventions linked to claims of 
national sovereignty may not have been commonplace or seemed likely to commentators.  
But, the democratic values that so many saw as embedded into the internet had to flow in 
                                                
8 Including the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 
Internet Society (ISOC). See Mueller (2002); Paré (2003) and Goldsmith and Wu (2006) for overviews of 
these various bodies, their mandates, relationships, and back-stories.  
9 Discussed in Appendix 1 of this thesis.  
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somewhere. Concerns were raised that “negotiations among actors in the public and 
private sectors may be giving rise to a potential weakening of effective public control 
over the design and terms and conditions of access and use of new electronic networks 
and services” (Mansell 1996, 188). Indeed, governments were concerned about this too.  
The initial round of non-intervention on the part of governments was fueled by 
what is best encapsulated as technology-deterministic hype about the internet (see 
Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Barney 2000). As the penetration, value and influence of the 
internet increased dramatically, the non-interventionist approach was quickly eclipsed by 
a more hands-on approach to internet policy development (Geist 2003) and by a series of 
coordinated efforts to constrain the actions of various stakeholders through the regulation 
of intermediaries and the application of existing legal frameworks to online behavior (See 
Goldsmith and Wu 2006).  
 
Internet as mass communication 
The internet was not created to be a mass medium of communication. Pointing out 
that, in 1969, there were 200 people connected at 21 nodes, “The ARPANET”, Milton 
Mueller (2002, 74) writes, “was not the internet”.  The ARPANET was, Mueller 
continues, “an experimental backbone of leased lines connecting research scientists in 
university, military and industry sites”. Funded by the US Defense Department’s 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the purpose of the ARPANET was, Mueller (ibid) 
continues, to “facilitate time sharing on mainframe computers”.   
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimates that there were 
1,542,000,000 global internet users as of 2008 and that, since 2007, there have been more 
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internet users in the world than fixed-line telephones.10 In many OECD countries, more than 
two-thirds of households had broadband subscriptions by 2007. In Korea for example, more 
than 90% of households had broadband internet connections by 2005.11  The specifics of 
these statistics are less important than the essential point that they underline:  whatever the 
ARPANET was created to be, it has grown in terms of its use and influence into a medium 
of mass communication. Social media platforms connect neighbours and families separated 
by continents. Online news sources ranging from the Huffington Post to the blogs of 
individuals (c.f. Elmer et al 2007) dramatically influence political affairs.  Internet content, 
in other words, can now be described in the terms that Raboy (2004a) uses to explain how 
the regulation of broadcasting is justified:  “public discourse and communication that takes 
place in a particular moral and ethical environment”’ (see also Raboy 2010). In particular, 
the internet is a crucial platform for inter-cultural dialogue, for the exercise of citizenship 
and for the promotion and protection of cultural diversity- contributions that are 
fundamental to social life in a globalized world.    
Through voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephony and internet broadcasting 
services, the internet is increasingly taking over functions of other information and 
communication technologies. Education, government and a variety of other public 
services are offered over the internet. Digital technologies are central to work and 
commerce in modern society but also to entertainment, cultural production and creativity 
(see Lessig 2004; 2008; Benkler 2006). Perhaps nowhere is this ubiquity and mainstream 
status more apparent than in the way that blogs, youtube videos and social media were used 
                                                
10 Source: The International Telecommunication Union: “ITU Key Global Telecom Indicators for the 
World Telecommunication Service Sector”.  http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom99.html 
11 Source: OECD Broadband Portal, document 1d: “Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants (Dec. 
2008)” http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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in the campaign of US President Barack Obama.  Indeed, it is significant that point 1 of 
Obama’s technology policy platform was : “Ensure the Full and Free Exchange of Ideas 
through an Open Internet and Diverse Media Outlets” (Obama’08 n.d.). 
Regulation of mass communication is justified by normative as well as technical 
dimensions. Radio was not created to be a medium of mass communication either; its initial 
regulation was dominated by specialists and focused on technical considerations such as 
frequency allocation and standard setting (c.f. Barendt 1993). But broadcasting grew beyond 
the grasp of the network of engineers, hobbyists and specialists who created and nurtured it 
and the communication that it supported became intertwined with public life and discourse. 
Thus, normative regulations were developed alongside technical ones. Normative 
broadcasting regulations were developed because of the ubiquity and influence of mass 
communication. These were justified as being in the public interest because, the prospects 
for democracy in a society no longer suited to resolving political issues through face-to-face 
communication are contingent upon mass communication, in particular, on the protection of 
vulnerable values and social groups within it and the extent to which its public character is 
insulated from capture by the interests of the state and private power-holders (Raboy 2004a, 
2010; Hoffmann-Riem 1996; Tambini and Verholst 2000; Peters 1989).  
 The spread of digital technologies and their linkages to globalization have made 
the public interest in the regulation of mass communication more complex. The internet 
facilitates a type of borderless communication; there is no guarantee that the source of the 
message resides within the same jurisdiction as its receiver. However, both technical and 
normative regulation of global communication has existed since at least the introduction 
of the telegraph. Dating back to the League of Nations, international organizations have 
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dealt with coordination and standards setting issues related to cross-border implications of 
various information and communication technologies including: the telegraph (c.f. 
Nordenstreng 2005); telecommunications (c.f. MacLean 2003), radio and wireless spectrum 
attribution and satellite broadcasting (cf. Price 2002; Grant and Wood 2004).   
Normative regulation of communication at the global level has proven more 
controversial. During the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, free 
expression was originally framed not as an autonomous right in and of itself, but as part 
of a larger right, the right to freedom of information. However, political squabbling 
between western countries and the Soviet bloc about whether the freedom of information 
meant ‘the freedom to impose cultural imperialism’ or the ‘freedom to practice 
censorship and propaganda’ (this was not particularly a citizen-focused discussion) 
quickly escalated (Raboy and Shtern 2010a). The result of this intractable polarized 
debate was that freedom of expression emerged as the only element of communication 
where there was enough common ground to form the basis of a universal human right 
(see Binder 1952; Kortteinen, Myntti and Hannikainen 1999). By the 1960s, efforts to 
buttress and expand upon freedom of expression began to be renewed. French public 
servant Jean D’Arcy (1969) is credited with launching the concept of a right to 
communicate in a paper written for the European Broadcasting Union.  The idea would 
elicit discussion, refinement and several more rounds of polarized and intractable debate 
within UNESCO. By the 1980s enthusiasm for discussing, let alone formalizing, globally 
constituted normative principles for the regulation of communication had understandably 
ebbed (see Padovani 2005; Raboy and Shtern 2010a).12  
                                                
12 Notable subsequent efforts to bridge the ideological divides that define efforts to establish globally 
applicable normative principles for communication regulation include the joint ITU/UNESCO (1995) paper 
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But, contrary to the decline of state thesis, governments were never simply going 
to stand aside and relinquish their sovereign responsibilities and rights to enforce their 
laws. Commentators began to see globalization and digital technologies as the basis of a 
regulatory regime rather than as an obstacle to one. Marsden (2000, 13), for example 
wrote that “the internet is global in scope and its societal and political impact, and thus its 
governance […] will equally become global. The internet can be regulated and will be 
regulated”.  Understanding how global internet governance is emerging and the role of 
the public interest within it necessitates a greater unpackaging of two issues that have 
tended to receive essentialist treatment in discussion of the regulation of the internet: 
digital technologies and global governance.  
 
Unpackaging digital technologies and global governance 
 The emergence of the internet as a medium of mass communication is being 
accompanied by a shift in thinking about its regulation. In particular, about the linkages 
between the largely private basis of its governance, and the normative dimensions of the 
public communication it supports. Within the internet governance literature, critiques 
emerged that the interests of governments, intellectual property lobbyists and the internet 
technical elite were politicizing technological management functions that could and 
should be apolitical, neutral and facilitative  (c.f. Mueller 2002). Scholars working in 
what Paré (2003) labels the commons school argued that the internet can be defined as 
                                                                                                                                            
“The right to communicate at what price?” and the report of the UNESCO (1998) World Commission on 
Cultural Development.  
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one singular object and coalesced around calls for imposing top-down forms of 
governance.13 
Technology, in the philosophical terms of Andrew Feenberg (1999, 131), can 
have a “legislative authority” that tends to be masked by discourse about its neutral and 
apolitical nature. The work of a series of scholars, Stanford Law Professor Lawrence 
Lessig most prominent among them, has illustrated how this is particularly true in regard 
to internet technology.14 Lessig’s work underlines and problematizes the legislative 
authority of internet technologies by arguing that the values that are embedded into the 
code or architecture of the internet function to regulate its use. This approach has been 
the basis of a fundamental challenge to the view that the internet is not subject to 
regulation.  
Lessig argues that the premise that the internet is not, or cannot be, regulated 
misunderstands and misrepresents regulation. Regulation stems, in Lessig’s view, not 
only from law, but from the interaction of four separate factors: laws, social norms the 
market and architecture or code. By code, Lessig (2006, 121) means  
The instructions embedded into the software or hardware that makes cyberspace 
what it is. This code is the “built environment” of social life in cyberspace. It is its 
architecture.  
In this sense, internet technical regulation is also normative regulation. Making 
decisions that shape the technological code or architecture of the internet is, in Lessig’s 
view, both an act of regulation and an exercise of power. Rather than a benign or 
                                                
13 See Chapter 3 in Paré (2003) for his comprehensive overview of this literature.  
14 Lessig and his more immediate contemporaries will be the focus of this literature review. Other 
important contributions to the debate over the political implications of internet architecture and design 
include: Trudel (2000); Reidenberg (1998; 2005) and Mitchell (1995).  
  
32 
inherently democratic regulator, internet technology is, in Lessig’s view, less transparent 
and fair and more open to capture by powerful interests than other possible internet 
regulatory approaches grounded in social norms, the market or law. For Lessig (2006: 78) 
the configuration of the architecture of the internet and its contingency for being 
otherwise is power.  
The conditions that led many to celebrate the libertarian freedom and democratic 
values of cyberspace had little, according to Lessig, to do with the nature or essence of 
internet technologies. Indeed the fact that cyberspace proved so malleable to the 
embedding of those values only suggests that the technology could be recoded with other 
values. The extent to which code is law on the internet means that technology can be 
regulated to increase regulatability. In this sense, Lessig proposes that the potential for 
more powerful actors such as governments and commercial interests to apply normative 
regulation to internet technologies is, rather than an impossibility, a clear and present 
threat.  “In answer to those who say the net cannot be regulated”, Lessig (2006: 151) 
argues that governments could easily take steps to transform existing internet architecture 
from unregulatable to regulatable. 
Goldsmith and Wu (2006) focus more specifically on two of the claims that 
emerged from the essentialist view of internet technology problematized by Lessig. They 
examine the notion that the internet is creating a borderless world as well as the claim 
that the internet would facilitate the emergence of the sort of post-territorial order 
forecast by Johnson and Post (1996) and others. Goldsmith and Wu systematically 
discuss how real institutions are evolving to use real world laws, as well as pressures 
associated with norms and markets, to effectively regulate the internet. In the process, 
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they dissect the claim that borderless communication is unregulatable or unregulated. 
Goldsmith and Wu problematize the decline of the state thesis by illustrating that the 
effect of the internet on the power of nation states is neither drastic nor uniform.  They 
argue that nation states can use national law to protect and enforce constraints upon the 
impact that communication has within their borders, regardless of the jurisdiction of 
origin of that communication. This can be accomplished because, in their view, the 
mediation of behaviors and services over the internet creates an intermediary that might 
not have otherwise existed. Goldsmith and Wu also point out that the enforcement of 
rules of any kind related to the use of the internet relies on powers of investigation, 
seizure and punishment- public goods monopolized by nation states.  So-called 
‘borderless’ internet phenomena like eBay often succeed they suggest, not due to their 
ability to skirt regulations or some uniform altruistic characteristic embedded in the 
technology and the internet community, but precisely because they are backed by the 
threat that nation states can force people to pay their bills and honour their contracts.  
Rather than a challenge to the nation state, the internet has, in other words, come 
to reinforce its value in new ways.  But unevenly so, as smaller states have more trouble 
influencing the behavior of intermediaries. For example, whereas Yahoo! may modify its 
business model in order to conform with the laws of France and stay in the large French 
marketplace, it is doubtful that Yahoo! would make the same sort of concessions to stay 
in a more limited market of the size of say, Finland,  let alone Morocco or Senegal. 
Furthermore, where public goods such as the predictable rule and enforcement of law by 
police and courts are not present, internet regulation is very difficult. Goldsmith and Wu 
cite the refusal of eBay to enter the Russian market as an example.     
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Thus, rather than being irrelevant to the regulation of borderless communication, 
Goldsmith and Wu (2006, 165) argue that governments are the central protagonists. 
“Whether the issue is online gambling, internet domain name governance or privacy 
law”, they observe, “governments are fighting one another to favor themselves using the 
traditional tools of international politics and international law”.  
These moves echo a similar debate within the globalization and global governance 
literatures to problematize the presentism and overly deterministic thinking at the root of 
much of the narrative of the demise of the state (D. Held 1999). Sassen (2006) observes a 
tendency for commentators to approach global governance as “international law” that 
emerges from harmonization- through conflicts, law or force- of different national legal 
frameworks rather than to consider “the formation of global regimes”. To Sassen (2006, 
268) global law is “emergent”, “autonomous” and “partial” but is unique rather than 
synthetic. By restricting evaluations of global governance to the prospects for, and power 
dynamics of, overlapping national interests, the “international law” view lends itself to 
unqualified support for the decline of the state thesis. Sassen (2006, 192) suggests that the 
narrative of the decline of the state also ignores the internal transformations and 
reorganizations that occur as the state manages what she calls “the shift of public 
regulatory functions to the private sector where they emerge as specialized corporate 
services, accounting, legal and other such ‘maintenance’ services”. Sassen argues that the 
devolution of state power through private governance arrangements is based on a “utility 
logic” that tends to shift regulation from serving the public good to serving a private 
good. “As efficiency becomes the objective”, Sassen writes (196), “it tends to replace or 
function as a stand in for the public interest”.  
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The view of the regulatibility of the internet, and the place of governments within it, 
arguably came full circle in 2002 with the publication in “Foreign Affairs” of an article 
entitled “Governing the Internet”. Its author was Zoe Baird, head of the Markle 
Foundation and a former Clinton administration nominee for attorney general. Writing 
that  “although governments do not all share the same values, they are the only 
institutions that can provide stability and a place for debate over what public values need 
to be protected”, Baird (2002, 2) insists that “government participation in regulating the 
internet is necessary”. “These issues”, Baird (ibid) continues, “are significant policy 
questions that require democratic resolution, not just technical matters that can be left to 
experts”. Baird (2002, 4) used the platform of a decidedly mainstream venue to argue that 
“the internet has become part of the mainstream, and therefore, mainstream governmental 
institutions will be expected to step in and protect people from harm and encourage 
innovation”.  
The sum effect was a challenge to the unregulatable internet technology and decline 
of the state theses based on the principles that:  
• internet technology is embedded with values and politics,  
• states can and do regulate global internet mediated communication according to 
their own sovereign interest; 
• states exercise agency over the global order through their internal 
transformations, in particular those related to their devolution of public 
regulatory functions to private global regimes that bury normative impacts within 
service and efficiency mandates. 
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The implications of this shifting perspective are that private technical management 
should not be approached as something distinct from the question of the regulatibility of 
the internet or the power of nation states. Instead, over the course of the evolution of the 
internet, regulatory functions have shifted from the sphere of public governance into the 
sphere of private technical management where they have been walled off from 
widespread public and government participation in decision making.  
  
Internet and Public Interest 
The typology presented at the beginning of this chapter suggests that the public 
interest in communication is neither uniform nor static. The conceptual unpackaging of 
global governance and digital technologies reviewed above has underlined the extent to 
which normative regulation of the internet is possible and is occurring. But what do we 
actually know, in practice, about the public interest in the normative regulation of the 
internet? What notion of the public interest is being used to justify decisions that are 
being made in the normative and technical governance of the internet and to assess those 
decisions by commentators and policy analysts? How does the public interest in global 
internet governance fit within and/or suggest the need to modify existing typologies of 
the public interest?  The balance of this chapter is devoted to the construction of a 
theoretical framework in which such questions can be meaningfully addressed.  
Influenced by Lessig’s model of internet regulation and its implications, the work 
of a group of scholars is collectively developing a series of normative claims about the 
public interest principles that ought to be considered alongside efficiency in the global 
governance of the internet. Lessig himself (2006, 4), for instance, argues for the need to 
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develop a constitution of cyberspace. By this he means: “not just a legal text but a way of 
life that structures and constrains social and legal power to the end of protecting 
fundamental values”.  For Zittrain (2008) the internet should adapt to new tasks, be easily 
mastered by non-experts and promote modification and improvement of existing 
architectures rather than development of new ones. In a similar vein, Benkler (2006, 385) 
argues that practices of non-market information production, individually free creation, 
and cooperative peer production can be linked to “gains in autonomy, democracy, 
justice”. “The network environment makes possible a new modality of organizing 
production”, Benkler (2006, 60) writes. What he calls “commons based peer production” 
is defined as  
radically de-centralized, collaborative and non-proprietary; based on sharing 
resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals 
who cooperate with each other without relying on either market symbols or 
management commands. 
Of these approaches, Benkler’s view is the most developed. 
Commons based peer production is in Benkler’s view, innately related to a certain 
kind of public interest: the public sphere. In Benkler’s model, the term the public sphere 
is “used in reference to the set of practices that members of a society use to communicate 
about matters they understand to be of public concern and that potentially require 
collective action or recognition” (177).  
These are significant developments where the public interest in communication is 
concerned. The understandings of internet regulation that were dominant during the 
1990s and early part of the 20th century led Verhulst (2002) to describe a “paradigm 
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shift” in the way communication is governed. The actions of governments of the day 
were turning discourses about unregulatable digital technology and declining state power 
into self-fulfilling prophecies. If not broken, Price (2002) observed that this cycle would 
lead to a “collapse” of the very idea that decisions made in the governance of 
communication centre on their implications on the public interest. The claims Benkler, 
Lessig and Zittrain forward about how the public interest in internet regulation should be 
understood underlines the evolution in discourses about sovereignty and the regulatability 
of internet technology.  The paradigm, to reuse Verhulst’s turn of phrase, is again 
shifting. Rather than collapsing, debate over the question of how the regulation of 
communication can and should be justified by the public interest is, through the work of 
these and other important commentators, moving from the periphery to the centre of 
efforts to understand and theorize global internet regulation.  
As general theories of the public interest in internet governance, however, there 
are gaps in, and limitations to, the approach of Lessig and his contemporaries.15 There are 
gaps between the normative frameworks developed and the empirical characteristics of 
actually existing internet governance; between the unabashed ‘global issue through an 
American perspective’ mode through which the subject has been engaged and the global 
dynamics involved in internet governance; and between the public interest in internet 
governance and the public interest in communication more generally. I review each 
below.  
 
 
                                                
15 In the 2nd version of  Code 2.0 Lessig invites readers to view his work alongside the books of Zittrain, 
Goldmsith and Wu and Benkler as a school of thought.  
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Normative v. Empirical 
Lessig and his contemporaries present sound and compelling theoretical 
arguments about the public interest principles that should challenge efficiency as the 
primary objective of internet governance and, in the process, transform private technical 
management into a more public, accountable form of governance.  
However, as described in the insightful literature review of Paré (2003), the utility 
of these arguments is restricted by their speculative accounts and prescriptive, normative 
focus. These characteristics, Paré (2003, 157) writes, ensure that the work of Lessig and 
his contemporaries can “explain how the technical architecture of the internet may 
influence regulatory processes and the promulgation of certain types of social order”, but 
that “it cannot explain why particular changes manifest themselves or why certain groups 
of actors may succeed in exerting greater influence than others over how the process of 
change is manifested”.  “Despite recognizing the process of value allocation as being 
inherently political”, Paré (ibid) writes,  “Lessig’s  essentially linear view of change 
offers no means of interpreting how social actors involved in such processes make 
choices, or how they assess the legitimacy of emergent changes.” In short, Paré (2003, 
57) insists that “these shortcomings highlight the need for an empirical analysis of what 
social actors actually do in contrast to prescriptive and/or ideologically laden speculation 
about what they should do”.  Proposing normative principles that ought to form the basis 
of decision making in, and assessment of, internet governance is, in other words, separate 
from evaluating how the public interest is being defined and treated by such processes.  
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American v. Global 
 This literature also attends to the global basis of questions of internet regulation in 
a very particular, ultimately partial way. Lessig, Goldsmith, Benkler, and Wu are all 
American and/or American-based scholars. It is also noteworthy that they are American 
lawyers16. As such, they tend to come to the question of regulating global communication 
from the perspective of the American legal system. This is in and of itself not particularly 
a fatal flaw. The American legal system is, after all, the dominant legal influence in the 
global governance of the internet and much of the related debate has centred around 
American policy. Furthermore, as Goldsmith and Wu point out, the market power of the 
United States in internet mediated services assures that multi-national companies are 
heavily incentivized to conform with American law. In addition, the close linkages 
between American companies and officials and the technological and institutional 
development of the internet leads many in the United States to claim a sense of 
ownership over the internet.  But, these books are written from the perspectives of 
American jurists for largely American audiences. Lessig (2006, 8), for instance is clear 
that when he asks if “we” are up to the challenges posed by internet governance, he 
means Americans.  In this sense, Lessig’s work and the work of Benkler and also Mueller 
represents more of an examination of the interactions between the US perspective and a 
global issue than it does a comprehensive examination of the global dimensions of 
internet governance.  
                                                
16 This comment about the tendency to view the global through the lens of the United States also most 
certainly applies to the work of Milton Mueller. Though Mueller is not a lawyer and his focus and approach 
should be seen as distinct from the Lessig School, he is unquestionably a leading figure in scholarly 
discussions about the Internet Domain Name System (DNS) and the sub-field of internet governance. (see 
Mueller 2002).   
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Despite being one of the most important recent contributions to the globalization 
literature on the role of the state, Goldmsith and Wu’s book addresses the global in 
anecdotal respect.   Illusions of a Borderless World addresses a variety of interactions 
between nation states and the global dimensions of internet governance: France, China, 
Saudi Arabia and of course, the United States. But, typical of its grounding in legal 
scholarship and the conventional mode of legal argument, it does so anecdotally, in 
support of more conceptual arguments about the relationship between “The State” and 
“The Internet”. In the process, we discover interesting details about France, China and 
other countries but there is no claim made that these countries represent all or even the 
most important actors in global internet governance. Sassen (2006, 325) underlines that 
“we can think of digital assemblages as a sort of theoretical frontier for understanding the 
character of the global”. There are crucial insights to be made on the basis of the study of 
the global dynamics shaping internet governance. But to what extent does this literature 
offer insight into the global dynamics shaping internet governance? In regard to the 
crucial question of the global basis of internet communication and its governance, this 
literature- despite providing insight about what the state as a unitary actor can do as well 
as about what certain specific states are doing- fails to provide a comprehensive picture 
of who the global is in global internet governance and how global governance works in 
the internet domain. 
 Some form of a natural corrective to this blind spot is already occurring. As 
internet governance has emerged as an increasingly important topic for global debate, a 
series of non-US based scholars have emerged as active participants and influential 
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voices (c.f. Kleinwächter 2004a; 2004b; Hoffmann 2007).17 This trans-national dialogue 
is important and is contributing to a more globally-based approach to the study of internet 
governance. These developments underscore broad recognition of the fundamentally 
global character of the internet and its governance. Such efforts must be supported in 
parallel by research programs that more explicitly confront the challenge of theorizing the 
dynamics, characteristics and implications that define the global element of global 
internet governance.  
 
Communication v. Technology 
 Much of the so-called internet governance literature adopts a narrow, instrumental 
focus on largely technical processes such as DNS management and standards setting (see 
Paré 2003).  The work of the Lessig school operationalizes a sophisticated critique of 
over-simplistic, over-deterministic understandings of the relationship between internet 
technology and governance. It also imports broader fundamental questions about the 
governance of society in the age of internet including free speech (Goldsmith and Wu 
2006); labour and production (Benkler 2006) and creativity (Lessig 2004; 2008 and 
Zittrain 2008).   
 However, this approach too, is often addressed narrowly to the particularities of 
the technologies of the internet. Under-theorized is the extent to which broader social 
processes of communication are shaped by the technologies of the internet, but also by 
                                                
17 As a reflection, in 2006, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GIGANET) was formed as 
a broadly international scholarly association focused on internet governance research. There has also been a 
certain degree of cross-fertilization between global and American perspectives. For instance, Jeanatte 
Hoffman- a German-born professor at the London School of Economics- was recently appointed to the 
scientific committee of the Syracuse University Internet Governance Project. Leading American internet 
governance expert Milton Mueller was, conversely, appointed to the faculty of Delft University. 
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various other platforms of mass communication and debates about their regulation as 
well. Lessig (2006, 9) suggests that the internet can be just another medium of 
communication, but that it can also support a unique richer experience called cyberspace. 
Goldsmith and Wu (2006, 73) essentially dismiss the claims about cyberspace.  But they 
also distinguish between what they call “the feuding worlds of media and technology” 
(18).  Zittrain’s (2008) contribution to this school of thought expands the code is law 
framework beyond the internet to consideration of a series of digital information and 
communication technologies including some, such as the personal digital video recorder, 
that link conventional media with internet. As evidenced by his prescriptive conceptual 
construct of generative technology however, Zittrain’s faith and attention is with the 
design of the devices that connect to the internet rather than the impact that emergence of 
the internet is having on the public interest in communication.  
 This boundary between mass communication and the public interest in the 
internet is most apparently (and interestingly) drawn in Benkler’s treatment of the public 
sphere. The linkage between the public sphere and communication governance is not 
unique to the new media nor the scholarship of Benkler. Public service broadcasting 
(PSB), which Raboy (1995) defines as: “a set of objectives and practices based on 
democratic principles and the view that broadcasting can be a means of social and 
cultural development” (p.10) is, in many respects, the personification of the link between 
communication governance and the public sphere (Garnham 1990).  
 The public sphere has also been integrated into the critical media studies and PEC 
research programs. For Mosco and Reddick (1997, 21) to give an example, the public 
sphere is “set forward as a set of principles, including democracy, equality, participation 
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and citizenship”. The utility of the notion of the public sphere is that it encapsulates a set 
of practices that, bound up with commodification, conceptualize a certain, specific,  
highly normative understanding of the public’s interest in communication (Garnham 
1990; Mosco and Reddick 1997).  
In Benkler’s view, the internet-mediated public sphere could be magnitudes more 
dynamic than that of the traditional mass media public sphere. Yet, despite the relative 
gains made in embedding the priorities of the public sphere into the governance of 
broadcasting through the notion of public service, Benkler argues that the legacy of 
broadcast regulation represents a threat rather than opportunity to the internet-mediated 
public sphere.  Viewing traditional media, in particular commercial broadcasters and 
Hollywood as the vanguard of efforts to use the commodification power of intellectual 
property rights in ways that will enclose common resources and curtail the peer-to-peer 
commons based production that he argues to be bound up in the hopes for the internet 
mediated public, Benkler (385) argues that “law would have to achieve a great deal in 
order to replicate the 20th century model industrial information economy in the new 
technical-social context”. In his view, none of which would positive. For Benkler, Law 
would have to: curtail fundamental technical characteristics of computer networks; 
extinguish fundamental human motivations and practices of sharing and cooperation; 
shift the market away from cheaper general purpose to more controlled and predictable 
devices; and squelch wireless and other emerging technologies. Benkler’s view is rooted 
in philosophical assumptions about politics and technology. “There is more freedom to be 
found through opening up institutional spaces for voluntary individual and cooperative 
action”, Benkler (2006, 22) writes,  “than there are in intentional public action through 
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the state”. In short, though Benkler argues that hopes for the realization of the internet-
mediated public sphere are crucially bound up in what he calls “the battle over the 
institutional ecology of the digital environment”, the struggle for the public sphere takes 
the form of resistance to the efforts of the incumbents to use regulation to enclose the 
commons. In this sense, Benkler seeks not rejoinder with the gains made by the public 
sphere in the broadcasting realm but a radical disjuncture wherein media and internet 
practices remain separate. Thus, Benkler’s public sphere remains rooted in perceived 
particularities about the technologies of the internet and what they could accomplish for 
the public sphere.  
Benkler’s public sphere is one in-depth example of how communication over the 
internet tends, in other words, to be viewed by the Lessig school as a radical disjunture 
rather than as part of an existing ecology of mass media and a historical continuum of 
efforts to determine the most appropriate role for mass communication in society.  
 
Critical Media Studies 
The critical media studies research programme, in particular through the political 
economy of communication research tradition, would seem to be ideally placed to 
complement the work of Lessig and other internet regulation scholars by filling the three 
significant knowledge gaps outlined above. 
In regard to the normative vs. empirical gap, critical media scholars have 
historically been engaged in ongoing policy debates around issues such as public service 
broadcasting, the concentration of media ownership, and universal access to 
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telecommunication, offering trenchant critical analysis while remaining close enough to 
the issues to contribute to policy debates.18  
Regarding the need to internationalize the research program around global 
internet governance, political economy of communication is also argued to have “always 
been particularly well suited to examinations of international issues” (McChesney, Wood 
and Foster 1998, 11). PEC scholars were particularly effective through their analyses of, 
and interventions, in the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) 
debates at UNESCO in the 1970’s and 1980’s (c.f. Nordenstreng 1986; UNESCO 2004).   
Furthermore, global media policy (GMP) (c.f Raboy and Padovani 2008) is an emerging 
research area that represents an effort to reintegrate the critical media studies research 
programme within the contemporary communication governance framework that is 
increasingly being restructured by globalization. By developing more comprehensive, 
even if preliminary understandings of the global media policy environment, the GMP 
approach aims to contribute the sorts of empirical and conceptual understandings 
required “as progressive politics come to be redefined in keeping with the new political 
challenges of globalization” (Raboy 2007, 344). Based on the stance that the governance 
of global communication is a key structural component of globalization in general and of 
the emerging global governance regime (c.f. Raboy in 2002), the GMP research 
programme operates in dialogue with literatures on globalization and global governance. 
 Greater integration of the perspective of critical media studies into the scholarly 
dialogue on the regulation of the internet would assure that consideration is given to the 
public interest in communication as well as the public interest in the regulation of  
                                                
18 See Mosco’s (1996) broad and comprehensive survey of PEC research and its contributions as well as 
McChesney’s (2007) account of the “rise and fall” of the PEC programme and its policy relevance.  
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internet-based platforms and technologies. The view that the internet constitutes a radical 
disjuncture from other mass medias of communication is in stark contrast to the 
perspective of many communication scholars on the subject. For Raboy (2002, 131):  
The question of internet regulation illustrates some of the most important issues at 
the cutting edge of global communications policy. The powerful technology of the 
internet exacerbates many old problems related to communications policy at the 
national level and introduces new ones globally.  
Carey (1998, 34) writes that the internet is at the centre of what he calls  “a new media 
ecology”. Meaning, Sandra Braman wrote in 1995 (7) that, “as we attempt to make policy 
for the new technology of the internet we must at the same time remake policy for print, 
broadcast and common carriage”. 
The regulation of communication on the internet is, in this view, only one- albeit 
one fundamentally important- determinate of the status of communication in 
contemporary society. The critical communication studies perspectives suggests that 
decisions made in the governance of the internet fundamentally influence the governance 
of other media, but also that policy issues and regulatory responses related to the 
regulation of communication have been debated in various contexts and in regard to 
generations of new technical platforms for mass communication.  
The sum result is that the media and communication studies field should be 
particularly well placed to contribute to the emerging multi-disciplinary dialogue on the 
issues surrounding global internet governance and to contribute much needed analysis of 
the public interest implications of it. But treatment of internet governance from PEC has 
remained largely at the normative level and neglects the consensus forming in other 
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disciplines that the internet may indeed be regulated. As a result, few inroads have been 
made in applying the insights on the public interest in communication governance that 
were developed by PEC in regard to traditional media to a new media politics 
(McChesney 2007; Mansell 2004). Thus, a more significant overlap between the internet 
regulation and critical communication studies research programs contains the potential to 
enrich each.  
 
Problematic and Research Question 
As stated previously, the internet has emerged as a mainstream mass medium and 
as a legitimate subject for consideration within debates over the regulation of 
communication. This thesis asks how does the global debate on internet governance 
influence the public interest in communication? 
To return to the definition of the public interest cited in the beginning of this 
chapter, the evolving multi-stakeholder dialogue on the regulation of the internet has yet 
to meaningfully address what notion of the public interest in communication is emerging 
in practice, as “the primary decision-making guidepost for policymakers” (Napoli 2001, 
72). Nor does the research into global internet governance operationalize a public-interest 
based assessment of actually existing policy making.  
Writing in 1997, Boyle offered that “if we are to have some alternatives to the 
jurisprudence of digital libertarianism we will have to offer a richer picture of internet 
politics than that of the coercive (but impotent) state and the neutral facilitating 
technology”. In the interim, a compelling theoretical debate has emerged about the 
regulatability of digital technologies and the conventional wisdoms about the decline of 
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the state in the context of globalization have shifted. Yet, our picture of internet politics is 
largely restricted to: argumentative accounts based on a series of essentially arbitrarily 
linked case studies from Goldsmith and Wu, Lessig and others; Paré’s (2003) case study 
of the politics surrounding the UK’s top level domain name; and Milton Mueller’s 
empirical work on and critical analysis of ICANN (2002).  A “richer” picture of global 
interenet govenance is called for that contributes additional empirical evidence about the 
interaction between state sovereignty and internet politics, and about the extent to which 
institutions and governments will accept the delineation between regulation by code and 
regulation by law (c.f. Paré 2003; McChesney 2007). Crucially, hypotheses about how 
discourses on technology and efficiency factor into how power is exercised in the 
allocation of internet resources remain largely untested.  
In sum, the literature on internet governance offers a conceptual framework for 
approaching the normative regulation of the internet but further empirical investigation 
into if,  and how, these models operate in practice is needed. As is further unpackaging of 
the concepts of global governance and of the linkages between technology and 
communication. Such a corrective, I argue, can be achieved through integrating the 
conceptual discussions of Lessig and other internet regulation scholars into the critical 
communication studies research program.  
Of particular importance to this synthesis of approaches are the efforts underway 
within the global media policy research area to develop an empirical approach to 
researching global governance. Global media policy research investigates the practices 
and institutional processes through which actors articulate their interests and engage in 
political contest over decision making related to the governance of media and 
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communication.19 Such activity can be said to be part of the global media policy domain 
when the issues, actors or institutions are active simultaneously or in close succession 
across the national and supra-national (regional, intergovernmental, etc.) levels. In this 
sense, global media policy is “multi-leveled”. It is also “multi-sectoral” in the sense that, 
for example, decisions that influence global communication governance are made 
through policies related to international trade and intellectual property as readily as they 
are in discussions about telecommunication policy, universal human rights or internet 
standards. Because what Raboy (2002) calls “the global media policy environment” is 
simply too vast a terrain to be approached through any one or series of studies, global 
media policy research is indiscriminately multi-leveled and multi-sectoral; insights 
gained through analysis localized to even one sector and one level contribute to filling in 
knowledge gaps related to the entire global environment (Raboy and Padovani 2008).  
 
Thesis Structure 
This framework is operationalized through a case study of the negotiations over 
an agreement on internet governance that occurred at the UN World Summit on the 
Information Society that were held between 2001-2005.   
In chapter 2, I present the research design and provide context to the subject of 
my case study. In chapter 3, I narrate the story of the case study. I discuss the emergence 
of the issues of internet governance at the WSIS and provide an in-depth accounting of 
the negotiations that followed. I operationalize Lawrence Lessig’s theory of “code is law” 
                                                
19 This definition draws on a text written by Raboy and Padovani (2008) to summarize the research project 
on “Mapping Global Media Policy” to which I am contributor. Thus, it reflects my perspective on the 
subject and I have been parti to the discussions through which it was developed. That said, of course I will 
be very clear when the words I use on the subject are not my own.  
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by explaining how various actors debated and ultimately reached conclusions about the 
boundaries between normative public policy issues and questions of technical regulation 
and management. Chapter 4 presents an overview of how the debate over global IG has 
evolved since the conclusion of the WSIS.  In Chapter 5, I use the case study to draw a 
series of conclusions about the actors and institutional characteristics that influenced the 
WSIS negotiations on IG. Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks about what the case 
study suggests about the public interest implications of this debate and then reflects on 
the programmatic implications for the media and communication studies research agenda.  
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-CHAPTER 2- 
Research Design, Case Study Overview and Background 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 This thesis will be focused on an in-depth case study (c.f. Yin 1989) of the 
negotiations over an agreement on internet governance that occurred at the United 
Nations World Summit on the Information Society.  This chapter will introduce the case 
study and review the existing literature on the WSIS. Chapter 1 reviewed the compelling 
theoretical perspectives that are emerging in response to questions about the regulation of 
the internet and the global governance of communication. It also underlined that 
comprehensive empirical assessments of these concepts are needed. This chapter will 
review the literature on the WSIS and suggest the questions raised by the problematic of 
this thesis were indeed in play during the WSIS.  From there, this chapter will explain the 
research design of this study as well as the processes through which data has been 
collected and analyzed. Presentation of this methodology will conclude with a reflexive 
assessment of its limitations and an attempt to anticipate some of the possible 
methodological issues that might be raised.  
 
The UN World Summit on the Information Society: Overview and Literature Review 
The World Summit on the Information Society was a two-phased United Nations 
Summit hosted by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Its participants 
included representatives from governments, the private sector and civil society 
organizations. The first summit was held in Geneva in 2003, the second in Tunis in 2005. 
The preparatory committee (PrepCom) meetings- the venue for formal discussion of 
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issues, resolutions and modalities of participation- began as early as 2001. The WSIS was 
initially devised as a framework for developing global policy that would contribute to 
extending the “digital revolution” across the “digital divide”.20 From the start however,  
participants seemed intent on pushing a whole series of broader concerns including the 
role of global policy in the control and management of the internet (see Kummer 2005). 
Rejection of the original narrow, prescriptive policy agenda can be attributed in part to 
the active participation of NGOs, academics and activists through the formal inclusion of 
civil society in the WSIS process (cf. Raboy and Landry, 2005) but also to the absence of 
existing institutional venues in which appropriate policy responses to public-interest 
concerns about issues such as the use and management of the internet could be discussed. 
The need to understand the challenges of internet governance was identified during the 
first phase of the WSIS as one of the most problematic concerns arising from the 
technological changes of the turn of the century. 
A great deal has been written about the WSIS.  The back-story of the Summit is 
covered in detail through: published accounts of the gradual emergence and taking shape 
of the summit (Stauffacher and Kleinwächter 2005; in particular the introduction); broad 
overviews of the general institutional modalities of UN World Summits and how they 
apply to the WSIS (Klein 2005b); and descriptive accounts of the development of 
structures for incorporating civil society actors into the WSIS (Raboy and Landry 2005).  
The evolution of the literature on the WSIS largely reflects the trajectory of the 
issue of global internet governance that is discussed in chapter 3.  That is to say that 
literature published during and around phase I treated the WSIS as a broad discussion of 
                                                
20 Quoted from:  The International Telecommunication Union,  “Basic Information about WSIS: Why a 
Summit on the Information Society”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/why.html. 
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information and communication policy but that the parameters of the WSIS literature, 
like the debate, narrowed over the course of phase II into more focused discussion of 
internet governance.  
 One important strain of the broader literature associated with Phase I is the 
connection between the WSIS and previous efforts at global governance of 
communication, in particular the NWICO debates at UNESCO during the 1970s and 
1980s (c.f. Padovani and Nordenstreng 2005; Mansell and Nordenstreng 2008; Pickard 
2007; Afonso 2005). This reflects the importance during the first phase of the WSIS of 
the issue of human rights in relation to the information society21 as well as the important 
discussions that occurred around the participation of the Communication Rights in the 
Information Society (CRIS) campaign (c.f. CRIS 2005; Hamelink 2002, 2003, 2004a; Ó 
Siochrú 2004c; Kuhlen 2004; Birdsall, McIver and Rasmussen. 2002; McIver, Birdsall , 
and Rasmussen 2003; McIver and Birdsall 2004; Raboy 2006). Commentators questioned 
the vision and ideologies underlying the summit itself (Zhao 2004; Pickard 2007; Moll 
and Shade 2004; Ó Siochrú 2004b), and in regard to the debate over internet governance 
in particular (Sarikakis 2004; McLaughlin and Pickard 2005).  Through working papers 
and blogs, research centres such as the Syracuse Univeristy-based Internet Governance 
Project (IGP) and the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) contributed resources to, and 
analysis of, WSIS issues on an ongoing basis. Commiserate with the spike in academic 
interest in the subject, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network was created in 
2006 to acknowledge and push forward the status of internet governance as an emerging 
subfield of inter-disciplinary academic research.  
                                                
21 c.f. the special edition of Revue Québécoise de Droit International entitled “Beyond WSIS: Incorporating 
Human Rights Perspectives into the Information Society Debate” (Lavoie and Leuprecht 2005) see also 
Jørgensen 2006.  
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 The coming to prominence of the internet governance issue around the conclusion 
of the Summit’s first phase was paralleled by a series of articles and reports on the 
subject (c.f. Dutton 2005; Klein 2005a; 2005b; Dugré 2005; Peake 2004). A collection of 
edited papers on the subject was commissioned by the UN ICT task force (MacLean 
2004). A series of texts have since chronicled and assessed the emergence, resolution and 
aftermath of the WSIS debate; both as an issue in and of itself (Mayer-Schonberger and 
Ziewitz 2007) or as part of a discussion of a series of parallel developments in internet 
regulation (Lessig 2006; Goldsmith and Wu 2006) or information society politics broadly 
defined (McDowell, Steinberg and Tomasello 2008).  
 Elsewhere, the problems with, as well as the structures and benefits of, civil 
society participation in the WSIS has been a significant focus of the literature (Raboy and 
Landry 2005; Mueller, Kuerbris, and Pagé 2007; Ó Siochrú 2004a, 2005a; Cammaerts, B. 
and Carpentier 2005; Cammaerts 2008). 
 A series of edited collections were published over the course of the WSIS in 
which prominent WSIS participants and observers describe and assess events from their 
perspectives (MacLean 2004; Stauffacher and Kleinwächter 2005; Drake 2005b; Drossou 
and Jensen 2005; Lavoie and Leuprecht 2005). The articles contained within such 
collections are a mixed bag of broadly focused analytical efforts,  transparent attempts to 
spin certain position and push specific issues, useful descriptive syntheses of important 
events, and cynical examples of how platforms for public communication become 
currency for currying favour with high level dignitaries in the UN system.  
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 Commentators have attempted to asses the impacts of the summit (Hamelink 
2004b) and, crucially, its implications for understanding global communication 
governance (Raboy 2004b; 2004c; 2005). 
 Thus, WSIS is relatively well-covered in the literature. Yet a crucial gap emerges 
where the problematic of this thesis is concerned. Dots have not been connected between 
the experiential accounts of WSIS participants and the need to ground emerging debates 
over the regulation of the internet and the public interest in global communication 
governance in empirical case study. For example, the insightful and important 2007 
article by Schonberger and Ziewitz is probably the most in-depth published account of 
the WSIS IG negotiations to date. It makes broad conclusions about the gap between the 
positions of the European Union and the United States. Yet, it does so through a 70 page 
article that repeatedly cites newspaper stories as the source of important details. 
Newspaper stories are also cited in Goldsmith and Wu (2006) and McDowell, Steinberg 
and Tomasello’s (2008) accounts of similar events. While there are literally volumes of 
published first hand accounts of the WSIS, they collectively make no claim to 
comprehensively covering all of the important events and perspectives 
The problematic outlined in chapter 1 suggests that empirical evidence is required 
in order to evaluate an important set of emerging conceptual debates over the 
regulatibility of the internet and the public interest in global communication governance. 
The WSIS negotiations of IG are an ideal test case for doing so. But, such an agenda 
requires a comprehensive, ethnographic approach that can fill in gaps around the 
numerous important existing contributions.   
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Methodology 
 The methodology deployed within this case study is what could be described as 
an ethnographic stakeholder approach. Rather than restrict my analysis to outcomes of 
the policy process, I focus on the actors, issues, practices and institutional frameworks 
that shape them. The period covered by the primary case study of this research was the 
lead-up to the first preparatory conferences of the Summit in 2001 until the end of the 
Second phase of the Summit itself in November 2005, though I have provided additional 
detail on some of the events that followed (see Chapter 4) in the aim of further 
contextualizing the primary case study. 
 Such approaches have provided valuable insight within the critical media studies 
literature. By asking “what are the goals and purposes an actor can have in relation to the  
mass media?”,  McQuail and Siune (1986, 14)  “learned about the issues involved and the 
processes at work” (1986, 7). Thus, the foundation of their work in developing 
generalizable understandings of the balance between forces of change and forces of 
preservation in the contemporary media was informed by “the empirical data about media 
structures, policy, politics and actual events” gained through this approach.22 
Similarly, actor-centred qualitative methodologies are used within various strains 
of constructivist sociology of technology as the basis of empirical investigation into the 
sorts of questions about how normative values come to be embedded into technologies 
that are treated conceptually in the work of Lessig and his contemporaries.23  
 
                                                
22 McQuail and Siune (1986, 11). See also Raboy (1990) who describes the similar approach he took to a 
series of Canadian media policy processes in what is largely, and beneficially, a methodological text. 
23See, for example, Bijker 1997; Callon 1986; Woolgar 1991; Law and Hassard 1999. The work of Lessig 
is suggested to share a set of epistemological beliefs about technology with the constructivist sociology of 
technology: (Barney 2004; McDowell, Steinberg and Tomasello 2008).  
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Data collection techniques 
 Data was collected for this thesis using the following techniques: participant 
observation; semi-structured interviews; document and policy analysis. 
 The contribution of the technique of participant observation is well established 
in media and communication research (c.f. Hansen et al 1988). It is also central to the 
sociological and media studies actor-focused frameworks described above. Participant 
observation provided me a necessary sense of context within what was a complex and 
multi-faceted research terrain. In this study the participant observation phase included the 
following elements: 
 Participation as a civil society representative (as researcher) in the first phase of 
the WSIS in December 2003;  
 Participation as a civil society representative (as a researcher) in the 3rd 
preparatory conference of the second phase of the WSIS; 
  Participation as a civil society representative (as a researcher) at the 2nd phase of 
the WSIS in November 2005; 
 Participation in various WSIS civil society organizations, most notably the WSIS 
Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus which was a valuable network of 
knowledge sharing amongst WSIS civil society participants; 
 Participation in various national and regional consultations, meetings and 
briefings on the WSIS including the Canadian Commission for UNESCO’s  
meeting in Ottawa in Jan. 2004 and consultation of Canadian Civil Society in 
Winnipeg in June 2005 as well as the US State Department, Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG) and Internet Governance Project co-sponsored 
  
59 
briefing on the American reaction to the WGIG report in Washington in June 
2005;  
 Participation as civil society delegate in the internet governance forums of 2006 
and 2008 (in person) and in the 2007 IGF (remotely);  
 Observing, following and participating in email and listserv exchanges. The 
availability online of streamed video and written transcripts of many of these 
meetings also proved valuable in cases where I was not personally in attendance 
or I wanted to re-evaluate the context around points I had made in my field notes 
before drawing final conclusions.   
 In addition to providing me with a large volume of observational data that formed 
the basis of this study, this experience as participant observer has privileged me with the 
necessary context from which I can evaluate events that have occurred in other summit 
meetings and events at which I was not physically present.  
I should be clear though that my functional involvement as a participant was 
limited. While I was present for meetings, negotiating sessions and policy development 
exercises such as those carried out through the structures of WSIS civil society, I made 
no substantive interventions suggesting one course of policy development in place of 
various alternatives.   
At the onset of my field-work, I established a set of self-imposed boundaries. I 
determined that advocacy for one policy alternative over another would compromise the 
goal of researching the processes itself and of following the important actors. Naturally, I 
found certain positions more convincing than others. While I may have worked through 
various issues in discussion with WSIS colleagues, I consciously shied away from 
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entering the larger WSIS or even internal civil society debates in public or meaningful 
ways.  
My role then could perhaps be described as “non-participant observer”. However, 
consistent with my view of the responsibilities of an accredited “delegate” and as an 
interlocutor in various civil society structures, I committed to contributing to the WISS 
process in whatever fashion I could within the boundaries. Thus, I performed a variety of 
facilitative tasks including: sharing versions of my field notes of the negotiation sessions 
over various WSIS email discussion lists; sharing general and informal impressions and 
information with various stakeholders based on my observations; providing decidedly 
amateurish simultaneous English-French and French- English translation of a series of 
civil society meetings; and contributing to the administration of civil society structures 
and to discussions on their evolution.   
In this sense, I am more comfortable with the term “participant” observation 
though I believe there is an important distinction to be made about the extent to which my 
participation actually influenced the case study. In particular I would emphasize the 
efforts that I made to establish and maintain distance between my own involvement and 
the core dynamics being observed. That said, my accreditation as a “delegate” must be 
seen to have influenced the predispositions of other WSIS participants toward me as well 
as their manner of interacting with me. As I argue later on in this chapter, whatever 
criticism one might be inclined to associate with participant observation, this technique is 
justified in this case by the value of filling in the knowledge gaps related to this 
research’s problematic.  
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 In terms of documentary analysis, the WSIS produced an astounding volume of 
official and internal documentation. This represents the most instructive and most 
abundant resource of information on the different actors and their approaches to internet 
governance. As such, much of the analysis draws on official documents and on 
statements, draft proposals, chair’s papers, and all of the other forms of documents where 
different actors express their perspectives. These records were used to investigate how 
different perspectives emerged and how various actors have abandoned earlier positions, 
joined forces with other perspectives and more generally, how the parameters of debate 
and balance between perspectives have shifted over the course of the process.  
 Semi-structured interviews are a central component of most approaches to 
qualitative research and are accepted as a valid standalone methodology themselves 
(Hansen et al 1988). A series of semi-structured interviews targeted certain key actors in 
the WSIS process. These were conducted mainly with key participants and government 
delegates who functioned as spokespeople for certain crucial positions within the process. 
Consistent with the ethical agreement presented to, and approved by, the Research Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Science at the University of Montréal24, 
participants were given a range of options about the formality of these interviews. Some 
participated under the expressed condition that their comments were “off the record” 
while other interviews were recorded, transcribed and are quoted at places throughout 
this thesis. In analyzing my data, I have tried to minimize the extent to which the 
availability of  “on the record” interview quotes related certain ideas and perspectives 
might have influenced my presentation of the material. I have tried to use interview 
                                                
24 A copy of the ethics approval certificate issued to this project by the Comité d’éthique de la recherche de 
la faculté des arts et des sciences (CÉRFAS) of the Université de Montréal is included in this thesis as 
Appendix III.  
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quotations only illustrate points that I am confident I would have made with or without 
being able to draw on the words of interview subjects. In particular, I have been 
extremely careful not exclude any important points for lack of quotable interview data.   
Respecting my ethical obligations, I do not give hints where conclusions are 
presented that draw on the careful notes taken from “off-the-record” interviews. I 
recognize that this might lead to an imbalance in the weight of proof attributed to certain 
points in relation to others and open my research to criticisms of being unaccountable. 
However, I am happy with the extent to which the interviews that I conducted covered 
the terrain. These interviews were designed as informational resources- to summarize, fill 
in and put in participants’ own words- details about information and interactions in the 
process. These interviews were not intended as sociological study of how different 
individuals use the international political position to further their own ends.  Subjects 
were asked to speak to the positions that they represented. The interviews filled in 
necessary knowledge gaps. In some cases, they added backroom context to existing 
public events. Crucially, these interviews allowed me to triangulate the conclusions of my 
participant observation and documentary analysis. In this sense, I would argue that they 
provide a measure of inter-coder reliability.  
 As mentioned, much of the communication in the periods between WSIS sessions 
was coordinated by the use of email discussion lists maintained by various civil society 
structures. Though I had initially given some consideration to approaching this as a 
separate technique of data collection, I have in fact decided that the nature of the 
information shared by this medium of communication is entirely consistent with both the 
participant observation and the analysis of public and internal statements described 
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above. It was therefore treated as such- as were the numerous volumes of articles written 
by WSIS participants during and since the WSIS process discussed earlier in this chapter.   
 
Analysis of Data 
 Data collected through all of these different tracks was assembled and analyzed 
over the course of the case study. The most focused analysis occurred after the participant 
observation and interviews had been concluded. In presenting the material and drawing 
conclusions, various data sources were treated relatively inter-changeably. However, the 
general thematic focus for analysis was largely developed on the basis of the participant 
observation phase of the data collection. This formed the basis of the protocol for a pilot 
semi-structured interview. After reflection on the pilot interview, the framework was 
refined for the remainder of the semi-structured interviews.  
Documentary analysis was an iterative process, occurring over the course of the 
participant observation to assure that I could follow the proceedings, and during the 
interview phase to inform my discussions with interview subjects. Finally- on a much 
larger scale- literally hundreds of WSIS documents were reviewed to provide a 
comprehensive grounding of preliminary conclusions reached during the participant 
observation and interview phases. Some preliminary observations and possible themes of 
this study were thrown out along the way either because they proved to be off-base or 
simply in the effort to reduce the scope of the study. The general analytic framework 
examined:  
• the major actors, issues and positions in the WSIS process and their evolution over 
the course of the process and since; 
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• the story and events of the negotiation of the WSIS IG agreements; 
• the understandings of internet technology and the linkages between internet 
technology and public policy that informed various delegations and positions;  
• the linkages between the domestic level and the global level in terms of policy 
development, policy consultation and the interests of various delegations; 
• descriptive accounts of what global communication governance involves and who 
does it. 
 
Chapter Conclusion: Reflections on this method 
 The potential criticisms related to this methodological framework include:  
• the mélange of techniques of data collection; 
• the iterative and post-hoc jumps between analysis and the field; 
• the impossibility of comprehensively covering a research terrain as large as WSIS;  
• the subjectivity of my own perspective in this process. 
Concerning the combination of multiple techniques of data collection, critiques of 
this approach could point to the fact that there is no formal organization of the 
relationship between the field research and analysis and that there are not clearly 
established relative merits nor roles for each. Certainly this represents a nebulous process, 
but this sort of ‘the more the better’ approach to data collection is argued by proponents 
of the grounded theory methodological approach to be not only acceptable but to be 
entirely necessary in regards to research that demands the generation of new theoretical 
concepts rather than the verification of existing theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). This is 
certainly the most apt response to the problematic pursued by this dissertation. According 
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to Charmaz (2000, 509), “grounded theory methods consist of systematic inductive 
guidelines for collecting and analyzing data to build middle-range theoretical frameworks 
that explain the collected data”. As such grounded theory refers to strategic approaches to 
the data collection and analysis process, and any and all qualitative and quantitative 
techniques for investigation can be utilized- either individually or in combination- for 
data collection. The problematic of this thesis demands the extraction of as much data as 
possible from a field site that could never be claimed to have been comprehensively 
investigated. 
 The most serious point of reflection in any methodological approach to social 
science research is the inherent subjectivity of the researcher’s perspective.  This is 
especially the case in regard to this project where my perspective on the events is 
inherently limited. The criteria which I established for organizing this analysis are 
obviously shaped by my pre-dispositions and I, as a participant observer, am not a neutral 
observer but am myself implicated in the terrain. In response to these concerns, I would 
suggest that again the grounded theory approach can be utilized to justify this 
subjectivity. In conducting this research, I have gone to lengths to reflect on, 
acknowledge and minimize the impact of my own subjectivity. I would argue that, of 
course, truly objective research does not exist in any context and that this is realistically 
all that can be asked of social science research.  People have offered and will offer 
conflicting accounts of what transpired over the course of the WSIS as well as disparate 
interpretations of its significance. However, as I outlined in Chapter 1, the context of this 
research is a series of fundamental issues confronting contemporary society; responses to 
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which are being obstructed by knowledge gaps, under-theorization and the absence of 
empirical data. Each subjective voice that enters this conversation enriches it.  
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-CHAPTER 3- 
Case Study: The UN World Summit on the Information Society 
Negotiations of a Framework for Global Internet Governance 
 
Chapter Overview 
 Neither internet regulation in the broad sense, nor the more narrowly defined 
issue of the governance of the internet domain name system (DNS), figured prominently 
in the plans or initial agendas of the WSIS.25 This chapter reviews how, through the 
chaotic process through which delegations and summit organizers sorted out an agenda 
for a policy object as abstract as the ‘information society’, a series of competing 
problems and claims coalesced, in various and changing combinations, to push internet 
regulation and governance up the WSIS agenda. It will examine the fluid and inconsistent 
manner in which the issue of internet governance was framed over the course of the first 
phase of the WSIS and the intractable debate that followed over the extent to which 
public policy issues apply to internet governance. This chapter examines how- through 
WSIS- internet governance came to be seen as encompassing a much wider range of 
issues and concerns than merely domain name management.  
This chapter examines the emergence of internet governance as a more broadly 
defined policy field; in particular the contribution to this evolution of the Working Group 
on Internet Governance (WGIG).  The Internet Cooperation of Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) was eventually determined to not relate directly to many of the 
broader internet governance, ICT policy and information society issues that were raised 
over the course of the first phase of the WSIS. But, the extent to which such issues were 
discussed alongside, and conflated with, ICANN underlined the extent to which issues 
                                                
25 For a background and historical overview of the DNS and of ICANN, see Appendix I of this thesis.  
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such as the digital divide, communication rights, spam etc. were closely associated with 
internet governance. As a result, in defining the term going forward to the second phase 
of the WSIS, lines were drawn about what issues were considered to fall under the 
heading of global internet governance. The story of the first phase of the WSIS thus is 
significant to consider within the conceptual debate over the regulatibility of the internet. 
However, the mere recognition of the public policy implications of internet 
governance is not the end of the story. This chapter reviews the focused- but equally 
charged and controversial- debate that occurred as internet governance came to dominate 
the agenda of the second phase of the WSIS. It provides in-depth accounts of the 
sensationalized split between the US and the EU on the issue of governmental oversight 
of ICANN and the dynamics of the Tunis deal that brokered compromise through the 
creation of the Internet Governance Forum- a new multi-stakeholder global governance 
organization- as well as an ill-defined process of “enhanced cooperation”.  
 In conclusion, this chapter suggests that Lessig’s code is law theory introduced 
in Chapter 1 is particularly well suited for unpackaging the enigma of internet 
governance and the power dynamics that defined the WSIS.  
“Something Must be Done About…” 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the WSIS was initially devised as a framework for 
developing global policy for extending the “digital revolution” across the “digital 
divide”.26 
                                                
 
26 Quoted from:  The International Telecommunication Union,  “Basic Information about WSIS: Why a 
Summit on the Information Society”, ITU,  http://www.itu.int/wsis/basic/why.html. 
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The initial summit agenda’s mapping of “issues that may be relevant” included 
mention of some of the questions that would come to define the debate over internet 
governance. For instance, the “developing a framework” issue pointed to defining the  
“roles of government, the private sector and civil society” and “establishing appropriate 
policy, regulatory and market structures” objectives. The same document defines the 
agenda for the “Democracy and governance” theme of the Summit around the 
implications of the use of ICT by governments in (or e-governance) in the governance of 
Society.27 This was a qualitatively different notion of governance and the internet than 
the debate that would emerge about the governance of the internet itself and the role of 
governments within it. 
But the “information society” is a nebulous and fluid term. There is no agreed 
definition and it is easily manipulated to suit a wide range of agendas. It was apparent 
from the start that any effort to use the WSIS to define the ‘information society’ would be 
complex and controversial. Absent a clear and agreed upon overarching set of priorities 
that could be imposed top-down to define the issues to be debated, the agenda of the 
WSIS was quickly captured bottom-up by calls for global governance responses to a 
series of emerging policy problems. As one interview subject put it, much of the early 
agenda of the WSIS was structured around “a general feeling that something must be 
done, but for all sorts of different reasons”.28  
Many of these calls that “something must be done” related to concrete obstacles 
that certain developing country governments had encountered whilst trying to enforce 
                                                
27 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom I, “Document WSIS/PC-1/DOC/4-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|1 (at para 24) 
 
28 Tim Kelly, (ITU Strategy and Policy Unit and the WSIS Executive Secretariat), in conversation with 
author, July 2007.  
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what they perceived to be their sovereign rights in relation to internet resources and 
communication. Issues arose from the more general objections of countries related to the 
management and use of the internet. The ‘somethings’ that the WSIS was being asked to 
do included:  
• …a 1998 report of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunicatons & 
Information Working Group (APEC Tel) entitled International Charging 
Arrangements for Internet Services (ICAIS) that underlined the inequity of 
internet interconnection pricing.29 Developing countries wishing to connect to the 
global internet backbone must pay for the full costs of the international leased line 
to the country providing the hub. As of 2000, more than 90% of internet 
connectivity passed through North America and the marketplace for international 
internet interconnection works on the principle that payment flows upstream: 
small local ISPs pay national tier two ISPs who pay tier one global backbone 
providers. Thus, despite the fact that traffic passes in both directions and benefits 
customers in the hub country as well as the spoke country once an interconnection 
agreement is established, the costs are primarily borne by the local and national 
ISPs in countries that do not have tier one global backbone providers. In 2000, 
ISPs in Asia Pacific reported a net deficit of US $5 billion per year from 
international interconnection costs and, in 2002, African ISPs were thought to 
have paid US$ 500 million in interconnection costs. These higher costs are, of 
course, passed on to customers making internet service more expensive in the 
                                                
29 For more see: APEC, “APEC Principles on International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services “, 
APEC,http://www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/sectoral_ministerial/telecommunications/2000/ann
ex_b.html 
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developing world. This situation is a stark contrast to the ITU’s Accounting Rate 
program which was strategically biased toward settling international telephone 
interconnections in favour of developing countries, resulting in significant 
payouts to developing countries in US dollars intended as subsidies for further 
telecommunication infrastructure development. This issue was taken up at the 
ITU before emerging on the WSIS agenda (Peake 2004);  
• … the fact that in Brazil, and other places, country code top level domain names 
(CCTLDs) were not being managed in ways that reflect their status as  effectively 
sovereign territory. Jurisdiction over country code top level domain names 
(CCTLDs) was assigned many years ago by internet founding father John Postel 
to individuals and organizations on behalf of each country, often without 
involving governments.30 Something had to be done in particular, to rectify the 
situation of the government created, multi-stakeholder “Steering Committee for 
the Internet in Brazil” (know by its Portuguese acronym CGIbr). Efforts on the 
part of CGIbr to develop a technically sophisticated registry that would be well-
protected from fraud and run as an “asset of the commons” for the people of 
Brazil were being undermined by its institutional status. CGIbr was being 
formally run as a project of FAPESP, the state of Sao Paulo’s Research 
Foundation.  The lack of an institutional status for the CGIbr meant that FAPESP 
                                                
30 See Mueller (2002) at 125-126. For example, a 2003 survey conducted by Geist (2004) polled all 189 
ITU members states about the management of their CCTLDs. Of the 66 countries who responded to the 
survey, only 43% of governments reported that they retain “ultimate control” over their CCTLD in one of 
the following ways: directly operating it themselves through a government ministry or agency; through a 
company that was created as a subsidiary of a government ministry or agency; through enacting legislation 
asserting government authority; through operational contracts with the appointed national CCTLD 
manager. Pointing the growing dissatisfaction with allocation of CCTLDs, 39% of respondents were either 
in the process of taking steps to formalize the government relationship with the CCTLD or actively 
planning to do so and only 7% of respondents had neither control nor plans to acquire it.  
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was able to restrict the use of monies made through, and earmarked for, the 
registry. FAPESP also decided to convert the CGIbr’s internet exchange point 
(IEP) from a not-for-profit service into a business and then sell it to a Miami-
based company called Terremark. Generally, efforts in Brazil were perceived to 
have been undermined by the lack of a guaranteed right to have “.br” appear in 
the root server and an inability ultimately decide who technically controls the 
country’s name space and critical internet resources (Afonso 2004)31; 
• …about the fact that the domain name “southafrica.com” was registered by a 
private, Seattle-based tourism company called Virtual Countries Inc. who refused 
to hand it over when the government of South Africa later decided to get into the 
e-government business.  During the ensuing litigation, the Government of South 
Africa resisted the efforts of Virtual Countries to have the case resolved in 
American courts;  
• …because over 80% of allocated IPv4 addresses have been given to North 
                                                
31 There were other examples. Tuvalev had sold the rights for its “.tv” domain name to entrepreneurs in the 
US who, instead of operating it as a traditional country code, are marketing it as an alternative to .com for 
webservices offering media content. When a dispute developed between the government of Lybia and the 
manager of its CCTLD, ICANN deliberated for more than two years about whether or not the CCTLD 
should be re-delegated and  the “.ly” domain name fell inactive.  The “.iq” domain name for Iraq was 
delegated to a company run by a man named Saud Alani who had a Baghdad telephone number but lived, 
operated his businesses and hosted his servers in Texas. His Palestinian chief technical operator Bayan 
Elashi and four of Elashi’s brothers- all of whom worked for InfoCom- were arrested in December of 2002 
on terrorism related charges. In other words, less than 6 months before they would invade Iraq in March of 
2003, the US was able to effectively shut down the “.iq” domain name and procure what ever intelligence 
and information warfare value it could from the “.iq” servers that had been hosting “.iq” as evidence in an 
unrelated proceeding  (McCarthy 2003) 
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American institutions32; 
• …to rectify a situation in which email and website addresses could only be typed 
in the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII). As a result, 
only non-accented Latin characters are accepted and languages that use non-
Roman scripts have to be transliterated into what are essentially English phonetics 
or abbreviations in order to be integrated into the naming and addressing system. 
Non-English speaking internet users in China for example, are required to use 
“.cn” as their domain name rather than “.中国”, the Chinese characters that 
signify “.china”. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)- a technical 
standards making body- and the Internet Cooperation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN)- the organization in charge of allocating and managing 
internet identifiers that allow for interconnection- were each working on the 
multi-lingual domain name issue over the course of 2001 and 2002. When it 
became clear that the technical standards could be put in place to create 
internationalized domain names, questions started to be asked about the process 
by which internationalized domain names would be arrived at. For example, 
questions were asked about which of the governments of the mainland People’s 
Republic of China and the Taiwanese “Republic of China” would be granted the 
(likely to be contested) international domain name  “.中国”?33 How could the 
                                                
32 Peake (2004) points out that this number reflects early block allocations that were made “under a system 
that did not anticipate the rapid growth of the internet” (p.13) and that, under the current system of regional 
allocation that was introduced in the early 1990s, geographic fairness has improved to the point that 
allocations since 1999 are relatively balanced (p.14). Nonetheless, when viewed through prism of the early-
WSIS focus on the digital divide, the optics of these statistics proved to be a source of consternation.   
33 Thank yous are extended to Siu-Min Jim and Tiffanie Ing for helping me clarify that  “.中国” is 
simplified Chinese script for “.china” and that, though Taiwan generally uses the traditional Chinese 
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Peoples’ Republic of China tolerate a system in which internet technologists and 
industry representatives working through ICANN could conceivably bestow the 
defacto recognition of an ostensibly international organization onto Taiwan’s 
historical claim to being the ‘real’ China? Given that the only avenue available to 
governments such as the People’s Republic for participating in such discussions at 
ICANN is through the decidedly non-binding Government Advisory Committee 
(GAC), questions were also asked about how the US Government might use its 
oversight of ICANN in such instances where intergovernmental relations were 
clearly at stake; 
• …about American dominance of GTLDs. There are two types of top level 
domains: generic top level domains (GTLDs) such as .com, .gov, .mil, .edu etc. 
and country code top level domains (CCTLDs) such as .ca for Canada or .fr for 
France. Of the original seven GTLDs created, “dot.mil” and  “dot.gov” were 
effectively reserved for US interests. The general perception was that the highly 
restricted GTLD space was geared toward US interests and not the global internet 
community. Such complaints were only reinforced during the WSIS when the 
.xxx GTLD was initially proposed by bottom up ICANN policy development 
process and then was ultimately overruled by the USG for domestic political 
reasons34;  
                                                                                                                                            
characters, the domain name would be legible as “.china” for both Cantonese and Mandarin speakers in 
mainland China and Hong Kong and for the majority of Taiwanese.  
34 The idea was that the “.xxx” GTLD could be used to create a red light zone that would encourage 
pornographers to identify themselves and thus make it easy for parents to filter their childrens’ use of the 
internet. The creation of a .xxx domain name was first proposed in 2000, but was one of many failed new 
proposals for new GTLDs occurred during the ‘domain name wars’ that are discussed in Appendix I (see 
also Mueller 2002). The .xxx idea re-emerged in 2003 when ICANN’s so-called bottom-up  policy 
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• …about the high overhead and transaction costs involved in ICANN’s not-for-
profit governance of the domain name system. ICANN has been responsible for a 
comodification of internet identifiers that has introduced a largely unnecessary 
level of cost to internet domain registration that has, in turn, created a cottage 
economy around the organization (Mueller 2002). What’s more, with American 
companies such as Verisign being the chief beneficiaries of the cost of domain 
name registration, with the organization itself operating in the United States and 
with the litigious practices associated with ICANN disputes and dispute resolution 
requiring parties to hire American lawyers (Mayer-Schonberger and Ziewitz 
2007), the ICANN micro-economy provides jobs to Americans and ensures that 
capital flows from around the world to the American businesses that service 
ICANN, its clients and employees. For all stakeholders- in particular for 
developing countries- the exchange value cost that ICANN’s not-for-profit 
governance has fixed to domain name registration is out of line with the use value 
of internet identifiers, in many cases prohibitively so. The case was being made, 
in other words, that perhaps another organization could do not-for-profit 
governance with lower transaction costs, or at least that opting to pay the same 
transaction costs to an intergovernmental institution would be preferable to, in 
effect, being forced by the United States to line the pockets of American 
businesses;  
                                                                                                                                            
development process initially approved the creation of “.xxx”. However, after the Department of 
Commerce (DoC) and various American government agencies and political figures were bombarded by an 
organized protest from the “family values” lobby, a politely worded letter from a DoC high up requested 
that the ICANN board delay their implementation of the proposal so that the (mostly negative) comments  
that were still coming in could be heard. When delay turned into reversal and “.xxx” was abandoned, many 
suspected that the ICANN board had read between the lines of the letter from the DoC  and acquiesced to 
the wishes of its political master. In other words, the “.xxx” questioned the extent to which DoC oversight 
is, as claimed, merely administrative. (see Internet Governance Project 2006; Raboy and Shtern 2010b) 
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• … about pornography and “cybercrime”. Though it was not ratified until 2004, by 
the early stages of the WSIS, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
(see Council of Europe 2004) had been drafted as an effort to establish a common 
criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime by 
obligating ratifying states to adopt a set of prescribed legislation and to participate 
in a framework aimed at promoting international co-operation in preventing, 
investigating and prosecuting cybercrime. Despite the reservations of many (c.f. 
Peake 2004; Shariff 2008), the CoE treaty was a strong statement that some global 
coordination on preventing undesirable uses of the internet might be feasible and 
a variety of governments were interested in discussing how international 
agreements could be used to fight cyber crime, including through the regulation of 
various categories of speech whose legality tends to be defined on a country by 
country basis such as hate speech, spam and pornography.  
 Some of these calls that “something must be done” related directly to the 
management of the DNS system, what was conventionally defined as internet governance 
prior to the WSIS. They posed fundamental challenges to the instrumental view that 
technical regulation of the internet of the type preformed by ICANN is a neutral, 
facilitative, apolitical process and that the regulatory objective of efficiency can be 
accomplished without normative impacts. Other claims problematized the very premise 
of such narrow, prescriptive definitions of internet governance by underlining the extent 
to which issues related to how the internet is governed can be external to the DNS 
system.  Each call that “something must be done” asserted the need to reconsider the 
place of law in regard to regulatory functions that have been left to the market and 
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devolved to code.  
 The American political scientist John Kingdon (1984, 122) draws on a concept 
from biology to describe the process through which ideas and issues compete for space 
on political agendas as “the policy primeval soup”. “There is a long process of softening 
up”, Kingdon (123) writes, continuing that  
ideas are floated […] speeches made; proposals are drafted,  then amended in 
response to reaction and floated again. Ideas confront one another (much as 
molecules bumped into one another) and combine in various ways. The “soup” 
changes only through the appearance of wholly new elements, but even more 
through the recombination of previously existing elements.   
 The extent to which ideas emerged from the policy soup to set the agenda of the 
WSIS is unusual when assessed within Kingdon’s framework. Kingdon (1984, 4) defines 
the policy agenda as “the list of subjects to which government officials and those around 
them are paying serious attention”. Typically though, the agenda is set top-down by a 
fairly narrow, pre-defined set of interests. Political agendas can, under certain conditions 
(see Kingdon 1984, chapter 6), be effectively influenced from the bottom-up. The 
unresolved definitional complexity of the term ‘the information society’ meant that, at 
WSIS, unanticipated issues emerging bottom-up from the “soup” could claim to be every 
bit as integral to whatever “the information society” was as those that came top-down 
from summit organizers.  The WSIS agenda was, in other words, unusually open to being 
set bottom-up.   
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 Within the policy soup, these calls that “something must be done” jockeyed for 
space on the WSIS agenda with numerous other issues that seemed to contain some 
dimension of internet regulation. Alleviating the digital divide and the deployment of 
information technology for development were primary focuses of the first phase of the 
WSIS. Other important and related ICT policy issues raised over the first phase of the 
WSIS included:  
• The use and status of free and open source software and other copyright and 
intellectual property issues; 
• the need to stimulate local content creation in many languages as a counterbalance 
to English-language, developed country dominance of web content; 
• The status of freedom of expression and, more generally, human rights in relation 
to communication. On one hand there were some countries seeking to assert the 
limits of article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 
their sovereign right to restrict locally defined categories of criminalized 
expression in the name of promoting “public order”. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Brazil and elements of civil society advocated that the WSIS be used to 
go beyond the UDHR by creating a right to communicate that would expand 
speech rights for the information society.  
 There were also calls that “something be done” in regard to the general 
trajectory of governance in the information society, about underdevelopment and about 
the stark gap between the information society’s haves and have-nots that is intrinsic to a 
system based on market-reliance, global economic integration and the spread of Western 
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style consumerism and capitalism.  This view was perhaps best captured in discussion of 
the following paragraph from an early draft of the Geneva Phase Declaration of 
Principles: 
6. Faced with complex and ever-evolving challenges, all of us: governments, the 
private sector and civil society, have challenges that require new forms of 
solidarity and cooperation and new or increased roles and responsibilities.  
A proposal from the delegation from Iran would have grafted an additional sentence onto 
the end of this draft paragraph reading: “In this context, special attention must be paid to 
particular problems facing negative aspects and impacts of globalization”.35 Given the 
centrality of the internet to all of these broad processes, such claims certainly also seemed 
to prescribe some consideration of internet regulation. In other words, issues significantly 
broader than the DNS were being considered in the context of internet governance at 
WSIS (see figure 1).  
 Over the course of the first phase of the WSIS each of these issues was pushed 
and pursued by various stakeholders and coalitions of interests. Kindgon (1984, 130) 
suggests that  
origins become less important than the process of mutation and recombination 
that occur as ideas continuously confront one another and are refined until they 
are ready to enter a serious decision phase. 
 
                                                
35 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
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Figure 1: “Internet Governance-Related” Issues Raised at Phase I of WSIS 
Level of Debate Something must be done about… 
1. DNS/ICANN -US unilateral control 
-lack of government input 
-cost and US monopoly of economy 
-CCTLDs 
-multi-lingual domain names  
-allocation and geographic inequity of IP addresses 
2. Broader IG Governance -the sovereign rights of countries 
-cybercrime 
-pornography 
-international interconnection costs 
-English dominance of Web/local content 
-stability and security of internet 
3. ICT governance -access /digital divide 
-free software 
-copyright  
-expression and communication rights  
4. Information Society 
Governance 
-impacts of globalization 
-development and capacity building 
 
 Kingdon’s description applies to the evolution of internet governance at the 
WSIS.  Internet governance- in the narrow sense of the management of the DNS system- 
emerged as an issue at WSIS. But, in the manner described by Kingdon, within the policy 
soup that was the agenda of the first phase of the WSIS, efforts to get and keep a whole 
series of issues external to the management of the DNS were grafted on in various 
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combinations, at various times by different actors and collations of interests. Some of 
these moves were strategic while others have been attributed to mis- and under-informed 
delegations. The next section reviews this process through an in-depth chronological 
summary of the emergence of the debate over internet governance at the first phase of the 
WSIS.  
WSIS Phase I: [International/Intergovernmental] 
 “Somebody is raising internet governance”, an email from the Canadian 
contingent to a meeting in Bucharest reported to the Industry Canada team working on 
the WSIS file in Ottawa. It concluded by asking what would become the fundamental 
question of the entire WSIS process: “any idea what that means?”.36 
 The Canadian delegation “interpreted it immediately as meaning ICANN”.37 
Many others did as well. As discussed earlier, ICANN is a not for profit private 
organization that coordinates the naming and numbering registry that allows the global 
internet to function. Operating through a series of agreements with the Department of 
Commerce of the United States Government, ICANN was the controversial outcome of a 
decade long discussion over how the internet domain name system should be governed.38  
ICANN is an essentially unique experiment in global governance (O Siochru and 
Girard 2002). It is a not-for-profit corporation based in Marina Del Ray California 
incorporated under the statutes of the State of California. ICANN coordinates the DNS 
                                                
36 Bill Graham (Industry Canada), as discussed with author, Oct. 2006.  The Bucharest meeting in question 
is presumably the Pan-European Regional Conference for WSIS that was held in Bucharest between 7-9 
Nov, 2002.  
 
37 Bill Graham (Industry Canada), as discussed with author, Oct. 2006 
38 See Appendix I of this thesis for a brief summary. For more detailed background see Mueller (2002); 
Paré (2003); Goldsmith and Wu (2006).  
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system, the root server system, the allocation of IP addresses and policy development 
related to these functions (Hoffmann 2007; see also Appendix I of this thesis). It does so 
through what it describes as a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process 
that is typically framed as an extension of the standards making processes the internet 
technical community has developed through the structures such as the Internet 
Architecture Board (IAB) and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). ICANN has been 
a lightning rod for criticism in its short history. For example, it is seen as prone to being 
captured by the agendas of technical elites, the US Government and multi-national 
communication firms in particular (c.f. Mueller 2002). More generally, it is seen- simply 
put- as not sufficiently democratic or accountable (Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 170). In 
particular, ICANN has institutionalized the tension between private technical 
management and public communication governance discussed in chapter 1. ICANN has 
always insisted that its role is neutral, technical management. As Esther Dyson, the first 
president of ICANN, once quipped: “ICANN governs the plumbing not the people” 
(quoted from Mueller 2002, 8-9).  
From the first WSIS PrepCom there were indications that disaccord over the 
ICANN system was going to push the WSIS agenda. Brazil’s intervention at PrepCom I 
of phase one complained that  
democratic and representative Governments should not be replaced by arbitrary 
groupings of private business and non-governmental institutions in decisions 
regarding the economic space brewing within powerful digital networks, such as 
the internet. Organizing this new environment to the satisfaction of all, and 
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ensuring the beneficial participation of developing countries and their societies is 
central to our work.39 
The EU’s contribution was more specific, calling for the WSIS “to indicate a set of 
common principles underlying future actions and initiatives” related to “electronic 
communications regulatory frameworks” as well as “legal aspects of e-commerce and 
internet governance”40.  
Slotted between PrepCom I and PrepCom II, the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) held its regularly scheduled Plenipotentiary Conference in Marrakech in 
October of 2002. According to Kleinwächter (2004a, 42), “a bitter controversy about 
private sector leadership and the future role of ITU in internet governance took place”.   
A series of resolutions were passed underlining the need to reinforce the sovereignty of 
governments in domain name related matters and directing the ITU secretary general to 
encourage all ITU member states to participate in discussions over international 
management of domain names and numbers. These resolutions also encouraged the 
Secretary General of the ITU to himself take a “significant role” in such debates and 
initiatives.41 
From there, the issue of internet governance percolated onto the WSIS agenda 
through a series of declarations made by regional WSIS preparatory meetings that were 
also held between PrepComs I and II (Kleinwächter 2004a). The declaration of the 
already alluded to European WSIS Ministerial Meeting in Bucharest (Nov 2002) 
                                                
39 WSIS Geneva Phase, PrepCom I, “Statement from Brazil”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|1 
  
40 WSIS Geneva Phase, PrepCom I, “Document WSIS/PC-1/CONTR/3-E” , ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|1 
 
41 see Resolutions 102 and 133 of the 2002 Marrakech ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/resolutions/2002/resplen5.html 
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mentions in passing that “management of domain names” is one among many issues that 
should “be addressed with the active participation of all stakeholders”.42  The declaration 
of the January 2003 Asian WSIS Ministerial Conference in Tokyo declares that  
the transition to the information society requires the creation of appropriate and 
transparent legal, regulatory and policy frameworks at the global, regional and 
national levels. These frameworks should give due regard to the rights and 
obligations of all stakeholders. 
 The subsequent list of policy issues requiring such reforms includes “management of 
internet addresses and domain names”.43 Two weeks later, the Latin American Regional 
Ministerial conference held in Bávaro called for “multi-lateral transparent and democratic 
internet governance” as part of an effort to establish “appropriate national legislative 
frameworks that safeguard the public and general interest and intellectual property that 
foster electronic communications and transactions”.44 Finally, in February 2003, in 
Beirut, the West Asia Ministerial Conference for WSIS mentioned “multilingualism” and 
“national sovereignty” as two of the reasons that “the responsibility for root directories 
and domain names should rest with a suitable international organization”.45  
Thus, the controversies that were emerging around ICANN outside of the main 
WSIS plenary made the WSIS a logical venue to raise the issue of internet governance. 
                                                
42 WSIS Geneva phase, PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/DOC/5-E : Final Declaration of the Pan 
European Regional Conference”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|pe&c_type=all| 
43 WSIS Geneva phase, PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/DOC/6-E: Final Declaration of the Asia-
Pacific Regional Conference”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|as&c_type=all| 
44 WSIS Geneva phase, PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/DOC/7-E: Bávaro Declaration”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|l&c_type=all| 
45 WSIS Geneva phase, PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/DOC/8-E : Final Declaration of the Western 
Asia Preparatory Conference”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|l&c_type=all| 
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Yet, as discussed, the WSIS agenda was far from set and domain name system problems 
were competing for the limited space on it alongside much broader internet, ICT and 
information society public policy issues. By PrepCom II, ICANN issues were being 
raised at WSIS, but often inter-changeably with, and indistinguishably, from other 
broader concerns about the governance of communication and the public’s interest in it. 
A Brazilain intervention to PrepCom II for instance argued that  
internet has evolved into a global public good and its governance should 
constitute a core issue of the information society agenda. Developing countries 
should have full access to take part in all decision making bodies and processes 
concerning the structure and functioning of the cyberspace, within which public, 
private and non-governmental agents will increasingly conduct their social and 
economic activities. 46 
Supporters of ICANN largely chose to ignore calls that the issue of its reform be 
placed on the WSIS agenda, presumably hoping that the issue would simply go away. By 
PrepCom II, some veiled support for the existing institutional framework for internet 
governance did begin to creep into certain interventions. The Coordinating Committee of 
Business Interlocutors (CCBI) contribution to PrepCom II offered a carrot in the direction 
of calls for more intergovernmental cooperation on internet governance: “many cross-
border issues have already been and are being coordinated by international fora”. 47  But 
also a stick:  
                                                
46 WSIS Geneva phase, PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/CONTR/57-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|2 
  
 
47 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/CONTR/35-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|2 
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the critical role of the private sector must be recognized more clearly and actively 
in the WSIS process. This has not been adequately done to date. […]Given the 
right conditions, business will assume the risks necessary, and invest. […] ‘No 
investment, no information society. 48  
Updated drafts of the Plan of Action and Declaration of Principles were 
circulated on March 21, 2003 and comments were solicited from all stakeholders in 
advance of the ‘intersessional” meeting planned for Paris in July. The March, 2003 draft 
documents reformulated and reorganized the language on internet governance slightly. 49 
The new formulation in the plan of action was particularly revealing. At paragraph 33, 
the plan of action reads:  
Internet governance: A transparent and democratic governance of the internet 
shall constitute the basis for the development of a global culture of cyber-security. 
An [international][intergovernmental] organisation should ensure multilateral, 
democratic and transparent management of root servers, domain names and 
Internet Protocol (IP) address assignment.50 
 That the words “international” and ‘intergovernmental” are inserted into para 33 
in square brackets is significant. In the referencing system used to mark-up negotiation 
documents in the UN system, square brackets are commonly used to indicate text that has 
been suggested by one or more delegation but that lacks unanimous approval (c.f Riles 
                                                
 
48 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom II, “Document WSIS/PC-2/C/0035 (add. 1)”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|2 
49 c.f. WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/1-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
 
50 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/2-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
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2006). By the intersessional meeting, in other words, it was clear that some WSIS 
delegations were campaigning for reform of the ICANN model or for its replacement by 
a more traditional, intergovernmental organization while others supported the existing 
model of an international organization that is not intergovernmental. The first phase of 
the debate over internet governance would be a battle over which word was going to have 
its square brackets removed. What was not clear was whether this debate was only about 
the DNS system or what exactly internet governance meant in the context of the WSIS. 
After lurking at the margins for the first months of the WSIS, by the end of PrepCom II, 
internet governance had officially arrived on the WSIS agenda, whatever it meant. 
 In their comments on this draft of the Declaration of Principles, Cuba suggests 
inserting the word “intergovernmental” into the first sentence of paragraph 44 so that it 
would read:  “internet governance must be multilateral, intergovernmental, democratic 
and transparent”.51  Brazil is more explicit, suggesting that its previously cited comments 
about the internet as a public good be amended to acknowledge that:  
The International Telecommunication Union, as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations System, shall play a leading role in the emergent information 
society and in the regulation of the global information and communications 
infrastructure.52 
By this point it was becoming clear that, for Brazil, an intergovernmental organization 
was required to govern a global public good. What was less clear at the time however, 
                                                
51 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E: (Reference document: 
Compilation of comments received by March 31, 2003)”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
 
52 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E: (Reference document: 
Compilation of comments received by March 31, 2003)”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
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was whether the global public good was, in Brazil’s view, the DNS system or 
communication on the internet. 
For example, in their comments on the Plan of Action, Brazilian proposed 
amendments include: “the internet is the base of the information society. The internet 
must be considered a public international domain. Every country and every person have 
the right to be connected and to take full advantage of the benefits offered by the 
internet”. However, Brazil then goes on to insist- in the very same paragraph- that the 
administration of the DNS must occur through an intergovernmental organization and 
involve developing countries.53 Again, the result is that when Brazil frames ‘internet 
governance’ “as a key issue of the information society”54, it is entirely unclear whether 
internet refers to the DNS system or something much broader.  
 The responses from developed country governments, the internet technical 
community and the private sector supporting the status quo were varied.  
The comments of certain delegations appear to be aimed at diffusing the tension 
by replacing references to specific organizations and institutional labels with more 
general terms. Australia, for example, simply calls for “administrative and coordination 
activities related to the internet [to] remain the responsibility of an organization with 
broad stakeholder input”. Canada insists that “the coordination responsible for root 
servers, domain names and Internet Protocol (IP) address assignment should rest with a 
suitable organization”. Leveraging the expressive potential of the conventions for 
                                                
53 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E: (Reference document: 
Compilation of comments received by March 31, 2003)”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all|  (at para 44) 
54 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E: (Reference document: 
Compilation of comments received by March 31, 2003)”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| (at para 33) 
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marking up UN negotiating documents to the hilt, Japan’s contribution was simply:   
"An [international][intergovernmental] organization should ensure  
multilateral…".55 
 ‘Broad’, ‘suitable’, ‘international’:  rather than referencing a definable institutional 
forum, each are vague normative catch-alls that could be argued to be present in the 
ICANN system as it was configured at the time, or to be a goal that the ICANN system 
was capable of working toward without fundamental changes in its mandate.   
Other comments were slightly more restrictive and prescriptive. The US  
emphasized the need for “public-private parternship” in DNS management in order to 
“preserve and enhance the necessary global interoperability and coordination of the 
internet's unique identifier system while recognizing its technical limitations and 
requirements”.56 The intervention of the Internet Society (ISOC)- a coordinating body for 
the activities and interests of the internet technical community- reinforced the  
implication that the calls for reform seemed to be neglecting the extent to which the 
characteristics of internet technologies effectively constrain the range of policy 
alternatives. ISOC professed to be 
very concerned by statements in the draft documents that imply the need for new, 
intergovernmental organizations to “manage” the internet. In particular, proposals 
to replace ICANN and create a new mechanism for managing root servers, 
domain names and IP addresses is unnecessary, will lead to significant disruption, 
                                                
55 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PCIP/DT/3-E: (Reference document: 
Compilation of comments received by March 31, 2003)”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all|  
56 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PC-3/CONTR/47-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all|  
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and is unlikely to succeed.57   
Inter-governmental oversight of the internet, was in other words, a total non-starter to a 
series of delegations.  
The invocation, at this juncture, of discourses on the limited extent to which the 
technology of the internet would tolerate such efforts is revealing. By asserting that the 
power dynamics of global internet governance simply preclude the possibly of dramatic 
calls for reform, the US, the ISOC and their sympathizers underline how, in the absence 
of a more intrusive legal framework, the ability to control and define technology is 
power. A subsequent CCBI intervention threatened that “business cannot accept any 
reference to an inter-governmental organization engaging in such management”.58 In 
other words, technological power was being wielded alongside political economic power 
by the chief beneficiaries of the status quo in the effort to use their capacity leverage to 
bully the debate over meaningful reform of internet governance right off the WSIS 
agenda before it even got off the ground.  
 The delegation comments on the March 21, 2003 draft documents were compiled 
into a single document that was distributed on June 12 and, despite their obvious 
contradictions, formed the basis of new versions (June 5, 2003) of the draft documents.59 
The WSIS entered the so-called intersessional meeting (July 15-18, 2003 in Paris) 
with a singular, if contradictory and controversial, set of draft paragraphs on internet 
governance. WSIS delegates thus arrived at the intersessional meeting entirely aware of 
                                                
57 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “Document WSIS/PC-3/89-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all|  
58 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional period, “WSIS/PC-3/CONTR/10-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pci|1&c_type=all| 
59 c.f. WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS03/PCIP/DT/4(Rev.1)-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3 
 and WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “WSIS/PCIP/DT/5”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3 
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the degree of divergence in opinions on internet governance. In recognition that the WSIS 
was further away from reaching consensus on the language on internet governance than it 
was on many of the other issues being discussed, governments created an “Internet 
Governance Ad-Hoc Working Group” at the intersessional meeting. With the exception 
of its first meeting, this Working Group did not adopt the multi-stakeholder rules of 
participation in force in the wider WSIS activities.  Meetings of the IG Ad-Hoc Working 
Group were largely restricted to government delegations, even if many sympathetic 
government delegations chose to openly report back to civil society and private sector 
would be interlocutors (see Kleinwächter 2004a). 
By the conclusion of the intersessional meeting, the draft Declaration of 
Principles proposed three possible formations of the main text on internet governance. 
Each agreed that the “the international management of the internet should be democratic, 
multilateral and transparent”. Opinions however, diverged from there.  
One proposal recognized that internet governance contained technical as well as 
policy issues. While private sector leadership should continue at the technical level, 
governments, it was argued, ought to  
take a lead role, in partnership with all other stakeholders, in developing and 
coordinating policies of the public interests related to stability, security, 
competition, freedom of use, protection of individual rights and privacy, 
sovereignty, and equal access for all. 
 This proposal remained unclear about whether this should occur within a traditional 
intergovernmental organization (presumably the ITU) or an ‘international’ one such as 
ICANN. The second proposal focused explicitly on the DNS. It asserted the sovereign 
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rights of countries over policy authority of their CCTLDs and called for multi-lingualism 
in internet governance. Responsibility for management of the DNS should reside, it 
continues, with an intergovernmental organization. The third proposed model suggested 
that global internet governance should “respect geographic diversity” and ensure the 
participation of those governments that are particularly “interested” in internet 
governance.60  
The Extract from the Draft Plan of Action was already managing expectations 
about the prospects for agreement prior to the conclusion of the Geneva phase of the 
summit, suggesting that the second phase of the WSIS should be devoted to reviewing 
the continuing international dialogue on the subject.61 In other words, by convening an 
Ad-Hoc working group on the subject, the WSIS probably did more to reinforce the 
differences between delegations on the issue of internet governance than it did to resolve 
them, at least initially.  
As an issue for the WSIS, internet governance was hardly unique in respect to its 
lack of progress. The initial two PrepComs and the intersessional period had largely been 
devoted to debate over the agenda and procedures of the Summit. There were very real 
logistical and financial obstacles to the efficient administration of negotiation62 and, in 
                                                
60 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS03/PCIP/DT/4(Rev.3)-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3 
61 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS03/PCIP/DT/7-E.”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3 (at 104 and 105) 
62 Numminen (2005, 65) writes that, in addition to all of the procedural questions raised by the inclusion of 
non-governmental stakeholders in the WSIS, there was the more basic issue of the effect that an 
exponentially increased population of accredited participants has on the secretariat. More people being 
allowed to speak means more words that need to be organized and taken into consideration. For example, 
the call for comments issued on the March 21, 2003 version of the plan of action alone solicited more than 
800 pages of responses that had to be read, analyzed and re-packaged in a useable format for WSIS 
participants. The need to do all of this before meetings can resume made immediate resumption of meetings 
difficult. Numminen also reminds us that “unlike the other UN Summits, WSIS preparations rely on 
voluntary contributions” meaning that, meeting time was required beyond what had originally planned for 
the PrepComs “nobody could guarantee that the costs of the resumed meeting would be covered”.  
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addition to the emergence of unanticipated issues such as internet governance, the 
inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in the WSIS to a degree that was essentially 
without precedent in the UN system had incited a prolonged discussion of procedures and 
modalities of participation. “PrepCom III in September 2003 was”, as Finish Ambassador 
Asko Numminen (2005, 65) put it, “the first formal preparatory committee to focus really 
on substance”.63 Thus, progress had not been made on emergent issues like internet 
governance. But then, progress had not really been made anywhere, including on issues 
that had been logical items for the WSIS agenda since the beginning such as:  financing 
the digital divide; the role of media in the information society; and freedom of expression 
and communication rights. However, amongst the general pressure and tension at 
PrepCom III, internet governance was particularly singled out as a difficult issue. 
 Negotiation of internet governance at PrepCom III was, according to Swiss 
Diplomat Marcus Kummer (2007, 6), “both very polarized and, to a large extent, also 
very abstract. There were misunderstandings on both sides”. The obstacles created by the 
fluid definitions of what internet governance was and the misunderstandings about what 
ICANN did and did not do were not lost on the participants to the debate. One 
government delegate recalled making a series of interventions   
stressing that we that we needed to get a handle on what [internet governance]  
was and what people mean about it. We couldn't possibly negotiate something as 
amorphous as the phrase ‘internet governance’. So our submissions were, okay- 
“we need a process to define what this is that will break out what governments 
                                                
63 After spending the weekend break of PrepCom III sequestered in the ITU building for 24 hours aiding 
the WSIS secretariat in expediting a workable set of new draft documents, the Finish delegation might have 
been given more cause than most to reflect on the how the WSIS had managed to arrive at PrepCom III 
with so little time remaining and so much work to do. (ibid) 
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can deal with from what they can't”- which I think is just sort of policy making 
101,  you can't do policy until you understand the topic.64 
The ‘governments only’ edict of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Internet 
Governance meant that many of the world’s leading practitioners of, and experts on, 
internet Governance were left milling around in the corridors outside the rooms in which 
the negotiations were taking place when they very easily could have been called upon to 
help fill in knowledge gaps and offer explanations when it became clear that 
misunderstandings were holding up progress. In what has become an oft-repeated parable 
in WSIS civil society circles, even ICANN CEO Paul Twomey himself had to leave the 
room so that governments could resume their debate (Kleinwächter 2004a).  
 By the end of the first week of PrepCom III, a new (Septmeber 19, 2003) draft had 
broken out the three competing versions of the Declaration of Principles’ paragraph 44 
into a series of new paragraphs. The divisive point remained the question of how issues 
that were now being discussed under the decidedly broader-than-ICANN label of 
“internet issues of an international nature related to public policies” should be 
coordinated. There were a series of alternative linguistic formations proposed, but the 
sticking point remained the role of governments and the imposition of an 
intergovernmental institution dedicated to internet governance.65  
                                                
64 Bill Graham, (Industry Canada), in discussion with author, Oct. 2006. 
65 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “WSIS/PC-3/DT/1”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-
all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3 (at para 44).  
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Over the rest of the September sitting of PrepCom III however, these paragraphs 
would change only slightly66 and they would not change at all over the course of the first 
resumed PrepCom III session held in November 2003.67  
 In a stroke of nomenclature that could only have been produced within the UN 
system, it was decided that there would be a “PrepCom III resumed II” to take place 
immediately before the first phase of the Summit, on December 5 and 6, 2003. 
Determined not to let the Geneva phase of the Summit fail on its watch, the Swiss 
delegation, led by Secretary of State for WSIS Marc Furrer, effectively took ownership 
over this final stage of the negotiation.68 Responsibility for pushing through a 
compromise on internet governance was assigned to Marcus Kummer.  
Faced with five different proposals for the conclusion of the paragraph on 
‘Internet issues of an international nature related to public policies’ that he saw as 
“mutually exclusive” and confronted with delegations that “were firmly entrenched in 
positions that were diametrically opposed”, Kummer (2007, 7) concluded that “the only 
way out was to establish a process to deal with these issues”. The last ditch efforts of 
PrepCom III resumed II focused less on bridging the gap between the different 
perspectives and instead “focused on the modalities of the process [delegates] hoped to 
initiate” to continue the discussion going forward (Kummer 2007 , 7). A key domino of 
compromise fell when the secretary general of the ITU was replaced as the presumptive 
                                                
66c.f. WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS/PC-3/DT/1(Rev.2 B )-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3  
 
67 WSIS Geneva Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS/PC-3/DT/6-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all-pc.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc|3  
68 In an article written after the WSIS, Furrer (2005, 73) admits that “behind the scenes, we had been 
preparing the ground for this facilitation work as early as October” suggesting that the debates over the 
controversial issues such as internet governance during the September sitting of PrepCom III were 
combative enough that it was already clear- at least to the Swiss- that the PrepCom III resumed session was 
not going to produce consensus. 
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convener of the proposed follow-up study group by the Secretary General of the UN 
itself. The initial proposal to appoint the head of the ITU as the chair of this group that 
was to study an issue being defined by a debate over the role of ICANN vs. the role of the 
ITU was politically fraught from the start. In Kummer’s words, the formula of including 
some form of United Nations involvement without favouring calls for greater ITU 
leadership provided “the flexibility required to be inclusive” to both the 
intergovernmental (ITU) and private sector (ICANN) factions (Kummer 2005, 246). 
Alongside this compromise there was some massaging of the language so that, in 
Kummer’s (ibid) terms 
the wording of the final documents addresses the needs of both groups: it takes 
care of those governments trying to find their role in this new policy environment, 
and it respects the views of those who emphasize the importance of the private 
sector and civil society. 
 Under these conditions, without reaching any kind of agreement about what 
internet governance means or who ought to be responsible for it, agreement on language 
on internet governance for the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action was 
reached late night on December 6th 2003; four days before the opening of the Geneva 
Summit and three days before a compromise would be reached on the creation of a 
funding program for the alleviation of the digital divide, the final unresolved phase I 
issue.  
Internet governance is discussed in the final Geneva Declaration of Principles in 
the following terms:  
48.The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public 
  
97 
and its governance should constitute a core issue of the Information 
Society agenda. The international management of the Internet should be 
multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of 
governments, the private sector, civil society and international 
organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of resources, 
facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the 
Internet, taking into account multilingualism. 
  
49.The management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public 
policy issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant 
intergovernmental and international organizations. In this respect it is 
recognized that: 
a. Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the 
sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for 
international Internet-related public policy issues; 
b. The private sector has had and should continue to have an 
important role in the development of the Internet, both in the 
technical and economic fields; 
c. Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, 
especially at community level, and should continue to play such a 
role; 
d. Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to 
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have a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related 
public policy issues; 
e. International organizations have also had and should continue to 
have an important role in the development of Internet-related 
technical standards and relevant policies. 
50. International Internet governance issues should be addressed in a 
coordinated manner. We ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to set up a working group on Internet governance, in an open and inclusive 
process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active participation of 
governments, the private sector and civil society from both developing and 
developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and 
international organizations and forums, to investigate and make proposals 
for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005.69 
 
And, in the Geneva Plan of Action (at 13b): 
We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to set up a working 
group on Internet governance, in an open and inclusive process that 
ensures a mechanism for the full and active participation of governments, 
the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed 
countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international 
organizations and forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as 
                                                
69 WSIS, Geneva Phase Summit. “Geneva Declaration of Principles: WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|1160 
 
  
99 
appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005. The group should, 
inter alia: 
i. develop a working definition of Internet governance; 
ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet 
governance; 
iii. develop a common understanding of the respective roles 
and responsibilities of governments, existing 
intergovernmental and international organisations and other 
forums as well as the private sector and civil society from 
both developing and developed countries; 
iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity to be 
presented for consideration and appropriate action for the 
second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 200570. 
Internet Governance at WSIS Round II: The WGIG 
 “Before it would have been possible to find a solution”, Kummer (2007, 7) 
understood, “there needed to be a common understanding that there was a problem that 
needed to be resolved”. More than a year after one head of delegation had been contacted 
by a colleague attending a WSIS regional meeting in Bucharest who knew internet  
governance was emerging on the WSIS agenda but did not know what it meant, internet 
governance had become a focal point of the WSIS agenda and there still was not a clear 
                                                
70 WSIS, Geneva Phase Summit. “Geneva Plan of Action: WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/0005”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|1160 
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understanding of what it meant. This is actually not as laughable as it might seem.  It 
could be said that internet governance as a new field of regulation was invented at this 
point of the WSIS.   
 The creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was the 
response to the definitional problem. The WGIG secretariat was formed in July 2004 and 
held a series of open consultations in Geneva from 20-21 September 2004. The 
composition of the Working Group was announced on November 11, 2004. There were 
40 members drawn from civil society, governments, industry, the internet technical 
community, NGOs and academia.71 “All members of the group had”, MacLean’s (2005, 
11) “Brief History of WGIG” explains, “expertise in some aspect of internet governance” 
and “many had also been involved in WSIS-I and previous multi-stakeholder policy 
processes such as the G-8 Digital Opportunities Task Force and the United Nations 
Information and Communication Technologies Task Force”. The usual UN overtures 
were made toward ensuring geographic and gender balance and toward promoting the 
representation of developing countries.  Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General 
Nitin Desai was appointed Chairman and Marcus Kummer directed the secretariat. 
 The first formal meeting of the WGIG was convened on November 23, 2004. In 
what was a somewhat auspicious beginning, ITU Secretary General, Yoshio Utsumi 
delivered a speech that one WGIG member summarized “in a few words” as making the 
case that:  
the focus of the group’s work should be the managing of names, addresses and 
protocols- the rest, according to Utsumi, was illusory […] the group should 
concentrate on discussing proposals for the worldwide management of the 
                                                
71 For a list of WGIG membership see its report (WGIG 2005).  
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internet’s logical infrastructure (Afonso 2005, 9).  
Given the ITU’s declared interest in worldwide management of the internet and the fact 
that the WGIG owed its mandate in part to the intractability of the WSIS phase I conflict 
over the role of the ITU, some interpreted this speech as a transparent and self-interested 
effort to set the WGIG agenda. In the aftermath of this episode however (and perhaps 
partially because of the animosity it inspired), the WGIG was- by all accounts- able to 
take a broad-based and fresh look at the issues being discussed by the WSIS under the 
heading of internet governance in a cordial and productive manner (c.f. Drake 2005b).  
 The WGIG held four meetings: November 23-25, 2004; February 14-18, 2005; 
April 18-20, 2005; and June 14-17 2005. All of these meetings took place at UN offices 
in Geneva although, during the final meeting, the group decamped to the Chateau de 
Bossey located in the country-side environs of Geneva to facilitate the report drafting 
process. In addition to the open consultations, a variety of WSIS regional and sub-
regional meetings provided input to the WGIG’s work (see Drake 2005b, 4). ICANN, the 
ISOC and a variety of internet technical organizations and academic institutions also held 
what were described as “various contributory sessions to the ongoing debate” (ibid).  
 The WGIG submitted a preliminary report to WSIS phase II PrepCom II which 
was discussed in a plenary session on Feburary 24, 2005, and released its final report July 
14, 2005. The methodology of the WGIG was to start by identifying all of the public 
policy issues relevant to internet governance and then to progressively build bottom-up 
toward a working definition of internet governance that would “capture the essential 
elements that were common to all of these issues” (MacLean 2005, 11). 
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From ICANN to Internet Governance 
 The WGIG report provides an accounting of what were determined to be the 13 
highest priority “public policy issues that are potentially relevant to internet 
governance72” which were organized into four “key public policy areas”: 
a. Issues relating to infrastructure and the management of crucial internet 
resources; 
b. Issues relating to the use of the internet;  
c. Issues relevant to the internet but, like intellectual property rights or 
international trade, “have an impact much wider than the internet and 
for which existing organizations are responsible”; 
d. Development and capacity building in developing countries. 
The WGIG understood that ICANN was just one dimension of the calls that  
“something must be done about…” that had dominated the first phase of the WSIS. The 
fundamental disconnect was that calls for reform of ICANN were being based not just on 
the need to do something about ICANN, but also the need to do something about a series 
of issues over which ICANN possessed no mandate.  
The WGIG accepted that if a policy field of internet governance was going to be 
defined, then issues outside the mandate of ICANN had to be a part of it.  Furthermore, 
the WGIG was clear that, if issues that were external to ICANN could be considered to 
                                                
72 Namely: Administration of the root zone files and system; interconnection costs; internet stability, 
security and cybercrime; spam; meaningful participation in global policy development; capacity-building; 
allocation of domain names; IP addressing; intellectual property rights (IPR); freedom of expression; data 
protection and privacy rights; consumer rights; multi-lingualism. (WGIG 2005, 4-6).  
  
103 
be internet governance issues, than internet governance had to be defined as something 
broader than the management of the DNS system. It is significant in this respect, that 
within the WGIG’s efforts to map the policy field of internet governance, “administration 
of the root zone files and system” was but one of the thirteen policy issues. It was also 
only one of a series of issues mentioned under the “Issues relating to infrastructure and 
the management of crucial internet resources” policy area (WGIG 2005).  
 As promised, the WGIG report presented a working definition of internet 
governance:  
Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the internet (WGIG 2005, 3). 
The WGIG report provided an accounting of the roles and responsibilities of 
governments, civil society and the private sector. It concluded that “some adjustments 
needed to be made to bring” the existing internet governance arrangements “more in line 
with the WSIS criteria of transparency, accountability, multilateralism and the need to 
address all public policy issues related to internet governance in a coordinated manner”  
(WGIG 2005, 9). In response it presented a proposal for creation of a forum that would 
function as a “new space for dialogue for all stakeholders on an equal footing on all 
internet governance related issues” (ibid). The WGIG report also proposed four different 
institutional models that could serve as the basis of a reformed system of “global public 
policy and oversight” which are outlined below in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Summary- The WGIG Models for Institutional Reform of Global Internet  
Public Policy and Oversight 
 
Italics: Proposed new organization/institution;  Underscored: Existing organizations/institutions subject to reform 
(reform details in brackets) 
 
 Oversight Government 
Input 
Policy 
making 
Management 
of Root 
Buoyed Sidelined 
Model 1 Global Internet 
Council (GIC) 
[anchored in the 
UN system] 
GIC GIC  ICANN, 
(formally 
accountable 
to GIC)  
-UN 
-govs. 
-ICANN GAC 
-US DOC 
-Civil Society and Private 
Sector (advisory roles) 
Model 2 None ICANN 
GAC 
(enhanced) 
- IGF* 
[coordinati
on/ analysis 
function]  
-ICANN 
 
-govs.  
(only 
slightly) 
-US DOC 
-UN 
Model 3 International 
Internet Council 
(IIC) 
IIC IIC ICANN, 
(accountable 
to IIC, with 
a host 
country 
agreement) 
-govs. -ICANN GAC 
-US DOC 
-UN 
-Civil Society and Private 
Sector (advisory roles in 
IIC) 
Model 4 Oversight 
Committee 
(Appointed by 
the Global 
Internet Policy 
Council [GIPC]) 
-GIPC 
-Oversight 
Committee 
-Advisory 
function in 
WICANN 
-GIPC 
-GIGF 
(Global 
internet 
governance 
forum) 
WICANN 
(“World 
ICANN”: 
linked to UN 
with a host 
country 
agreement) 
-UN 
-govs. 
 
-US DOC 
-Civil Society (observer 
role in GIPC and 
WICANN in observer 
capacity) 
-Private Sector (lead 
operational role in 
WICANN but observer 
status in GIPC and 
WICANN policy 
making) 
 
 When the discussion of internet governance resumed in the WSIS at phase II, 
PrepCom III, there was palpable appreciation evident for the work of the WGIG direction 
and membership. For staunch supporters of multi-stakeholder global governance, the 
WGIG is often pointed to as an ideal; a common refrain amongst WSIS civil society 
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participants who participate in the IGF is that “The IGF is no WGIG”. Former WGIG 
member Bill Drake (2005b) makes the case that the WGIG facilitated the WSIS 
negotiations on internet governance by: 
• Providing a common vocabulary to the terms and issues being debated that 
reduced the frequency of, and frustration over, the sort of misunderstandings that 
had plagued the internet governance debates during WSIS phase I; 
• Allowing for civil society, internet technical and industry experts to be in the 
room while government representatives addressed internet governance issues, 
thereby facilitating a process of institutional learning (see also Drake 2005a) that 
organically cleared up and filled in many of the misconceptions and knowledge 
gaps that had been evident during WSIS-1 (and thus also demonstrating the 
benefits of multi-stakeholder collaboration); 
• Creating a non-binding process wherein members could discuss openly and thus 
clarify not only the issues themselves but where various other delegations stood 
on them; 
• Incubating and developing the concept of an internet governance forum; 
• Deflecting the calls for reform away from a focus on the ITU’s possible role in 
global internet governance;  
• Creating a year and half long period of détente while the WSIS process largely 
put aside the issue of internet governance waiting for the conclusion of the 
WGIG. Thus allowing for the temperature to be reduced a bit and for delegations 
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to better coordinate and work through their positions;   
• Working through concepts and definitions.  
 As we have seen, the WSIS did not step into a vacuum on internet governance. 
The context in which the issue was raised at the WSIS was set by the legacy of the initial 
rounds of the domain name wars as well as the conventional view that pretty much 
everything else related to the internet was some combination of inherently democratic 
and immune to control. The result, according to Drake (2005a, 144), was that when the 
term first emerged during the WSIS 
the nearly standard practice [had] been to equate the term ‘internet governance’ 
with the social organization of internet identifiers and the root server system and, 
by extension, the functions preformed by the ICANN.  
This “narrow definition”, Drake continues 
was inconsistent with the empirical reality that there are a variety of collectively 
applicable, private and public sector rules, procedures and programs that shape 
both the internet’s infrastructure (physical and logical) and the transactions and 
content conveyed thereby. 
 What emerged in its place over the course of the first phase of the WSIS debate 
was what Drake (ibid) calls “a broader and more holistic conception that could 
encompass the full range of internet governance mechanisms and facilitate their 
systematic evaluation and coordinated improvement”.  
 Explicitly disaggregated from the question of ICANN oversight, certain public 
policy issues that had been discussed over the first phase of the WSIS lent themselves to 
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relatively uncontroversial resolution in phase II. This was the case, for example, with 
international interconnection costs, the questions related to the regional internet registrars 
and the linkages between government sovereignty and CCTLDs.  Other issues that had 
been prominent topics of discussion during the first phase of the WSIS and that had been 
identified by the WGIG as legitimate concerns within the field of internet governance 
such as free software and freedom of expression/communication rights virtually dropped 
off of the WSIS agenda altogether.  
 But the question of ICANN oversight, despite the work that the WGIG did to 
strip it of the mostly external public issues that had been grafted onto it over the course of 
phase I, remained a contested and controversial focus throughout.  
 The US Government, for instance, released a statement of four internet 
principles in June of 2005 and conceded that 
Governments have legitimate interest in the management of their country code top 
level domains (CCTLD).  The United States recognizes that governments have 
legitimate public policy and sovereignty concerns with respect to the management 
of their CCTLD.  As such, the United States is committed to working with the 
international community to address these concerns, bearing in mind the 
fundamental need to ensure stability and security of the internet's DNS […]we 
encourage an ongoing dialogue with all stakeholders around the world in the 
various fora as a way to facilitate discussion and to advance our shared interest in 
the ongoing robustness and dynamism of the internet. 
But insisted that  
ICANN is the appropriate technical manager of the Internet DNS […] the United 
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States is committed to taking no action that would have the potential to adversely 
impact the effective and efficient operation of the DNS and will therefore 
maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the 
authoritative root zone file.73 
But, despite making progress in achieving broad-based recognition- even from the 
US Government- of the need to establish public policies related to certain internet 
governance issues external to the question of ICANN’s oversight, many governments still 
wanted control of the DNS switch. 
 
Internet Governance at WSIS Round III: The Tunis Compromise 
 Responses to the WGIG report were collected over the course of the summer74 
and the effort to negotiate an agreement on global internet governance resumed in the 
WSIS with the opening of the third and final planned PrepCom of the 2nd phase on 
September 19th, 2005. As during the run up to the first phase, it was clear that it was 
going to be difficult- if not impossible- to reach an agreement before the Summit. 
Whereas internet governance was just one of a handful of issues that were not close to 
resolution by the final PrepCom of phase I, PrepCom III of the 2nd phase consisted of two 
subcommittees: Subcommittee A devoted to negotiation of internet governance and 
Subcommittee B that was devoted to negotiation of everything else to do with the 2nd 
phase of the Summit. The debate over internet governance had grown in significance at 
the WSIS, but had it evolved? 
                                                
73 US Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 
“Domain Names: U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System”, NTIA, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/usdnsprinciples_06302005.htm 
 
74 WSIS Tunis Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS-II/PC-3/DT/7(Rev. 2) E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all| 
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 The work of the WGIG in itemizing and explaining these categories 
undoubtedly proved instructive to many delegations and provided a lexicon for framing 
issues and perspectives going forward. While such efforts may have cleared up previous 
misunderstandings and prevented new ones from occurring, the WGIG’s terms of 
reference provided a common language in which stakeholders could express not only 
their agreements, but their differences as well.    
 The responses to the WGIG report revealed a general consensus that the WGIG 
definition of internet governance was at least workable and that there was little objection 
to using the WSIS to express aspirations that a handful of the public policy goals outlined 
in the WGIG report- combating spam, increasing capacity of developing countries to 
participate in internet governance, reinforcing the principle that governments have 
sovereignty over their CCTLDs, underlining the need for multi-lingualism,  etc.- might 
eventually be realized.75 In regard to institutional and operational questions- about the 
roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders, about the creation of an internet 
governance forum and crucially about the question of governmental oversight- however, 
the comments on the WGIG report reveal stark differences of opinion. 
 These differences were emphatically underlined only minutes into the first 
session of Subcommittee A of PrepCom III on September 20, 2005 by a Brazilian 
intervention that described internet governance in “three words: lack of legitimacy”. 
From there, Brazil moved on to argue that the adage “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” was a 
non-sensical and Orwellian construct, and to suggest instead that delegates consider 
                                                
75 WSIS Tunis Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS-II/PC-3/DT/7(Rev. 2) E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all| 
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“Stein’s law” that says that “things that can’t go on forever don’t”.76  Brazil, in other 
words, got straight to the point in summarizing the veracity of the calls for reform of 
global internet governance and in making an effort to disavow WSIS participants of any 
notion that the WGIG had somehow eliminated the fundamental differences that existed 
between the status quo and reform perspectives during the first phase.  
 What was clear from the comments that were received on the WGIG report and 
from the early discussions at PrepCom III was that the difference in opinion, though it 
had not gone away, had evolved. There was little direct discussion of the ITU in the 
PrepCom III round of the debate. Instead of ICANN vs. ITU, the discussion was largely 
over “the current system” vs. “a different system with a larger role for governments”. A 
knock-on effect of this discursive shift was the space that it created between the two 
poles for middle ground positions. Whereas many delegations had previously been unsure 
whether they preferred the ICANN or the ITU or had joined one or the other camp as a 
lesser of two evils choice, over the course of PrepCom III the notion that change to the 
existing system of global internet governance could occur in degrees and was not an all 
or nothing proposition emerged as viable negotiating position. 
 By the end of a first week in which the meetings of PrepCom III Subcommittee 
A were largely devoted to general discussion of the issues and repeated debate of 
procedural concerns (including the status of various working documents, the participation 
of non-governmental stakeholders and, generally, the working methods of the 
subcommittee), a “Chair’s Paper” Draft of the chapter on internet governance was 
                                                
76 The if “it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” line of defense of the status quo was articulated in various formations 
on numerous occasions. For example, it is spelled it in exactly those terms in then ICANN executive and 
‘internet founding father’  Vinton Cerf’s contribution to a UN-ICT Task Force published volume of articles 
on internet governance circulated to WSIS participants  (see Stauffacher and Kleinwachter 2005).  
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prepared.77 The level of detail in most sections reflected a growing sense of confidence 
on the part of the chair that consensus was emerging on certain issues. But the part 
labelled “Follow-up and Possible Future Arrangements” contained only a point-form 
laundry list of the really contentious issues: oversight, institutions and the creation of an 
internet governance forum (ibid).  The comments that were received on this part of the 
first draft made it clear that the reform-minded governments and the defenders of the 
status quo were still very far apart.  
 
The EU and a “New Cooperation Model” 
 A significant change in the dynamics of the WSIS IG negotiations occurred on 
Wednesday September 28th, 2005.  
 After arranging a meeting of senior officials- many of whom flew to Geneva 
from capitals all around Europe just for the occasion, the European Union introduced its 
own proposal for follow-up and future arrangements. The proposal was introduced by the 
head of the British delegation (acting in his capacity as head of the EU delegation) as  
“something that we hope the people from the extreme positions of the discussion could 
come to agree on”. “We hope”, he continued- obviously anticipating how it might 
actually be received- “that they will take it away and react tonight or react tomorrow 
rather than reacting as they hear it or read it” and, “with that explanation…”, he read 
aloud a proposal from the EU for “a new cooperation model” for global internet 
governance that involved:  
• International government involvement at the level of principles over various 
naming, numbering and addressing related matters including: allocation of IP 
                                                
77 WSIS Tunis Phase PrepCom III, “Document WSIS-II/PC-3/DT/10-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all| 
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blocks; procedures for changing the root zone file (particularly for new top level 
domain name creation and changes to CCTLD managers); DNS system rules; 
contingency planning for ensuring the continuity of the DNS functions; 
establishment of arbitration and dispute resolution mechanisms linked to 
international law; 
• Creation of an internet governance forum; and, in parallel a separate process to 
transition to the new model of international cooperation.  
 The “new cooperation model” was to be based on the principles of: not 
replacing existing mechanisms or institutions; maintaining a multi-stakeholder public 
private partnership; and reinforcing the involvement of government in the “principle 
issues of public policy”. The latter objective was, the proposal suggested, to be 
accomplished without granting governments any “involvement in the day-to-day 
operation” or threatening the existing “architectural principles of the internet, including 
the interoperability, openness and the end-to-end principle”. 78 
 Privately, the chair and secretariat and other delegations- including the EU- had 
been informed about the American “red line”; the maximum extent of the concessions 
that the US delegation was willing and authorized to make.79 In any case, despite being 
introduced with a disclaimer that called for other delegations to sleep on the proposal 
before reacting, the response of the Americans suggests that they immediately interpreted 
the proposal as a challenge to their authority.  
                                                
78 WSIS Phase II PrepCom III, “28 September 2005: European Union”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all| 
 
79 point corroborated by various interviews for this thesis.   
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 At the conclusion of the evening sitting of Subcommitte A on September 28th, 
2005 the US delegation asked for and was granted the floor. The interventions of US 
spokesperson Dick Beaird had, over the course of the PrepCom III, offered a master-class 
in the rhetoric of diplomacy. Disarmingly civil, Beaird’s interventions generally managed 
to be non-confrontational and support points made by other delegations while deflecting 
focus and discussion away from key issues and the specifics of US positions on them. In 
response to the EU proposal, rather than deflecting attention away from the issue, the US 
delegation chose to be direct and to the point in emphatically restating its position and 
what it was not willing to accept. “We want to make perfectly clear once again”, Beaird 
began 
[the distinction] between public policy and the day-to-day operations of the 
internet. The day-to-day operations of the internet, of which any changes or 
modifications to the authoritative root zone file is a part, is essential to the trust 
and confidence that the world may have and should have in the internet. It is a 
responsibility that the US takes with great seriousness and we will not do 
anything to adversely impact that responsibility. On the other hand, there are 
many issues that we would say fall in the domain of the public policy realm. That 
includes: spam, viruses, cybersecutiry, cybercrime all of the issues that we are 
very much concerned with and that we wish to engage in actively on a dialogue 
that will lead to the resolution of those issues.  
Concluding with the salutation, “Mr. Chairman, these are issues that this delegation takes 
as fundamental”80, the Americans emphatically reinforced the point that this was- in no 
                                                
80 Due to the length of this important intervention my field notes were checked against the streamed video 
archive of the session in which it occurred for accuracy. See ITU, “Broadcasting services for the Third 
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uncertain terms- their red line. The WSIS would either reach an agreement on internet 
governance that did not challenge it, or would reach no agreement that the Americans 
would accept.  
 The US was not alone in arriving at this interpretation of the EU proposal. Over 
the course of the first session of Subcomittee A on Thursday September 29th, 2005, a 
series of delegations took the floor to express interest in and support for the EU proposal. 
Making matters worse for EU/American relations, these new-found friends included:  the 
governments who had been most vocal in their calls for reform to the global internet 
governance system over the course of the WSIS such as Brazil and China; governments 
such as Saudi Arabia whose interest in communication regulation has historically been 
very different from that of most European Countries; and countries such as Iran, 
Venezuela and Cuba with whom the United States was actively engaged in diplomatic 
hostilities of varying degrees at the time.81   
 Delegations supporting proposals from Iran, Brazil and Argentina were 
encouraged by the chair to discuss their positions with the EU with an eye to condensing 
the series of proposals into one. The reports returned the next day- what was supposed to 
be the final day of PrepCom III- were clear that common ground had not been found 
between the EU and the other delegations.  
                                                                                                                                            
Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for WSIS (PrepCom-3)” , ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/ibs/WSIS/p2/pc3/index.phtml 
 
81 For instance: Cuba was under embargo until 2009; Venezuela under the Chavez presidency has gone out 
of its way to be antagonistic toward and isolated from the US and, over the later part of the George W. 
Bush presidency Iran’s refusal to abandon its nuclear program and its threatening behavior toward Israel, 
the US and the UN was the source of considerable discussion of a possible American military campaign 
against Iran (as was perhaps most famously captured by presidential candidate John McCain’s 2007 
expression of foreign policy by other means in which he sang “Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb Iran” to the 
melody of the Beach Boys song “Barbara Ann”).  
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 Regardless, there was a sudden spike in media attention on the WSIS that 
included a series of “EU and US clash over control of net” headlined stories that 
appeared in papers such as the New York Times and the International Herald Tribune on 
September 30th, 82 implying that the EU might be capitalizing on anti-Iraq War backlash 
to send a message about US unilateralism. 
 With that, Subcommittee A of precpom III ended much the way it had started: 
with a debate over the status of a document (the WGIG report in the beginning, a 
proposed Chair’s paper in the end).83 A draft declaration that was coming together on 
many issues, but sparse on the crucial questions of institutional reform, as well as a series 
of proposals on oversight and the internet governance forum, were forwarded for further 
negotiations planned in a PrepCom III resumed session scheduled for the days preceding 
the Tunis phase of the Summit. 84  But, with the Tunis Summit fast approaching and the 
debates receiving sensational coverage in the global media, the stakes were higher.  
 Of the proposals on the table, those of Saudi Arabia (on behalf of the Arab 
Group) and Iran centred on explicit creation of a new intergovernmental institution for 
oversight of the internet. Proposals from the EU, Ghana (on behalf of the African Group), 
Argentina and Russia each implied some process of gradual internationalization of 
internet governance. This was typically framed as an increase in the role of governments 
in internet public policy that remained vague about where internet public policy stops and 
oversight begins. The proposals from Brazil, Canada and Japan focused only the creation 
of the forum, though Ghana, Argentina, the EU and Saudi Arabia also advocated creation 
                                                
82 c.f. Wright (2007). This is beyond the scope of this thesis but it would be fascinating for further research 
to explore how this came about and what the whole episode suggests about the general problem of media 
coverage of communication policy and political economy issues.  
83 The particular document status debate that concluded this session is described in Chapter 5.  
84 I have summarized these proposals in a table presented in Appendix II.  
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of a forum. The Brazilian delegation framed its proposal for the forum as separate from 
its view on an intergovernmental oversight mechanism while Canada did not support new 
oversight at all and the Japanese proposal was clear that the discussion of new models 
should continue in the forum.85  
 In other words, the first- and initially only planned- sitting of PrepCom III 
concluded with calls for radical overhaul of the system that were entirely at odds with the 
line in the sand that had been drawn by supporters of the status quo. In the middle had  
emerged a perspective centred around progressive or evolutionary change and the idea 
that a forum could be created as a new institution whose non-binding mandate would not 
substantively impact the status quo. “I think at that stage that it became clear” to the chair 
and the secretariat that “when you get a problem that you can’t solve, you have to 
devolve a mechanism to continue to talk about it. The mechanism in the first phase was 
WGIG, the mechanism in the second phase was the IGF”. The forum was not only, in 
that sense “the way out”, it was essentially “the same way out that had been decided at 
the first phase”. 86 
 Between the conclusion of the September sitting of PrepCom III and the 
resumed session in Novemeber, 2005 work and politics continued behind the scenes. In 
the lead-up to the resumed PrepCom III session, the US is said to have exercised pressure 
at the highest diplomatic levels of its special friendship with the UK in order to convey 
the gravity of the EU proposal.87 
                                                
85 All of these proposals are available on the Prepocom III documents site. 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all|  
More details are available in Appendix 2 of this thesis (see previous note).  
 
86 Tim Kelly, (ITU Strategic Planning and WSIS Executive Secretariat), in discussion with author, July 
2007.  
87 In what has become the stuff of WSIS lore, Condelezza Rice is rumored to have personally sent her 
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The Tunis Compromise 
 Subcommittee A of PrepCom III resumed in Tunis on November 14, 2005 with 
a reminder from the chair that “we have a responsibility to citizens and constituencies 
around the world to come up with a result”. In plenary sessions and break out drafting 
groups, debate continued, often picking up where it had left off in September.  
 On the forum function, the US was willing to admit that “the United States 
always believes in dialogue” but Australia was insisting that the forum should be “pro-
market” and that it was “not the time to talk about governments”. When Saudi Arabia 
requested insertion of “a new cooperation model” into a room document list of common 
ground principles, Australia was quick to point out that there was not agreement that 
WSIS should advocate new models and the US insisted that, rather than a middle ground 
position, “a new cooperation model has become indistinguishable with a new 
intergovernmental model”.  
 From there, discussion shifted to the question of whether the ICANN GAC 
could be reformed to improve the participation of governments or whether a new body 
needed to be formed instead. Arguing that “we will never find a compromise on the word 
                                                                                                                                            
British counter part, Jack Straw a diplomatic letter expressing American concern for the EU (The British 
were, at the time, head of the EU delegation in their capacity as President of the EU) position on internet 
governance. What is claimed to be a text of the letter found its way to being available on the internet 
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/02/rice_eu_letter/). Exerts include:   
The success of the internet lies in its inherently decentralized nature, with the most significant 
growth taking place at the outer edges of the network through innovative new applications and 
services. Burdensome, bureaucratic oversight is out of place in an internet structure that has 
worked so well for many around the globe. We regret the recent positions on internet 
governance(i.e., the “new cooperation model”) offered by the European Union, the Presidency of 
which is currently held by the United Kingdom, seems to propose just that - a new structure of 
intergovernmental control over the internet[…]we ask the European Union to reconsider its new 
position on internet governance and work together with us to bring the benefits of the Information 
Society to all. 
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oversight”, the EU responded that the goal of the WSIS should come down to “creat[ing] 
a legal ground for the improvement of the GAC”. At that point, the Chair introduced a 
letter from then Chairman of the ICANN Board Vinton Cerf to GAC chair Mohamed 
Sharil Tarmizi discussing the need for reform. Acknowledging that, through the WSIS, “a 
great deal of attention has been devoted to the role of governments in the process of 
‘Internet Governance’”, Cerf suggests scheduling a meeting to “discuss how to best 
address these concerns, and what measures need to be taken to make our cooperation 
more effective, including ensuring the participation of developing countries”.88 At a 
crucial moment, ICANN was making very public overtures to its critics.  
 At the start of the evening session on November 14th, in response to a new 
Chair’s paper that included creation of a forum, discussion focused on the institutional 
teeth that the forum would be given. Australia argued against use of the word 
“governance” in the name of the forum, suggesting a change from “Internet Governance 
Forum” to “Internet Dialogue Forum”. The same intervention also advocated the ISOC as 
the host organization of the forum, a call which was echoed by the US in an intervention 
that criticized the UN and the ITU as unsuitable potential host organizations.  Imagining 
newspaper headlines along the lines of “Internet Kindergarten Forum”, Brazil, for one, 
voiced concern that a non-binding forum hosted outside of the UN system would not be 
taken seriously as en effort to internationalize internet governance.  
 The final planned day of negotiations began with the EU’s self proclaimed 
effort to “fit between two opposing sides”. They put forth a proposal that the forum be 
                                                
88 ICANN Correspondence, “Letter from Cerf to Tarmizi”. ICANN, 
http://www.icann.org/correspondence/cerf-tarmizi-08nov05.pd 
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accompanied by a parallel process of “enhanced cooperation” which would “enable 
governments, on equal footing to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international 
public policy issues pertaining to the internet not in the day to day or technical operation 
or arrangements”.  
 The US was satisfied that, within the proposed compromise, “the UN does not 
have a regulatory or oversight function”. Thus, it proved willing to accept a proposal to 
ask the Secretary General of the UN to convene the IGF. To the US, Australia and others, 
ISOC would have been a preferable institutional home for the IGF.  But, the UNSG was a 
good deal less problematic as convener of the forum for these delegations than the ITU 
would have been.  The vague parallel process of enhanced cooperation was accepted in 
principle.  After resolving a debate over the relative merits of the words “framework” vs. 
“mechanisms” and of “structures” vs. “systems”, the massaging of the final language 
concluded late on November 15th 2005. Saudi Arabia (as well as Iran and South Africa)  
threatened to reopen previously agreed upon paragraphs if the US did not concede to 
removing the clause “if justified” from the section on creating suitable multilateral 
mechanisms. The US promised to respond in kind by revisiting the concessions it had 
made elsewhere. The EU proposed reformulating “if justified” to “when justified”, which 
was rejected by the Saudis, Iranians and South Africans who then accepted a follow-up 
EU proposal for “where justified”. With that the WSIS negotiations on internet 
governance concluded and the square brackets were removed around the Tunis texts on 
internet governance.89  
                                                
89 The Chapter from the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society on internet governance is excerpted in 
Appendix 4 of this thesis. The entire document and its companion Tunis Commitment are available online. 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266|2267 
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Chapter Conclusion: Global Internet Governance between Code and Law 
 
 As reviewed in chapter 1, the characteristics of digital technologies and the 
processes associated with globalization were typically interpreted as making 
regulation of the internet impossible. Internet governance before the WSIS tended 
to be defined in very narrow terms, referring to a series of technical management 
functions associated with the DNS system rather a broad normative process of 
regulating communication.   
 Over the course of the case study that was narrated in this chapter, a series of 
seemingly isolated grievances about the allocation of internet resources effectively 
problemitized this instrumental view of internet governance. This was described by one 
interview subject as the “something has got to be done about….” school of thought. 
While certain policy issues pertained to the failure of markets or to the incapacity of 
developing countries to engage in them (the questions of English dominance of internet 
content, internet interconnection costs and of free vs. propriety software, for example), 
the majority of the things that “something had to be done” about reflected dissatisfaction 
with the performance of regulatory functions that had been devolved to the law of code.  
For example:  
• The “technical management” functions preformed in the DNS system were 
increasingly being seen to codify values into the internet about the economic and 
cultural attributes of communication, about taste, about languages, cultures and 
even about the sovereignty of peoples and nations;  
• The experiences of South Africa, Brazil and other governments as well as the 
controversy over the .xxx GTLD were leading many to see the regulatory 
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functions of the DNS systems as propriety, clandestine and closed rather than 
transparent, open and fair. 
The absence of global oversight of the DNS system means that, for the majority of the 
world’s governments, the DNS system is essentially a self-executing regulator, and Brazil 
and South Africa clearly saw themselves as having had subjective constraints imposed 
upon them through the ICANN system.90 
The “something” around which the majority of these calls that “something must 
be done” were framed was juridical intervention.  But, the debate over the applicability of 
public policy issues to global internet governance during the first phase of the WSIS 
often failed to distinguish between different types of policy issues and was largely devoid 
of specifics and solutions. Absent specifics about what different public policy issues 
involved, the IG discussions at WSIS phase I lent themselves toward conceptual catch-all 
debate over whether public policy applied to internet governance or not.  As one delegate 
described it:  
people had been talking about public policy as if public policy was some single 
unified homogeneous thing that you could recognize because it wore a long green 
dress. And anything that wasn’t public policy wore anything apart from a long 
green dress.91 
 The work that the WGIG did on parsing out the phase I debate into separate 
silos of “oversight”, “forum” and “public policy issues” informed the WSIS as to how 
                                                
90 In Lessig’s sense, the term “self-executing” regulator applies to the absence of human agency and 
oversight on automatic processes in checking architectural constraints. The WSIS debate suggests that the 
lack of political agency and oversight over the people who are charged with devising architectural 
constraints of the internet can be viewed as a logical extension of the problem of self-executing regulation 
by code.   
91 Martin Boyle, (Department of Trade and Industry, Government of the UK), in conversation with author, 
Nov. 2006.  
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public policy and internet governance interact and, in the process, underlined  how code 
and law interact in the regulation of the internet.  The presence of officially sanctioned 
resource material that contradicted claims about both the absence and ubiquity of public 
policy issues within the system of global internet governance provided something of a 
check on the rhetoric of supporters of both the reform and status quo positions. 
 The Chair’s introductory remarks to Phase II, PrepCom III included a plea for 
“the custodians of the internet” to “acknowledge that the internet can and is governed”. 
The either “global internet governance is regulatable by law” or “it is not” debate of 
phase I evolved into a discussion of what public policy issues legitimately should be 
treated as internet governance issues, which ones are related to the DNS systems and 
what balance between regulation by code and regulation by law needed to be struck as a 
result.  
 The acknowledgement in the Tunis Phase final documentation that public 
policy issues such as the sovereignty of CCTLDs and interconnection costs  
interface directly with the technical management of the internet, underlines an  
acceptance by WSIS of the  point that law can be- in principle- a more appropriate  
regulator in internet governance than code. The WSIS recognizes that in certain 
 cases, public policy issues may emerge from the governance of  certain specific 
and disparate functions that might warrant juridical intervention. The debate over  
the functioning of the DNS system also concedes that, regardless of whether or not 
the  internet can be described as a singular object, the internet at least contains 
singular choking points.  
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 Thus, the WSIS established in both empirical and political terms that the 
internet can be regulated and that the concerns of governments can and must 
influence this process. Yet, while the WSIS proved to be an effective venue for 
gaining recognition of the existence of public policy issues within internet 
governance, efforts to use public policy intervention as tool of reform were largely 
unsuccessful.     
Over the course of the first phase of the summit, many of the higher order, more 
abstract calls that would have contributed to the formation of a legal framework for 
regulating mass communication in the information society were gradually massaged out 
of the WSIS documents or diluted past the point of having a substantive effect. The anti-
globalization language proposed by Iran was ultimately rejected. Despite the knock-on 
awareness raising benefits that they produced, efforts to get the “right to communicate” 
mentioned in the Geneva Declaration of Principles ultimately proved unsuccessful.92 
Early drafts of the Geneva documents included strong language that free and open 
software  “should be used more broadly”, in particular, that the “adoption of open-
source/free software shall be actively considered by all public authorities and bodies” in 
order to “to provide freedom of choice and to facilitate access to ICTs by all citizens, at 
an affordable cost”.93 By the final Geneva phase documents however, the language on 
free and open source software had been massaged to refer only to the need to “promote 
awareness” of the “different software models and licenses” including both proprietary 
and free and open source. The effort to deal with financing telecommunications 
                                                
92 See O’Siochru (2010) for an overview of these efforts, their impact and the ultimate decision not to 
include the R2C in the Geneva documents.  
93 WSIS Geneva Phase intersessional meeting. “Document WSIS03/PCIP/DT/5-E”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory/PrepCom/intersessional/index.html 
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infrastructure and connectivity in the developing world as a response to the digital divide 
was downgraded from an obligatory tax on developed countries to a voluntary “digital 
solidarity fund”. At present, it is widely regarded as having entirely collapsed. And, of 
course, the effort to redefine the legal framework for oversight of the DNS led to no 
meaningful reform of the existing system.  
As discussed at length in chapter 1,  in Lessig’s model, law is one form of 
regulation alongside social norms, the market and what he calls code. Lessig suggests the 
internet has been structured to be predisposed to regulation by code and resistant to 
efforts to apply laws. The WSIS supports this theory by suggesting that the existing 
technological architecture of the internet and the political economies of internet 
governance combine to constrain the application of law and define power within this 
process. This is evident in the extent to which, for all the talk of laws and public policies, 
the WSIS process was defined by contest over the configuration of technology.  
While the main challenges to the status quo during the WSIS often proposed 
juridical intervention into domains regulated by code, other calls for reform simply pitted 
proposals for different sets of code-based regulations. The one real threat that backed up 
the calls for ICANN reform was that dissatisfaction with the current system could lead 
certain governments to “fracture” the root server system and create their own autonomous 
domain name systems, thereby potentially reducing the global reach and utility of the 
internet.94 The major EU challenge to the status quo was also, for example, premised in 
part on the technical principle of respecting the open and end-to-end architectural 
                                                
94 This possibility is explored in Bertola (2005). For an example of how it played within the discourse 
around the WSIS see: Richard Wray, “EU says internet could fall apart”, Guardian online,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/oct/12/newmedia.media. 
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characteristics of internet design. 
 A defining principle of Lessig’s model is the idea that code can be used to  
regulate for increased regulatibility. Something had to be done at WSIS about a 
whole series of issues, of which the status and mandate of ICANN was but one.  
The first phase of the WSIS proved that the self-executing nature of regulation by  
code makes it very easy to counter calls for reform on issues that are not framed  
explicitly around a switch that can be pulled to institute proposed changes.  
Something had to be done about pornography but the DNS- at least as presently  
configured- is not typically a switch that can turn off pornography. But, under  
different conditions, it could be.95 Thus while the first phase of the WSIS was  
defined by a push to broaden the collective understanding of the policy field of  
global internet governance, after doing so failed to substantively change the  
normative regulation of communication over the internet, the calls for reform 
focused narrowly on control of the DNS switch in the second phase.  
 The voracity with which the status quo was defended and the  
resounding endorsement that it received in regard to the ‘control of the switch’  
issue by the final outcome documents suggests that any effort to use law to get  
control of the ICANN system in the aim of regulating it for greater regulatibilty  
and broadening its mandate to incorporate more law-based and top down  
regulatory functions would be a long march that would face steep opposition and  
be unlikely to succeed.  
Rather than accepting the premise that ICANN and its associated functions- as 
currently configured- constitute benign, neutral technology management functions, the 
                                                
95 The controversy over .xxx reviewed earlier illustrates exactly this point.  
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WSIS redefined the field of internet governance in broad terms that identify public policy 
issues that require normative regulation, and exposed the normative implications of 
existing technical regulation.  However, this broad recognition of the jurisdiction of law 
over cyberspace is not the same thing as its application. The extent to which the debate 
focused on control of the DNS system, to which American possession of that switch 
withstood the pressure of the global community working through the United Nations, and 
the tendency for challenges to the status quo to pursue normative regulation indirectly 
through technical initiatives, all suggest that power in global internet governance 
continues to be primarily defined by the configuration of the architecture of the internet 
and its contingency for being otherwise. As Canadian internet law specialist Michael 
Geist summarized at the time  
The U.S. simply had a very strong hand and played it well.  Changes to the 
governance structure ultimately requires U.S. agreement since possession is even 
more than the proverbial 9/10th of the law.  The U.S. had loudly indicated that it 
was not prepared to make concessions […]Without a credible threat (the threat 
being the creation of alternate root), the U.S. was able to maintain its position and 
ultimately force everyone else to deal.96 
This is to suggest, as Lessig (2006, 79) predicted, that the WSIS case study 
underlines that “how the code regulates, who the code writers are and who controls the 
code writers” are the essential “questions on which any practice of justice must focus in 
the age of cyberspace”.  
 
                                                
96 Michael Geist, “The WSIS Deal”, 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1010 
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-CHAPTER 4- 
Enhanced Cooperation? Global Internet Governance Since the WSIS 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 Geist concludes his analysis of the “Tunis deal” (cited at the conclusion of 
chapter 3) by suggesting that  “the safe bet is that the future of the internet governance 
issue lies in whether the forum emerges into a powerful venue for change and 
whether/how ICANN responds”.97 The true impact of the WSIS was always going to be 
measured by how the field of global internet governance that it defined, and the debates 
that it incubated, evolved in other venues. This chapter will survey some of the most 
significant post-WSIS developments in the global governance of the internet in the aim of 
adding context to the central case study of this thesis. 
 The post-WSIS institutional landscape of internet governance has changed. There 
are new organizations involved. This chapter will reflect on the first three meetings of the 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the multi-stakeholder, non-binding space for 
discussing global internet governance issues that was created by the compromise that was 
struck at WSIS. Other predominantly government-based institutions such as the OECD 
and the Council of Europe have, in the aftermath of the WSIS, taken steps to expand and 
reposition their involvement in global internet governance. These will be reviewed as 
well, as will the extent to which ICANN has undergone a continuous process of 
organizational reform- particularly where the role of the Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC) is concerned. Since the WSIS, the ITU has launched a series of 
ambitious internet governance initiatives. At the national level, a series of governments 
                                                
97 http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1010 
 
  
128 
and domestic law-makers have turned their attention to internet governance issues 
including cyber-security and network neutrality.  
In the aftermath of the WSIS there has been a noticeable push to increase 
cooperation in global internet governance. Through an ever-increasing number of 
institutional arrangements as well as through informal partnerships and collaborations, 
stakeholders are talking and working with each other with greater frequency and effect. 
How does all of this reflect on the process of enhanced cooperation that was created by 
the Tunis compromise on internet governance? What can and cannot be attributed to 
enhanced cooperation is, as will be discussed, very much unclear at present.  
In this sense, global internet governance has evolved post-WSIS, but it has stayed 
the same too. Definitional problems and debate over process and procedures remain 
central to it. In addition, the US continues to drag its heels on the internationalization of 
ICANN and the EU continues to push its new cooperation model. All of these 
developments are reviewed in greater detail in this chapter. 
 
IGF 
The IGF meets annually under the aegis of the Security General of the United 
Nations.  At time of writing, it has met three times: 2006 Athens, 2007 Rio de Janeiro and  
2008 Hyderabad, India.  The mandate of the IGF calls for the Secretary General of the 
United Nations to conduct a review and evaluate whether or not the mandate of the IGF 
will be extended beyond an initial five-year period.  
 While the IGF does not pass resolutions, seek to establish consensus or negotiate 
texts, it provides a platform where stakeholders can coalesce for action around issues of 
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common concern. So-called ‘dynamic coalitions’ have emerged from the IGF as a way of 
using, in principle, the multi-stakeholder platform of the IGF to facilitate coordination, 
capacity building and awareness raising of internet governance issues elsewhere. 
 The IGF is primarily intended to be a forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue, an 
institution endowed with the potential for considerable influence and ‘soft power’, not an 
agent in its own right in the international arena. It is also an innovative arrangement set 
up in a highly contentious area of policy with extremely limited resources that depends 
on the goodwill and cooperation of its participants. In this respect, even its “soft power” 
potential was severely constrained from the start.  
 Over the course of its first three sessions, the IGF process has incubated 
coordinated, multi-stakeholder responses to a handful of internet governance policy 
issues. Protection against online child pornography and multi-lingualism stand out as 
issues where the IGF has been a valuable venue for coordinated, multi-stakeholder 
activity. 
 Through ongoing debate over the setting of agendas, the organization of 
meetings and the composition and role of its organizing committee, the IGF has 
continued to refine the process of multi-stakeholder global governance. The IGF multi-
stakeholder format has been lauded by many of its loyal participants. It has also been 
repurposed within various other institutions involved in global communication 
governance such as: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the OECD; 
and WSIS follow-up activities. In parallel, a variety of regional and national level IGF 
processes have emerged.  
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As a venue for meaningfully continuing the WSIS debate over internet 
governance however, the IGF model of non-binding multi-stakeholder governance has 
proven to be a source of frustration for reform minded governments. “It's not by talking 
about principles merely that we can solve this problem” the Chinese delegation 
intervened to a consultation on the review of the IGF’s mandate. Arguing that developing 
countries lack the resources and capacity to meaningfully participate in the IGF, the 
Chinese government was clear that   
China does not agree with extending the mission of the IGF beyond the five years.  
We feel that after the five years are up, we would need to look at the results that 
have been achieved.  And we need, then, to launch into an intergovernmental 
discussion. 98 
 Despite what the IGF has accomplished as an experiment in global governance 
and as a forum for sharing best practices and discussing emerging issues, the frustration 
of China is understandable.  The IGF has, in setting its own agenda, at times shied away 
from addressing controversial issues. In particular, questions about ICANN oversight and 
internationalization of other ‘critical internet resources’ were left off of the first IGF 
agenda and the issue of “rights and the internet” was rejected as a theme for the 2009 
meeting.99  
 The IGF suffers from a lack of meaningful engagement on the part of many 
government delegations. Questions have been raised from the start about how the idea of 
                                                
98 The Internet Governance Forum. “Transcript of the 13 May Open Consultations Full Transcript”, IGF,  
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/index.php/component/content/article/71-transcripts-/410-transcript-of-
the-13-may-open-consultations- 
 
99 Though, ironically, China was a driver behind the push to get rights off of the agenda of IGF 2009; 
illustrating that the frustration expressed by China can be shared by many IGF stakeholders, for very 
different reasons (see the transcript cited above for China’s comments on the proposed theme of rights). 
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multi-stakeholder governance can be structured around the ethical challenges facing civil 
servants who are participating in their own capacity, but also representing their 
governments. This in turn has led to a situation in which other stakeholders, in particular 
civil society, are engaging in what amounts to self-censorship in the effort to frame 
discussions in a way that will attract government engagement and prevent government 
disengagement.  
 The IGF fails to demonstrate the levels of coordination and sufficient political 
capital required to influence other organizations, despite innovating the idea of ‘dynamic 
coalitions’- multi-stakeholder working groups incubated at the IGF who could work to 
improve internet governance in other organizations.  Many of the dynamic coalitions 
instead seem largely confined to meeting at the annual IGF event.  
 In regard to its mandate to help build capacity and encourage developing 
country participation in global internet governance, local organizers have decided, on 
every occasion except the Rio IGF, to hold the meeting at more exclusive/expensive 
location than had originally been proposed.100 Raising funding to provide fellowships for 
developing country participants has been a challenge and remote/online participation has 
been unreliable, inconsistent and largely underused.  
 Fundamentally, with the exception of certain areas, the IGF remains 
preoccupied with process questions over substance questions. The dominant topics 
include debate about agenda setting, the role of various stakeholders and the status and 
                                                
100 the 2006 IGF was held in the affluent beach side suburb of Voulegamini instead of the originally 
proposed Athens in ’06:  reducing the choice of budget accommodation; the move of IGF ’08 from Delhi- 
where many international flights to India land- to Hyderabad added an additional flight cost for most 
participants and, the ’09 IGF that was initially awarded to Cairo has already been moved to the exclusive 
Red Sea resort of Sharim El Shek which will likely mean both additional fight costs and fewer choices in 
budget accommodations. 
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constitution of its multi-stakeholder advisory group. The upcoming five-year review of its 
mandate called for in the Tunis deal and the review process that is already underway 
threaten to only accentuate this tendency.  As a result, the IGF has been very slow to get 
off the ground in building any kind of real momentum.  
The sum result is that, as other international organizations expand their 
involvement in global internet governance, and as reform-minded governments critique 
and disengage from its non-binding modalities, the IGF faces a serious threat from 
organizational competition right as its mandate is being reviewed, despite its status as a 
still-evolving provocative and innovative model of global internet governance. 
 
ICANN 
Leading ICANN expert Milton Mueller points out that ICANN’s “Core Values” 
were revised in December 2002 to  “recognize that governments and public authorities 
are responsible for public policy and duly tak[e] into account governments’ or public 
authorities’ recommendations”. 101 Mueller argues that, as a result,  “ever since 2002, it 
has been practically mandatory for ICANN to follow GAC’s ‘policy advice’”.102 
 The reinforcement of the role of the GAC is one way in which ICANN has 
responded to the pressures that emerged over the course of the WSIS. “WSIS has clear 
repercussions for ICANN’s further orientation”, according to Hoffmann (2007, 42). “As a 
result of WSIS”, Hoffmann (ibid) continues, “ICANN takes more notice of other 
international organisations related to information and communications technology (ICT) 
                                                
101 ICANN, “ICANN Bylaws Article 1, Section 2”, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm 
 
102 Internet Governance Project Blog “Governments, ICANN and the JPA (part 2)” , IGP, 
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2008/1/29/3494481.html 
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policies”.  
ICANN developed a new “Accountability and Transparency Framework” in 
2007.103 ICANN’s strategic planning for 2006-2009 and 2009-2012 includes a number of 
objectives that directly respond to the pressure confronted by ICANN over the course of 
the WSIS. These include104: 
• Improve ICANN’s relationship with key external stakeholders; 
• Participate in IGF and other international fora to contribute to global internet 
governance discussions; 
• Develop the “ability to work globally”; 
• Increase international participation and develop and implement a policy for 
translating ICANN processes into various languages;  
• Introduce new GTLDs; 
• Develop and operationalize internationalized domain names. 
This is, according to Hoffman, part of a coordinated effort on the part of the organization 
to craft a  “post-WSIS ICANN”, as well as “an appropriate role” for ICANN “in the 
                                                
103 ICANN, “ICANN Accountability and Transparency Framework October 2007”,  
http://www.icann.org/transparency/acct-trans-frameworks-principles-17oct07.pdf 
 
 
104 This section heavily draws on, and was inspired by, Hoffmann’s (2007) discussion of how the 2006-
2009 ICANN strategic plan reflects the efforts of ICANN to response to pressures of the WSIS.  For the 
ICANN documents assessed see:  
 
ICANN, “ICANN Strategic Plan July 2006- June 2009”, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/strategic-
plan/consultation-process-2006-07/ 
 
and 
 
ICANN, “ICANN Strategic Plan July 2009- June 2012”, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/.../strategic-
plan/strategic-plan-2009-2012-09feb09-en.pdf - 
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broad group of international entities involved in internet functions” (Hoffmann 2007, 42).  
Most fundamentally, much of the post-WSIS attention to ICANN has focused on its  
relationship with the US Government.  
 
United States Government in Internet Governance Since WSIS 
 A 2003 amendment to, and extension of, the ICANN- USG Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU)105 was qualified by US Government insistence that ‘‘much work 
remained for ICANN to evolve into an independent, stable, and sustainable DNS 
management organization”.106 This amendment extended the MoU through September 
30, 2006 to allow sufficient time for ICANN to meet these objectives.  
 After public consultation in mid-2006, the Department of Commerce, on 
September 29, 2006,  signed what was called a Joint Projects Agreement (JPA) that 
extended the ICANN-MOU until September 30, 2009 and mandated a mid-term review. 
The Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications Administration (NTIA) 
conducted this review between late 2007 and early 2008. The mid-term review suggested, 
according to NTIA, that, four years after the WSIS had challenged ICANN’s legitimacy, 
there “remained key areas where further work was required to increase institutional 
confidence in ICANN”.  The areas identified by the NTIA included: long–term stability; 
accountability; responsiveness; continued private sector leadership; stakeholder 
participation; increased contract compliance; and enhanced competition.107  
                                                
105 see Appendix I of this thesis  for background on the ICANN MoU. 
106 US Government: Department of Commerce. “Statement Regarding Extension of Memorandum of 
Understanding with ICANN”, NTIA, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/agreements/sepstatement_09162003.htm 
 
107 NTIA, “Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 78/Friday, April 24, 2009/Notices”, NTIA, 
www.ntia.doc.gov/frnotices/2009/FR_ICANNVol.74_No78_Apr242009.pdf 
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 Between April and June 2009, NTIA solicited public comments on a range of 
questions about whether or not ICANN has evolved to the point where the US 
Government can end its oversight of ICANN and allow the JPA/MoU arrangement to 
expire.108 On June 4, 2009 The US House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Communications, Technology, and the Internet held a hearing entitled, "Oversight of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)” that discussed the 
future of USG involvement in the JPA amongst other issues.   
 These consultations reflect how the internet governance debate has evolved 
since the WSIS. A series of non-US based individuals, and civil society organizations 
including German Academic Wolfgang Kleinwächter, South African-based NGO the 
Association for Progressive Communication (APC), Indian NGO IT for Change and the 
global network of activists in the WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus all 
submitted comments to an American government policy consultation. Comments were 
also received from foreign government departments including Industry Canada and the 
Swiss Federal Office of Communications.109 The latest round of debates within the US on 
the ICANN-MoU underlines the extent to which the debate on IG has globalized and to 
which the WSIS has incubated an international, multi-stakeholder policy community 
around internet governance. 
 The recent MoU consultation also hints at how American discourse on internet 
governance is shifting post-WSIS. Despite the Obama administration’s overall 
                                                
108 NTIA, “Federal Register/Vol. 74, No. 78/Friday, April 24, 2009/Notices”, NTIA, 
www.ntia.doc.gov/frnotices/2009/FR_ICANNVol.74_No78_Apr242009.pdf 
 
109 All comments can be accessed at: NTIA, “Public Comments: DNS Transition”, NTIA, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/comments/2009/dnstransition/index.html 
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commitment to multilateralism, there is a deep skepticism evident about the potential 
impacts on American interests of renouncing US Government oversight of ICANN. Some 
of the views expressed during the testimony and discussion at the congressional hearing 
suggest that American politicians are increasingly suspicious of proposals to end US 
Government oversight of ICANN. Thus, WSIS-era framing of US Government oversight 
as some kind of handmaiden to the emergence of a different and better system seems to 
be in the process of being eclipsed by overtly nationalistic tones and explicit discussion 
of how its monopoly over ICANN oversight benefits American interests.110  
 Indeed, also introduced in April 2009 was a new commitment to cybersecurity 
from the Obama administration that, among other initiatives including the creation of a 
“cybersecurity czar” position (c.f. Nakashima 2009), would, according to the IGP blog 
require a Presidentially appointed cybersecurity advisory panel to ensure that 
national security would not be compromised before approving the renewal or 
modification of the contract between the US Government and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. According to a summary of the 
bill, it would "make sure that ICANN does not succumb to foreign pressure" to 
end its relationship with the US Government111 
 The 2008-2009 collapse and subsequent government bailout of the American 
banking system has arguably been a major driver of this shifting discourse and indeed of 
                                                
110 See Gross (2007). When this section was drafted, the streaming video archives of this session were 
available. However, as of June 27, 2009, the link seemed to be no longer working. However, there are 
numerous blog and listserv reports on the event available including in the archives of the list serve of the 
WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus which are available online at 
http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
 
111 Milton Mueller, “ICANN gets ‘securitized’”, IGP Blog, 
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2009/4/2/4141451.html  
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the (to be discussed) global push for interventionist cybersecurity policy.  Having been 
burned by the implosion of one crucial but under-regulated facilitator of modern 
capitalism, American politicians seem justifiably skeptical of the plan to willingly place 
another key cog in their suddenly fragile economy outside the oversight of the US 
Government- at least not without proof that the stability and security of the internet, and 
America’s interests in its use, will endure. 
 In other words, US Government policy during the WSIS may have aligned with 
American foreign policy but, in the post-WSIS internet governance debate, American 
domestic policy is emerging as a leading driver of the seminal role that the US 
Government plays in global internet governance.  
 
ITU  
 Only days after the first IGF was held in Greece, the ITU held its 2006 
Plenipotentiary Conference in Turkey. The 2006 ITU plenipot passed a series of 
resolutions calling for ITU involvement in internet governance issues.112 Particularly 
significant- given the role that the ICANN vs. ITU debate of the first phase of the WSIS- 
were the Antalya 2006 revisions to ITU resolution 102 that instructed the Secretary 
General of the ITU to, among other tasks, take a “significant role” in the management of 
internet and DNS resources, the coordination of public policy issues pertaining to the 
internet and the process of enhanced cooperation. By way of follow-up, the Antalya 
plenipot resolved to launch the Forth World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF),  
                                                
112 including; Resolution 101 (Rev. Antalya, 2006) on Internet Protocol-based networks;  
Resolution 102 (Rev. Antalya, 2006) on ITU’s role with regard to international public  
policy issues pertaining to the internet and the management of Internet resources,  
including domain names and addresses and Resolution 133 (Rev. Antalya, 2006) on Role  
of administrations of Member States in the management of internationalized  
(multilingual) domain names.  These can be accessed through: ITU, “ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
(Antalya, 2006)”, ITU,  http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/mina/index.html 
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“in order to discuss and exchange views regarding internet-related public policy matters, 
among other themes”. The role of the WTPF is to “prepare reports and, where 
appropriate, opinions ” for further consideration of possible reforms to the International 
Telecommunication Regulations at a World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) to be convened by ITU in 2012.  The WTPF forum was 
planned for Lisbon in April 2009.113  
 In the interim the ITU sponsored World Telecommunication Standardization 
Assembly, was held in Johannesburg in October 2008. This meeting passed a series of 
resolutions related to internet governance.114 
 In the follow-up and implementation of the WSIS agreements, the ITU was 
assigned Action Point C5: “building confidence and security in the use of ICTs”. As a 
response, ITU Secretary-General Touré formally announced the launch of the Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) on 17 May 2007.115 In addition, at a November, 2008 
ICANN meeting in CIARO Touré also made very public scathing critiques of the 
ineffectiveness of the IGF and its non-binding modalities. “I personally believe”, Touré 
offered in Cairo, “ that the IGF is just going around and around, avoiding the topics, and 
                                                
 
113 ITU, “Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference (Antalya, 2006): A Selection of internet related 
resolutions November 2006, ITU, http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/mina/index.html 
114including: WTSA Resolution 48 (rev. Johannesburg, 2008) on Internationalized domain names; WTSA 
Resolution 49 (rev. Johannesburg, 2008) on ENUM; WTSA Resolution 50 (rev. Johannesburg, 2008)  
on Cybersecurity; WTSA Resolution 52 (rev. Johannesburg, 2008) on Countering and Combating spam by  
technical means; WTSA Resolution 69 (Johannesburg, 2008) on Non-discriminatory access and use of  
Internet resources; WTSA Resolution 75 (Johannesburg, 2008) on ITU-T’s contribution in implementing  
the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society, and the establishment of a Dedicated Group  
on Internet-related Public Policy Issues as an integral part of the Council Working Group on World Summit  
on the Information Society. See WTSA, “World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA- 
08)”, ITU,  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/wtsa-08/ 
 
115 see ITU, “A Framework for Global Cooperation: GCA”, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/ 
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becomes sometimes a waste of time”. 116 During the opening session of the 2008 
Hyderabad IGF itself, Touré addressed his Cairo comments, insisting 
I make no apology for stating bluntly that I believe the IGF was not on track to 
meet the expectations of many countries that participated in the Tunis phase of 
WSIS [...] who were hoping for frank and fruitful discussions and concrete 
solutions on globally applicable principles for the management of critical internet 
resources.117 
 Tension between the IGF and ITU was evident as well at the WTPF in Lisbon 
in 2009.  Internet governance was again a highly controversial topic of discussion. Some 
of the ‘opinions’ that the WTPF produced to be considered as the basis for reforms at the 
WCIT in 2012 propose a larger, more formal role for the ITU within global internet 
governance. In particular, Opinion 1, the provocatively titled “On Internet Public Policy 
Matters”, advises that ways and means ought to be sought to: “enable ITU to continue 
playing its role in facilitating the coordination of internet-related public policy issues” 
and to  
develop and promote an enabling environment that allows all governments, on an 
equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public 
policy issues pertaining to the internet and in ensuring the stability, security and 
continuity of the internet. 
More generally, Opinion 1 supports and enables the involvement and intervention of 
                                                
116 ICANN Cairo, “Hamadoun Toure Speech  ICANN Meeting – Cairo Thursday, 6 November 2008”, 
ICANN,  https://cai.icann.org/files/meetings/cairo2008/toure-speech-06nov08.txt 
 
 
117 IGF, “Internet Governance Forum: Hyderabad, India Opening Session 3 December 2008” , IGF, 
www.intgovforum.org/cms/hydera/Opening%20Session.pdf 
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governments- through the ITU- in public policy development related to internet 
governance. Opinion 6 meanwhile, suggests amendments to the International 
Telecommunication Regulations that would expand the ITU’s role in internet issues such 
as spam, cybersecurity and domain name and address related processes. Opinion 6 
explicitly encourages the application of “the ITU-T Resolutions and Recommendations 
relating to naming, numbering, addressing and identification”.118   
 From participant accounts, the discussion of internet governance issues at the 
WTPF was tense and confrontational, seemingly reflecting the same differences of 
opinion over greater ITU involvement in global internet governance that dominated the 
early stages of the WSIS.  In particular, questions were raised about the formality of the 
enhanced cooperation process and the ITU’s role in it.  A Syrian intervention complained 
that enhanced cooperation had yet to be meaningfully taken up in the two years following 
the WSIS. The Syrian delegate to the WTPF demanded that enhanced cooperation be the 
focus of a dedicated working group of the council of the ITU composed of elected 
member states. Bertrand de la Chapelle, Special Envoy for the Information Society at the 
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, responded that “enhanced cooperation 
was not the exclusive responsibility of the ITU Council working group, but that all 
international organizations should equally contribute”.119  
 Thus, the ITU has, in the post-WSIS environment, reemerged as a challenge to 
existing institutions treating internet governance issues, and as a champion of the power-
                                                
118 Text of the “opinions” cited in this paragraph can be found in:  WTPF, “Report by the Chairman of 
WTPF (contains the  Lisbon Consensus)”, ITU,  http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/wtpf/wtpf2009/ 
 
119 Quote taken and discussion of this exchange drawn from : Monika Ermert,  “2009 World Telecom 
Policy Forum: All About The ITU Mandate”, Intellectual Property Watch Blog, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/04/28/2009-world-telecom-policy-forum-all-about-the-itu-mandate/ 
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sharing aspiration of certain governments. The ITU’s inter-governmental structure 
enables governments to use bottom-up policy development processes to create structures 
and, as we have seen, direct its leadership to advocate for greater institutional recognition 
of the sovereignty and interest of all governments in the governance of the internet. The 
push to position the ITU as an intergovernmental internet governance organization that 
dominated the first phase of the WSIS is arguably re-emerging. It is likely little 
coincidence that the WCIT is being planned for what would be year 6 of the IGF’s 
existing five-year mandate. If the IGF mandate is not renewed, the WCIT will be well 
positioned to fill the space vacated by the IGF. The institutional competition that defined 
the WSIS debates over ICANN vs. ITU is likely to continue with the ITU continuing to 
bear the standard for the ambitions of those governments who favour intergovernmental 
internet governance.  
 
National Level 
 Since the conclusion of the WSIS, a series of governments including Italy120, 
France121, Canada122, Germany123 and the UK124 have all enacted or introduced domestic 
                                                
120 See:  Senatto della Repubblica [in Italian], “Art. 50-bis.Repressione di attività di apologia o incitamento 
di associazioni criminose o di attività illecitecompiuta a mezzo internet”, Senatto della Repubblica, 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Emend&leg=16&id=392701&idoggetto=41387
5;. For English Commentary see: Corinna di Gennaro, “Internet censorship arrives in Italy”, Internet & 
Democracy Blog, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/idblog/2009/02/15/internet-censorship-arrives-in-italy/ . The 
issue was also discussed in a Mach 2009 email exchange that is available through the public archives of the 
list serve of the WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at 
http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
 
 
121 see Sénate [in French], “Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur Internet”,  Sénate 
(de la France), http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/pjl07-405.html. And, Le Portail Société de l’Information”,  
[in French], “Lancement d’une nouvelle étape de la lutte anti cybercriminalité”, Gouv.fr, 
http://www.internet.gouv.fr/information/information/actualites/lancement-une-nouvelle-etape-lutte-anti-
cybercriminalite-502.html 
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cybersecurity policies that allow for increased monitoring and surveillance of internet 
communication. Even Brazilian internet governance activists report that “we are right 
now in Brazil fighting against draconian bills of law which would in practice eliminate 
the internet as we know it”.125  
 On March 1st, 2006, China unilaterally instituted some form of an 
internationalized domain name policy, creating  "中国"(China), ".公司"(company) and 
".网" (Network) domains. Amidst uncertainty and speculation about whether or not 
China was fracturing the root, Chinese government sources were clear about one thing: 
whatever they had done was intended to be perceived as sabre-rattling by ICANN and the 
existing internet governance world order (The Economist 2006).  
 The role of national regulation in protecting the end-to-end principle of internet 
architecture has also come under interrogation since the WSIS. Efforts to establish the 
conditions under which internet service providers are permitted to shape or manage 
network traffic have been studied and politicized by a variety of national governments 
                                                                                                                                            
122 Department of Justice Canada, “Investigative Powers for the 21st Century (IP21C) Act”, JusticeCanada, 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2009/doc_32388.html and Public Safety Canada, “Technical 
Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act”, Public Safety Canada, 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2009/nr20090618-1-eng.aspx 
 
 
123 see: Netzpolitik, “The Dawning of internet censorship in Germany”, Netzpolitik, 
http://netzpolitik.org/2009/the-dawning-of-internet-censorship-in-germany/ .The issue was also discussed 
in a June  2009 email exchange that is available through the public archives of the list serve of the WSIS 
Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
 
 
124 DirectGov. “Communications Data Bill”, DirectGov,    
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/UKgovernment/Parliament/DG_078075 see also 
Home Office, “Protecting the Public in a Changing Communications Environment”, Home Office, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-communications-data?view=Binary 
 
 
125 Carlos Afonso, email to WSIS Civil Society Internet Goverancce Caucus listserv,  May 14, 2009. See 
also Notes from the Ubiquitous Surveillance Society, “Internet Surveillance in Brazil 2’ , Notes from the 
Ubiquitous Surveillance Society http://ubisurv.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/internet-surveillance-in-brazil-2/ 
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including: Norway126; the US127; and Canada128.  In addition to its public consultations 
devoted to the issue of network traffic shaping, the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) also launched a review of its 1999 new media 
decision (see CRTC 1999, as discussed in Chapter 1). The resulting Broadcasting policy, 
released in June 2009, maintained the principle that Canadian broadcasting over ‘new 
media’ services are exempt from regulation. The 2009 decision however, did provide 
some constraints on non-neutral network traffic shaping practices and underlined the 
problems created by a general lack of information on, and coordination of, digital 
communication markets, services and regulation in Canada and the need to reconsider 
existing definitions of “new media”.129  
International “clubs” 
 In the absence of formalized inter-governmental structures, global internet 
governance has received considerable attention within what Raboy (2002, 118) labels 
                                                
126 Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority, “Internet industry reaches agreement on network 
neutrality”, Post-OG Teletilsynet, 
http://www.npt.no/portal/page/intra/PG_NPT_NO_EN/PAG_NPT_EN_HOME/PAG_NEWS?p_d_i=-
121&p_d_c=&p_d_v=109606 
 
127 Federal Communications Commission, “ FCC Policy Statement of 23 September 2005” see also “ 
4/16/07 FCC Launches Inquiry into Broadband Market Practices (FCC 07-31)”, FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/. In addition ,Barack Obama made network 
neutrality legislation one of his early campaign promises and, as president, features it as point 1 of his plan 
for technology and innovation policy (cf. Huffington Post 2007; Obama’08 n.d. ). 
 
128 CRTC “Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2008-19 (Review of the Internet traffic management practices of 
Internet service providers)”  CRTC, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2008/pt2008-19.htm and CRTC, 
“Telecom Decision CRTC 2008-108: The Canadian Association of Internet Providers' application 
regarding Bell Canada's traffic shaping of its wholesale Gateway Access Service” , CRTC,  
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2008/dt2008-108.htm 
 
129 CRTC, “Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-329: Review of broadcasting in new media” , 
CRTC, http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-329.htm. See also  
Bram Abramson and Grant Buchanan, “CRTC New Media Policy Released”, McCarthy Tétrault,  
http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=4554  
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“international clubs”-  
political and economic arrangements involving various groups of states, such as 
NAFTA, the European Union and the G7 [that] create new transnational 
regulatory regimes for governing a range of activities, including communication. 
These groupings each operate differently, each according to its own raison d'être.  
 In the post WSIS period, there has been unsubstantiated speculation about the 
possibility that the G-8 or G-20 might eventually emerge as point organizations on 
internet governance or at least provide the institutional model for a new governmental 
oversight club. 130 Other club type organizations including the OECD, and the Council of 
Europe have been involved in important internet-related policy development since the 
WSIS.  
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) 
 The “Working Party on Communication Infrastructures and Services Policy” of 
the OECD’s Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (CISP) 
issued a report on “Internet Traffic Prioritization” (OECD 2007).  McIver (2010) writes 
that  
Among the CISP's key findings in this study were that (1) network service 
providers should operate in a manner that is transparent to customers with respect 
to network traffic shaping policies and their expected impacts; (2) antitrust laws 
must be re-examined in the context of traffic shaping concepts and realities; and 
(3) entry into the broadband market should be made easier to encourage 
                                                
130 This premise was, for example, discussed by prominent internet governance experts Wolfgang 
Kleinwachter, Jovan Kurbalija and others in a March 2009 email exchange that is available through the 
public archives of the list serve of the WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at 
http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
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competition.  
But significantly, McIver (ibid) points out, “the OECD report does not, however, deal 
with cross border issues of network neutrality”. Subsequent OECD activity in the area of 
internet governance gives greater consideration to the role that an international 
organization like the OECD can play in responding to the global governance challenges 
created by the internet.  
In June 2008, a wide swath of internet governance stakeholders from government, 
civil society and the private sector were brought together around an OECD ministerial 
meeting on “The Future of the Internet Economy”. A background report entitled 
“Shaping Policies for the Future of the Internet Economy” recognizes that “the open and 
collaborative nature of the internet challenges traditional policymaking”. In response it 
suggests that  
a multi-stakeholder approach to achieving an appropriate balance of laws, 
policies, self-regulation and consumer empowerment may be the only way to 
promote the internet economy effectively. An effective and innovative multi-
stakeholder approach has to be developed for government, the private sector, the 
technical community, civil society and individual users to join forces in shaping 
the policy environment for the future of the internet economy. 
In the OECD’s view, more effective internet policy-making is directly linked with 
improvements in our ability “to boost economic performance and social well-being, and 
to strengthen societies’ capacity to improve the quality of life for citizens worldwide”.131  
The Seoul 2008 meeting was planned to mark the 10th anniversary of the previous 
                                                
131 OECD, “Shaping Policies for the Future of the Internet Economy”, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_38415463_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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Ottawa ministerial meeting. In the interim, the OECD’s involvement in internet policy is 
described as being aimed narrowly “at fostering growth of, and building trust in, the 
digital economy”. This focus is significantly broadened by the Seoul declaration which 
directs the OECD to work not just in the area of “building trust and security in the use of 
the internet” but also to help: respond to the global internet economy; foster creativity in 
the development use and application of the internet; facilitate the convergence of digital 
networks, devices, applications and services; among other objectives The declaration 
mandates the OECD to interface with relevant international organizations as well as to:  
Reinforc[e] co-operative relationships and mutually beneficial collaboration with 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, the Council of Europe as well as the 
internet technical community, the private sector and civil society within fora such 
as the Internet Governance Forum.  
A three-year review of the progress achieved at the global level and within OECD 
governments is called for in the declaration.  The OECD is, in other words, in the process 
of taking a broader, more active and hands-on involvement within the institutional 
architecture of global internet governance. 132 
 
Council of Europe (CoE)  
 The council of Europe held its first “Council of Europe Conference of Ministers 
responsible for Media and New Communication Services” in May 2009, in Reykjavik, 
Iceland.  
 The most interesting development at this meeting was its explicit effort to 
                                                
132 OECD, “The Seoul Declaration for the Future of the Internet Economy”, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_38415463_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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address the policy issues that are common to both internet communication and traditional 
mass media. Going beyond simply recognizing the internet as a mass medium, the CoE 
calls for a reflection on how the emergence of the internet is redefining the social impact 
and governance of mass communication. Background reports prepared for the conference 
examined the issues of public service media and internet governance.133 
 The CoE declaration points out that fundamental communication rights 
including freedom of expression “have to be promoted and protected, regardless of 
changes in the media and media-like landscape”, despite the trans-border nature of the 
communication facilitated by “media-like” digital platforms. In response, the Action Plan 
proposes a “new definition of media”- reflection on the question of “whether our 
understanding of media and mass-communication services remains valid in the new 
information and communications environment”. It also interrogates a notion of  
“technology- neutral” public service- exploration of “the extent to which universal access 
to the internet should be developed as part of member states’ provision of public 
services”.  
 These concerns are presented alongside resolutions on  “Internet governance 
and critical internet resources” and “Developments in anti-terrorism legislation in 
Council of Europe member states and their impact on freedom of expression and 
information”. 134 
                                                
133 See Council of Europe, “Council of Europe Secretariat, Internet governance and critical internet 
resources” and “Council of Europe Secretariat, Public service media governance: looking to the future”, 
Council of Europe,  http://www.ministerialconference.is/agenda/conference-documents/ 
 
134 CoE, “1st Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Media and New Communication 
Services A new notion of media? (28 and 29 May 2009, Reykjavik, Iceland) Political declaration and 
resolutions”, CoE, http://www.ministerialconference.is/ 
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 Thus, while the policy field of global internet governance that was created by the 
WSIS was significantly more broadly defined than what passed for internet governance  
pre-WSIS, broader concerns about media and communication governance are just starting 
to enter the debate in meaningful ways. The most significant development of the CoE 
meeting may be its indication that what was once seen as a debate for technologists over 
technologies is beginning to emerge as a mainstream issue of media and social policy.  
 
International Clubs and Member’s Only Governance?    
Membership in many of these clubs is exclusively defined. The OECD, G-8 and 
G-20 exclude all but the world’s most important economic players. In contrast, 
membership in other clubs such as the Council of Europe is based on geographic or 
ideological proximity. The growing push to use the international club institutional model 
reflects the extent to which the internet governance debate is being polarized along 
economic and geographic lines. The interests of developed, Western countries are being 
challenged by a collation of interests from non-Western and developing states. This 
occurred at the WSIS, but has continued, as discussed, at the ITU since.  In the absence 
of an overarching global institutional framework, the use of the institutional model of 
exclusive international clubs allows the developed world to leverage its significant 
capacity advantages to make agenda-setting moves and insulate its interests.  
But, even when membership in these clubs is not exclusive, organizations that 
group together some- but not all- governments are increasingly active in global internet 
governance. For example, the UN Commission on Science and Technology for 
Development (CSTD), a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), was made a focal point in the system-wide follow-up to the WSIS. Rather 
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than a comprehensive multi-lateral assembly in which all states always participate, the 
CSTD is an inter-governmental body with a rotating membership on which 
representatives of 43 governments sit at any given time. It also makes allowances for 
multi-stakeholder participation on WSIS follow-up. The ICANN GAC as well as the IGF, 
and its dynamic coalitions, are similar examples of relatively open international clubs in 
which certain governments- but crucially not all governments at once- are working 
together, often alongside other stakeholders, on global internet governance. The 
emergence of exclusive and even more open institutions in which some governments 
work together suggests that the polarization of the debate over internet governance lends 
itself to the international club model of global governance.  
 
EU Post-WSIS 
EU governments and representatives from the European Commission were active 
participants in the first two IGF meetings and had planned a significant role for the third 
IGF before the Commission refused to send representatives to India in the aftermath of 
the Mumbai terrorist attacks. The government of France, through its “Special Envoy for 
the Information Society”- a position created within its Foreign Affairs Ministry in the 
aftermath of the WSIS- has been particularly committed and involved in the IGF process. 
The European Commission has emerged as the primary driver of the “evolutionary” 
institutional change advocated by the EU during the WSIS.  
Speaking in advance of a symposium on “Future Internet Governance 
Arrangements” and a meeting of the EU High Level Internet Governance Group 
(HLIGG), European Commissioner for Media and the Information Society Viviane 
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Reding used her May 4th, 2009 “weekly message” to call for dramatic reform to the 
institutional structure of global IG including:   
• an end to US "oversight" of day to day management of the internet in the 
form of a fully privatized ICANN at the conclusion of the JPA in 
September 2009;  
• a shift in ICANN litigation and dispute resolution from American law to 
International law;  
• the creation of a “G-12 for internet governance”, defined as: “a 
multilateral forum available for governments to discuss general internet 
governance policy issues [...] includ[ing] two representatives from each 
North America, South America, Europe and Africa, three representatives 
from Asia and Australia, as well as the Chairman of ICANN as a non-
voting member”.135 
In other words, Reding advocated a more detailed version of the same essential 
model proposed by the EU during the WSIS.   
This time EU governments immediately went to great lengths to be clear that this 
version of “a new cooperation model” did not reflect the wider view of the EU. 
Participants in the “Future Internet Governance Arrangements” symposium such as 
Milton Mueller were quickly informed that Reding’s statement was “her own personal 
initiative, not an official or vetted product of the European Commission”.136 This 
                                                
135 Vivane Reding, “:"The Future of Internet Governance: Towards an Accountable ICANN, 4 May 2009”, 
ITU, http://www.itu.int/osg/blog/ct.ashx?id=22fc013d-9551-42ba-aeb3-
c771515ac2c5&url=http%3a%2f%2fec.europa.eu%2fcommission_barroso%2freding%2fvideo%2ftext%2f
message_20090504.pdf 
 
136 Milton Mueller, “The EU High-Level Internet Governance Group Hearing”, IGP blog,  
http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2009/5/7/4177879.html 
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message was repeated soon after to those in attendance at the EU High Level Internet 
Governance Group (HLIGG) meeting. Wolfgang Kleinwachter reported back to the 
WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus listserv that “the proposal by the 
Commissioner was not discussed in detail, but it got mixed reaction and was watered 
down as a ‘personal reflection’ and a ‘contribution to the debate’".137 
 Thus, the EU position going forward is not particularly clear, though it is 
nominally familiar. Absent the need for Europe to speak in one voice that was created by 
the intergovernmental nature of the WSIS, the opinions of various European governments 
and agencies may diverge more publicly as internet governance evolves. Certainly, the 
immediate spin that was put on Reding’s message suggests that something was learned 
from the reaction to the previous new cooperation model proposal.  
  
Enhanced Cooperation 
 
The impact of one of the major elements of the WSIS compromise- the vaguely 
worded “enhanced cooperation” process to be convened by the UN Secretary General- 
has proven difficult to asses. The lack of a transparent and concrete structure for 
enhanced cooperation has led to uncertainty about how the term should be interpreted and 
confusion about which post-WSIS developments in internet governance, if any, are 
linked to the process of enhanced cooperation that was created in paragraphs 69 and 71 of 
the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society at the conclusion of the WSIS (see Chapter 
3).  
                                                                                                                                            
 
137 Wolfgang Kleinwachter, email the WSIS Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus listserv, May 
8th2009, available through the public archives of the list serve of the WSIS Civil Society Internet 
Governance Caucus at http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
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With no information forthcoming and no discernable institutional structure in 
place, various stakeholders were, by early 2007, using the IGF consultation process to 
push for answers and register their frustration about the lack of details about and progress 
on enhanced cooperation.  
Pointing out that a letter sent to the UNSG’s office from the chairman of the G77 
group of developing country government delegations seeking to clarify the state of the 
enhanced cooperation process had gone unanswered, an Iranian delegate observed that 
enhanced cooperation  “seems to have slipped quietly off the agenda”. “What happened 
to the mandate which was given also as regards to enhanced cooperation?”, he then asked 
Nitin Desai, the IGF chair and a UNSG special advisor. Desai responded that he had- as 
requested- done some consultations and submitted a report to the office of the UNSG, but 
that, since Ban Ki-moon had replaced Kofi Annan in that position, he had not heard back. 
Pressed by a subsequent intervention from the Brazilian delegation for a 
“glimpse” contents of the report and an indication of what the next steps might be, Desai 
responded that, on enhanced cooperation, 
my purpose, mandate was to canvass views, to find out what people expected, 
what people's expectations were, which is what I did by talking to many people. 
And what I have conveyed is that range of views, rather than a single proposal 
[…] there are some points of commonality, but there are also still substantial 
differences on next steps. So at this stage, I cannot say that there is any particular 
modality that I would be able to suggest as one which is generally acceptable to 
everybody.138 
                                                
138 IGF, “13 February 2007 IFG Consultations Geneva”, IGF,  
 http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/Feb_igf_meeting/13_February_Consult_2007.txt 
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In other words, the notion of ‘enhanced cooperation’ that was agreed upon in Tunis in 
2003 was not clearly defined by 2007, not even by the person who was nominally 
responsible for it.  
 In early 2008, a new, more concrete face was given to the enhanced cooperation 
process by a leaked letter that certain central IG stakeholder organizations received from 
a UN Under-Secretary that described Desai’s survey as an effort to “find common ground 
with respect to this process” and requested reports on how various organizations had 
enhanced their level of cooperation since Tunis.139  A subsequent resolution of the UN 
Commission on Science Technology for Development (CSTD) described these as the 
sole activities under the enhanced cooperation mandate; suggesting only that the 
Committee- a focal point for UN follow-up on the WSIS- “looks forward to the UNSG's 
report, which may contain recommendations on how the process should be pursued”.140 
 Despite objections from some prominent IGF stakeholders that enhanced 
cooperation was a controversial subject that was best left vague and was outside of the  
IGF mandate, Parminder Jeet Singh, in his capacity as co-chair of the WSIS Civil Society 
Internet Governance Caucus, pushed to get a discussion of enhanced cooperation onto the 
programme of the 2008 IGF.  
In a move that rejoined the WGIG’s mandate to define the issue of internet 
governance after the WSIS had already been negotiating an agreement on it for more than 
two years- and, almost three years after the Tunis agreement that launched the process of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
139 ISOC, “UN report request”, ISOC, 
https://wiki.tools.isoc.org/@api/deki/files/73/=UNrequest20080312.pdf 
 
140 CSTD, “Draft resolution recommended by the CSTD to ECOSOC for adoption Assessment of WSIS-
implementation 2008”, UNCTAD, www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs//ecn162008_r004_en.pdf 
 
  
154 
enhanced cooperation was reached- a proposal was put in for an IGF session entitled 
“Enhanced Cooperation - What Was Meant By the Tunis Agenda, and What Is the Status 
of It”. The session was to be structured around IGF participants’ responses to four very 
basic questions:  
(1) what do different actors mean and understand by the term enhanced cooperation?  
(2) what are your experiences with the state of enhanced cooperation in internet 
governance in your field?  
(3) What do you believe should be the direction of enhanced cooperation going 
forward and your vision for the future?  
(4) what further steps are needed to create enhanced cooperation, if any?”141 
The IGF workshop succeeded in fleshing out the lack of consensus on what exactly 
enhanced cooperation referred to. The different opinions tended to reflect the competing 
perspectives on IG that emerged over the course of the WSIS. A critical assessment from 
a Brazilian delegate tied the issue directly back to the place of governments within 
ICANN:  
Governments are underrepresented, in particular from developing countries, 
which leads me to conclude that the current GAC-ICANN arrangements are not 
conducive to enhanced cooperation and need to be reviewed. 
US Government spokesperson Dick Beaird saw things differently: “I would like to assert 
that since 2005, the process that was envisioned in Tunis has been remarkably successful 
                                                
141 For a copy of the event proposal- which is no longer available on the IGF website- see the email 
“Discussion on 'enhanced cooperation' at the IGF Hyderabad” sent from Parminder Jeet Singh on 
November 8, 2008, available on the  public archives of the list serve of the WSIS Civil Society Internet 
Governance Caucus at http://lists.cpsr.org/lists/info/governance 
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across many fora and international organizations”. Haiyan Qian from the UN Division for 
Administration and Development Management, who had personally been involved in the 
March 2008 survey on enhanced cooperation, admitted that 
The term ‘enhanced cooperation’ does not seem to provide us with much practical 
guidance as to what makes up enhanced level of cooperation or what makes 
cooperation truly enhanced. Thus, when requesting the relevant organizations' 
contributions for this report, we found ourselves in a rather difficult situation, as 
we could not provide clear or more specific guidelines to the organizations on 
how to prepare such reports or contribution.142 
 The status of enhanced cooperation is largely uncertain. Was enhanced 
cooperation a relatively meaningless construct that existed only to help with the optics of 
compromise during the WSIS that is unlikely to develop beyond the token gesture of the 
UN under-SG’s survey? 
 It is undeniable that there has been a noticeable push to increase cooperation in 
global internet governance since the WSIS. The most likely explanation is that the 
process of enhanced cooperation has emboldened reform minded governments by giving 
an air of legitimacy to their push for greater structure. The enhanced cooperation mandate 
has likely also pushed would-be defenders of the status quo to proactively engage in (or 
at least demonstrate) that they are indeed cooperating and that their level of cooperation 
has been enhanced since the WSIS as part of a coordinated effort to hold off calls for 
further intervention.  
                                                
142 all quotes from: “IGF, Internet Governance Forum Hyderabad, India Arrangements for Internet 
Governance, Global and National/Regional 5 December 2008”, IGF, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/hyderabad_prog/AfIGGN.html 
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Generally however, pending further evidence being made public, enhanced 
cooperation is best viewed as a principle that is being used at the convenience of various 
actors to justify a variety of often competing post-WSIS activities. The threat that a more 
interventionist enhanced cooperation structure could be developed is only going to push 
the status quo so far, however. Tension surrounding the push to establish binding 
intergovernmental internet regulation is likely to eventually either force the UNSG to 
spell out what enhanced cooperation means and how it gets institutionalized, or else 
reveal its lack of substance and teeth. It is possible that the latter has already occurred.  
 
Chapter Conclusion: The Emerging Global Internet Governance Regime 
 Global internet governance post-WSIS has developed in a variety of directions.  
Enhanced cooperation has been revealed to be something of a phantom process. 
Dissatisfaction with the non-binding mandate of the IGF may manifest in pressure to 
non-renew its mandate after five years. At the same time, American government interests 
seem to be digging their heels on oversight of ICANN.  Governments are working to 
position the ITU in a more significant role in internet governance. The EU is reasserting 
its new cooperation model.  
It is possible, in other words, that by 2012, there could be no IGF as well as no 
real process of enhanced cooperation, and that the proposed World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT) could initiate round two of the ICANN vs. 
ITU debate. In that scenario, recent developments suggest the EU could even once again 
occupy the middle ground with its new cooperation model. In some senses, it would be as 
though WSIS never happened.  
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 In other respects however global internet governance is dramatically altered post-
WSIS. National governments, in particular governments from OECD countries are 
passing invasive internet regulations. Through these cybercrime and security laws, as 
well as policy development on issues such as network neutrality and internet 
broadcasting, governments- in particular governments from developed countries with 
established regulatory and enforcement capacity- have begun to take much more serious 
looks at how the global communication of the internet can be regulated within the borders 
of states. Various organizations have become more interested in internet governance and 
are considering the points of overlap between internet governance and other policy areas 
such as media regulation and economic policy.  A new American administration is 
seeking to shed the “unilateral cowboy” (see Bolton 2007) image of its predecessor but 
has a new, more pressing problem to consider in the collapse of the unregulated 
American banking system. Different pressures, discourses and politics are emerging from 
within the American government as to their unique role in the governance of the internet. 
Finally, even if the future of the IGF is not yet clear, the multi-stakeholder governance 
model of the IGF has proved to be a contagious model for confronting internet policy 
issues in both emerging and traditional institutions.  
 This survey of global internet governance post-WSIS underlines the impact of the 
WSIS process. The WSIS reframed a limited debate over whether or not the DNS system 
can be said to regulate the internet as the broad and distributed policy field of global 
internet governance that was described in this chapter. Thus, even if global internet 
governance does travel the road back to from where it came, it can never go home again. 
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-CHAPTER 5- 
Unpackaging Global Internet Governance 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter evaluates this thesis’s  case study of the WSIS internet governance  
negotiations and their aftermath by making a series of observations about the mechanics 
of global governance and the participation of governments and other stakeholders. Its  
aim is to provide empirical insight into the set of largely theoretical assumptions that 
inform the research agenda on global governance of communication.  
 It is organized around three questions: Who does global governance?;  What is 
global governance?; How is global governance done? 
 Under the heading of  “who does…”, I have developed my own typology to 
summarize the various competing perspectives on internet governance that emerged over 
the course of the WSIS.  From there, this chapter moves on to discuss delegation 
compositions, in particular focusing on understanding the different approaches that 
various states take to engaging in global governance. The division of powers and labour 
in certain delegations between ICT specialists and foreign affairs departments is 
suggested to be particularly crucial to understanding global governance in the 
media/communication policy area. The effect of delegation composition on the capacity 
of certain countries to influence global governance is discussed as an important 
component of how power is exercised by states within global governance and distributed 
unequally between them.  
 The second part of this chapter turns to the question of “what is global 
governance?”.  I revisit the division between foreign affairs departments and ICT policy 
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specialists to reflect broadly on how global internet governance balances the politics of 
broader international relations with those that surround the internet as a specific object of 
policy making. From there, this chapter investigates the linkages between the national 
and global policy spheres. Drawing mostly on interviews conducted with important WSIS 
delegations, I examine how domestic policies influenced the positions adopted at the 
WSIS, how different governments consulted domestically on the positions they adopted 
globally and finally, on the tendency for governments to frame their global positions 
differently for domestic audiences.  
 Under the heading of “how is global governance done?” I consider how the 
need to arrive at unanimous consensus on global internet governance influenced the 
outcomes of the WSIS. I reflect on how the negotiations unfolded and conclude that 
global governance of the internet is pre-occupied with issues of process over substance 
and with the sovereignty of states in place of the rights of individuals.  
 In conclusion, I propose that global internet governance needs to be approached 
as a multi-leveled and multi-sectoral policy field in order to be meaningfully engaged and 
analyzed.  
 
Who Does Global Governance? 
The Emergence of Competing Perspectives on IG: A Typology of Actors 
 As we have seen, the WSIS debate on internet governance evolved over the 
course of the two-phased, four year process. A polarized, broad and il-defined debate in 
which government delegations took sides between ICANN and ITU became a gradually 
more nuanced discussion in which a broad array of actors, generally speaking, coalesced 
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around one of a variety of position143:  
 The Status Quo and Status Quo Plus: OECD governments outside of Europe 
largely supported the private sector and internet technical community’s calls to leave the 
system as it was from the beginning of the debate over internet governance. The “plus” 
refers to the move to reluctantly accept the creation of the IGF as a compromise position 
that various OECD governments, Canada and Japan most visibly, made at the end of the 
WSIS.144 
 This view largely opposed the convening of the IGF and highly scrutinized its 
parameters once it became obvious that one would need to be created in the interest of 
compromise. It vehemently contested any suggestions about the need to alter the existing 
structures of political oversight of the internet. In place of new models which would have 
given governments a greater role in internet governance, the United States, for instance, 
consistently proposed conservative language such as: “we recognize and acknowledge the 
vital role played by many existing organizations in the technical management of the 
internet, and strive to build on the current structures which have facilitated a rapid, global 
expansion of the internet in a secure and stable manner”. A recurring theme of Status Quo 
interventions echoed the following ISOC contention that “many issues related to internet 
usage are covered by existing treaties”, that “many issues related to internet resources and 
                                                
143 See also the related assessment of the various proposals for the final outcomes of the WSIS in Appendix 
II of this thesis. 
144 There where also arguably a Status Quo Plus and Minus Position through the various interventions 
made by some of the more active and influential members of the civil society internet governance caucus 
focused on the possibility of maintaining the ICANN system, but as a fully independent or privatized 
entity. But, according to Adam Peake, one of the Caucus co-chairs, “views on internet governance, its 
problems and solutions varied among civil society participants almost as much as they did among 
government delegates… civil society does not have a unified position on internet governance, the range of 
issues involved are too broad and civil society too diverse”(Peake 2004,  4). However, the extent to which 
WSIS civil society could be said to have a position on anything as well as the role of civil society in the 
process itself are complex questions that I deal with in part in chapter 6.  
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administration are successfully addressed through existing mechanisms” and, more 
generally, that “the role of the WSIS should be to encourage participation in these 
existing mechanisms before assuming that some other overarching mechanism is 
necessary”. Most often, the Status Quo position distilled to the oft-repeated mantra that 
“whatever action is taken should not threaten the stability and security of the internet”. 145 
In this respect, it relied heavily on promoting a fear of the unknown as a rationale for 
avoiding change.  
The Status Quo Plus approach can also be viewed as a compromise position 
between the advocates of change and the defenders of the status quo. It is thus not 
surprising that it is the position that is most reflected in the final documents of the Tunis 
phase of the Summit.  
 The pragmatic conservatives and reluctant evolutionists: As the debate became 
less polarized over the course of the 2nd phase of the WSIS, a variety of middle ground 
positions emerged.  To certain governments, in an ideal world, the DNS would not be 
subject to unilateral control by one government. But, given the success of the current 
system and the risks associated with making changes to it, many governments viewed the 
maintenance of the current order as an acceptable- if not ideal- arrangement that should 
not be altered unless demonstrated that the gains would outweigh the risks. 
 The progressive evolutionists: In contrast, others delegations- including the EU- 
argued that the system, though working, needed to evolve to allow for greater 
involvement of the global community. The evolutionary approach advocated the creation 
of a forum as a possible first step toward increased internationalization of internet 
                                                
145 All quotes in this paragraph from: WSIS Tunis Phase, PrepCom III, “WSIS-II/PC-3/DT/14 (Rev.3)”, 
ITU, http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=pc2|3&c_type=all| 
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oversight. Though it argued that a new cooperation model is necessary in order to 
facilitate “the development and application of globally applicable public policy principles 
and provide an international government involvement at the level of principles over 
[certain] naming, numbering and addressing-related matters”, the evolutionary 
perspective agreed that this new model “should not replace existing mechanisms or 
institutions, but should build on the existing structures of internet governance”.146 This 
view simultaneously demanded that changes be made to internet governance but did so 
whilst acknowledging the oft-voiced fears about the need to maintain the stability and 
security of the system. It argued for the IGF but framed it as part of a transition from the 
current system to a more internationalized system that would create a greater role in 
oversight of the internet for governments and the international community.  
The revolutionaries: Some governments including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Brazil 
called for what would have amounted to replacing the current system with an 
intergovernmental body. The revolutionary approach centered around the demand that the 
oversight of the internet be transferred to the jurisdiction of governments through the 
establishment of a formal intergovernmental institution. Not content with only a non-
binding forum for discussion, the revolutionary perspective differs from the evolutionary 
approach in the sense that this council would replace existing mechanisms and 
institutions of internet governance rather than build upon them.  
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Delegation Compositions and Capacities 
 The gap between the capacity that developed and developing countries have to 
participate in global communication policy making was well established prior to the 
WSIS turning its attention to it.147 An unavoidable irony of the “capacity building” issue 
being raised at the WSIS was that, of course, there were stark differences in composition, 
resources and capacity between the WSIS delegations negotiating the issue.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, theories of global governance tend to overlook crucial questions 
about the internal processes which influence how specific states engage in 
intergovernmental policy making. The WSIS negotiation on internet governance was 
revealing in this sense as to the capacities of different states to participate in internet 
governance and also as to how various states engage in global governance.  
 At one end of whatever capacity spectrum might be devised are most certainly the 
Americans. The American delegation to the WSIS included inputs and contributions from 
a wide swath of agencies and government departments including: the Commerce 
Department’s NTIA; the Justice Department; the Patent and Trade Office; the Library of 
Congress; the National Science Fund; the Federal Communications Commission; the 
Department of Defense; NASA; as well as several elements of the State Department 
including its international policy, legal, human rights and UN experts. Arriving at 
meetings with a roster of civil servants (many of whom worked exclusively in the domain 
of ICT policy) significantly larger than the amount of space reserved for each delegation 
                                                
147 c.f. Panos London, “Louder Voices: Strengthening Developing Country Participation in International 
ICT Decision-Making”, Panos London, http://www.panos.org.uk/?lid=324 
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on the plenary floor148, having existing working relationships with ICANN and various 
industry and technical associations and being able to work in a native tongue that was an 
official UN language, the capacity of the US delegation was, in a word, formidable. 
 In contrast, the delegation of Brazil- like many delegations to the WSIS- was 
largely composed of staff from the Brazilian Permanent Mission to Geneva. Many 
countries run permanent missions in Geneva and other diplomatic centres. By having 
permanent mission diplomatic staffs liaise with various departments and agencies on 
policy development, governments avoid the travel costs and lost productivity of sending 
delegations from their capital to the frequent meetings and consultations that occur in UN 
hubs like Geneva and New York. While Geneva permanent mission diplomatic staff have 
a wealth of experience representing their countries in international policymaking to draw 
on, they are required to cover each and every issue that comes through the UN offices in 
Geneva. As one head of delegation described it: “today it is environment, tomorrow it is 
WSIS, the day after it is nuclear”.149 Good Geneva permanent mission staff in other 
words, are skilled diplomats who handle numerous issues simultaneously, typically by 
learning just enough about each to get by. They may not posses a specialist’s degree of 
knowledge in any specific policy field and they are unlikely to be able to devote the 
attention that would be required to any one of the many issues that they cover in order to 
develop one.  That said, the fundamental role that the position of Brazil played in the 
internet governance debate at WSIS is attributable to the efforts of its permanent mission 
                                                
148 This fact I know intimately as much of my participant observation of the plenary took place from a 
vantage point that was adjacent to where the spillover of the US delegation camped out in the observer 
gallery. In addition to everything else the Americans did during the WSIS, they brought with them a power 
bar attached to an extension cord that made it possible to plug in laptops while sitting in the observer 
gallery and, in this case at least, only occasionally exercised their unilateral control of that system to favour 
their own interests over those of other would be global internet users.  
149 Valerie D’Costa, (Government of Singapore), in conversation with author, Nov. 2006.  
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staff.  As one WSIS participant put it: the Brazilian Geneva Permanent Mission staff 
involved in the WSIS “really got the internet governance issue”.150 
Foreign Affairs vs. ICT policy specialists  
Normative approaches to global governance tend to view states as unitary actors 
and, in so doing, neglect important dimensions of how state power is exercised within 
globalization (Sassen 2006).151 It is thus important to understand how states organize 
their response to issues of global communication policy. It was tempting during the WSIS 
to equate the positions adopted by various delegations with that country’s view of global 
internet governance, in particular from delegations that included a significant contingent 
of ICT policy experts dispatched from the capital.   
In the substantive sense, the WSIS was a communication or internet policy 
making forum, but the positions adopted by specific delegations typically reflected an 
intersection of policy spheres.152 The balance that delegations struck between the inputs 
of foreign affairs departments and ICT policy specialists was a topic discussed by various 
interviews with WSIS participants conducted for this thesis. Many delegations functioned 
so that ICT policy specialists vetted positions with their foreign affairs departments. In 
most cases, the positions adopted by governments over the course of the WSIS are 
properly framed as the view of the foreign affairs department on global internet 
                                                
150 Tim Kelly, (ITU Strategic Planning and WSIS Executive Secretariat), in conversation with author, July 
2007.  
151 Though he is not quoted extensively here, I would like to acknowledge the extent to which my interview 
with Martin Boyle influenced my view of the significance of this topic. 
152 Even the issue of which intergovernmental organization hosted the summit factored in. For example, 
had the exact same debate been held in a summit hosted by UNESCO rather than the ITU, the Canadian 
delegation and policy development process would have been led by the Ministry of Heritage rather than 
Industry.  
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governance of a given country, rather than as the view of that government of global 
internet governance full stop.153 
  
What is Global Governance? 
 
Internet Governance/ Global politics 
To many delegations, the WSIS was as much a summit on international relations 
as it was on the information society or global internet governance, if not more. Indeed, 
the complex question of defining the information society itself went essentially 
unresolved.  There is certainly a case to be made that the positions adopted by various 
governments might have been motivated by issues that had nothing to do with the WSIS 
subject matter, reflecting more general international relations issues, protest against Bush 
Administration unilateralism and the invasion of Iraq for example. The stout defense of 
its interests and its outright rejection of the European proposal- despite the fact that it 
contained some elements that could have appealed to American sensibilities (c.f. Mayer-
Schonberger and Ziewitz 2007)- reflects the suspicious attitude and siege mentality 
toward UN policy making evident elsewhere in the Bush-era American diplomatic 
core.154 A common theme of media coverage of the EU proposal at PrepCom III (c.f. 
Wright 2007) was the suggestion that the EU was capitalizing on anti-American backlash 
in an effort to  flex its diplomatic clout.155   
                                                
153 For example, had American ICT policy experts been more sympathetic to the calls for creating a new 
UN organization for IG or even supported an IGF with more teeth, such a position would have had to have 
conformed to the US Zero Nominal Growth (ZNG) policy toward the UN’s budget that precludes American 
support for any UN initiative that requires additional funds.  
 
154 Consider for example the title of Former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton’s (2007) memoirs: 
Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad.  
155 The general climate of international relations at the time also explains the stakes of the EU’s break with 
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Domestic and Global 
  Domestic policy approaches to internet governance are not only revised on their 
way to the global level, but may be filtered-and even subsumed- by more general, non-
issue specific foreign politics. That said, interviews conducted for this study suggested 
that existing domestic ICT policy did fundamentally contribute to the process of 
developing policy for the World Summit.  
For the Canadian delegation, the already-mentioned definitional issues created by 
the emergence of global internet governance as a negotiation issue necessitated 
consideration of how domestic policy applied: “nobody knew what the term meant in the 
beginning and so we had to draw very much on what we were doing domestically and 
extrapolate it into the international sphere”.156 
The drive for the Canadian delegation to extrapolate domestic policy into the 
international sphere was attributed primarily to the need for harmonization between 
global and national perspectives. A secondary consideration was a self-consciously 
proselytizing interest in 
sharing what we have learned because Canada was one of the early- and continues 
to be one of the earlier- developers in terms of community use of network. So we 
think we feel that what we've learned, and the policies we've developed nationally 
                                                                                                                                            
the US on internet governance. Bolton (2007, 131) writing about how the fear of breaking with the EU led 
to a revision of the American position on Iran’s nuclear armament “after Iraq, the fear of being separated 
from the Europeans was too great to overcome, even within an administration of supposed unilateralist 
cowboys”. Yet this is precisely what occurred in a different context at WSIS.  
 
156 Bill Graham, (Industry Canada), in conversation with author, Oct. 2006.  
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will genuinely be of value to the developing world, and in fact, to other developed 
countries dealing with their own internal policies.157 
A third, relatively small element of the drive to extrapolate domestic policy to the 
international sphere was that Canada “didn't have time to come up with a whole new 
policy development process”. This was attributed frankly to the fact that there simply 
“wasn't a domestic driver and the World Summit on the Information Society wasn't 
enough of a domestic driver to force a domestic policy development process”. As a result, 
“just out of sheer pragmatism”, Canada had to draw on and extrapolate from existing 
policy frameworks”.158  
 A common feature of the domestic policy development process was domestic 
stakeholder consultation with varying degrees of formality. British stakeholder 
consultations were  
informal, some had a certain degree of formality. But, by and large they were 
discussions around developing understanding, a few formal meetings, mostly not. 
By the time we got into the PrepCom, we had got a very, very good dialogue 
going with all of the actors.159  
British domestic consultations involved academics and NGOs in areas like human 
rights to an extent. However, reflecting the status the Department of Trade and Industry 
as the policy lead on matters related to internet governance in the UK, their focus was 
predominantly on discussion of the issues with private sector firms.  
                                                
157 Bill Graham, (Industry Canada), in conversation with author, Oct. 2006.  
 
158 Bill Graham, (Industry Canada), in conversation with author, Oct. 2006.  
 
159 Martin Boyle, (Department of Trade and Industry, Government of the UK), in conversation with author, 
Nov. 2006. 
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In Canada, consultations were organized by the Canadian Commission for 
UNESCO and were decidedly multi-stakeholder. Despite the fact that the Canadian 
government delegation “shared material on issues with [stakeholders] on an informal 
basis”, the ad hoc, time sensitive nature of the consultations coupled with the 
stakeholders’ relative lack of familiarity with the issues meant that “[stakeholders] didn't 
really input very much”. 160 
While some governments operationalized the multi-stakeholder approach of the 
WSIS primarily through coordinating policy development between delegations and 
domestic stakeholders, other governments- Canada, Sweden and Germany for example- 
included civil society or industry representatives on their delegation. This had real impact 
on the participation of civil society in the WSIS. At various times over the course of the 
process government delegations were given priority access to proceedings, for example in 
regard to the plenary sessions at the first phase of the summit. At other times- during 
breakout negotiation working groups for example- access was restricted to participants 
who had government delegation badges. In each case civil society representatives who 
had been included in various government delegations were able to attend and report back 
to wider civil society through email listservs, as well as face-to-face civil society 
structures and meetings (see Raboy and Landry 2005 for an overview of these CS 
structures). Interestingly, civil society delegates were not always even citizens of the 
countries whose delegations they were invited to be a part of.  
 
 
                                                
160 Bill Graham, (Industry Canada), in conversation with author, Oct. 2006.  
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Thus, there was continuity between the national and global level, but also 
disjuncture. Some governments with deregulated domestic telecommunication sectors 
were active advocates for the imposition of an intergovernmental framework on global 
internet governance. The United States illustrated a separate form of disjuncture between 
the global and the national level. The rhetoric that circulated through WSIS about the 
symbolic nature of US Government oversight of the ICANN and about how the US 
Government did not get involved in the day-to-day operations of the internet was directly 
contradicted during the  .xxx episode (discussed in Chapter 3). A freedom of information 
request subsequently filed by the ICM registry contains a copy of a poster in which the 
Congressional Internet Caucus was invited to a talk by high ranking NTIA officials 
describing how the US Government was able to use its historic role in the oversight of the 
DNS to strong arm ICANN into rescinding the .xxx GTLD (see Internet Governance 
Project 2006).  Thus, at the WSIS, the American line was, in effect, that ‘we’ should keep 
oversight because we don’t use it, in Washington the message was more of that ‘we’ 
should keep oversight because we need it and use it effectively.  This is an example of 
how the same policy issues and positions can be reframed at the global and national 
levels at the same time.  
 
 
How is Global Governance Done?:  
UN Modalities: Contested Processes and the Politics of Unanimity and Compromise 
 In the morning session of the final day of the September 2005 sitting of phase 
II, PrepCom III, when it had become apparent that there were “more divisions than 
agreements”, and that the issue of internet governance would “remain contentious and 
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divisive until it was resolved”, Subcommittee A chair Masoud Khan asked delegations 
whether they would prefer to keep consulting on their own or if it might be helpful for 
him to prepare a “Chair’s Paper that would satisfy no one perspective”, in the effort to 
push negotiations forward.  Brazil’s delegation responded with a refrain that is commonly 
used to describe unanimous consensus-based negotiation: “as long as you promise to 
disappoint us all equally”.  
 From there, over the course of two separate meetings of Subcommittee A, a 
debate ensued about what the status of such a paper would be and it was gradually 
demoted from “Chair’s Paper” to “Chair’s non-Paper” to “Food-For-Thought Document” 
to “a paper with no status that will not be used in negotiations”.  After being printed and 
circulated, the US suggested that the document had been published over the objections of 
Senegal and pointed out that the crucial proposal for creation of an Internet Governance 
Forum submitted earlier by Argentina did not bear the WSIS logo and a formal document 
number while the paper of the chair had both. Seemingly challenging the chair’s authority 
by suggesting that  “as a matter of equity [….] contributions of sovereign states [should] 
be on equal footing with your own”, the US delegation nonetheless stopped short of 
actually making any kind of specific request by adding another refrain that was oft-
repeated by delegations in their interventions on agenda issues and matters of process:  
“we’re in your hands Mr. Chairman”.   
 Each of these characteristics- the focus on process and the politics of 
unanimity- are crucial to the evaluation of how policy making frames global governance. 
The burden of producing outcomes that are accepted not just by a majority of delegations 
but, by all delegations, fundamentally shaped the outcome of the WSIS. As we saw 
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throughout the narrative presented in chapter 3, strong statements are easily rendered 
uncontroversial with the deployment of the conditional mode (wherein “must” becomes 
“should” or “could”, and “is” becomes “can”, etc.) or by simply inserting clauses that 
balance out language that was initially proposed to express a preference. The journey 
taken by efforts to use the Geneva Phase documents to make a strong statement about 
free/open source software discussed in chapter 3 is exemplary of both tendencies.   
 At WSIS, the politics of unanimity also involved what was a palpable pressure 
for the need to keep everyone happy and “get a deal done”. The term “red line” which 
many of the interview subjects used is revealing as to the effect that the burden of 
unanimity has on negotiation. Fundamentally, anything that is past the red line of any one 
delegation is, in principle, off the table as an alternative. In practice of course, there was a 
code of diplomacy evident that seemed to create a pressure for delegations- in particular 
minor delegations- to set their red lines in good faith. In the case of the WSIS, given the 
need to have the US sign off an any changes to the institutional structure of the DNS 
system under its control, the threat that US objections would- within a system that 
requires unanimity- prevent any kind of deal from getting done was very real. This fact 
was emphasized after the EU was perceived to have challenged the US red line. The 
collective sense of responsibility for coming up with some kind of text based on the years 
and millions of dollars that had been invested in the WSIS process certainly produced 
pressure on delegations to compromise on their demands. The internet governance 
negotiations at WSIS, however, illustrate how the politics of unanimity can also be a 
double-edged sword.   
 Whereas in majoritarian forums, one dissenting voice can easily be 
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marginalized, the ability of Brazil to hold up the early stages of the proceedings with an 
opinion that was not widely shared or supported allowed it to operate as what John 
Kingdon (1984, 129) would call a “policy entrepreneur”. for the cause of reforming 
global internet governance. The Brazilians invested a great deal in taking ownership over 
an otherwise marginalized idea and pushing it up the WSIS agenda. Consistent with 
Kingdon’s notion of policy entrepreneurship, it is likely that they did so- at least 
partially- out of an interest in the reputational capital benefits associated with being the 
driver of an issue. In the case of Brazil at the WSIS these likely related to a desire to be 
perceived by other developing and post-colonial country delegations as a champion of 
copy left and progressive information politics.  
 Kingdon’s research suggests that “an item’s chances for moving up on an 
agenda are enhanced considerably by the presence of a skillful entrepreneur and damped 
considerably if no entrepreneur takes on the case” (Kingdon 1984, 215).  It is quite likely 
that the issue would not have emerged as it did without the push of Brazil in the early 
phases of the WSIS. The need for unanimous consensus makes it effectively impossible 
for the forcefully supported dissenting view of one delegation to be completely 
marginalized. In this sense, the politics of unanimity enabled Brazil’s policy 
entrepreneurship during the WSIS.  
 The preoccupation with matters of process that was evident in the discussion of 
the status of the chair’s paper cited above was common over the course of the WSIS. In 
addition to the status of various documents, common processional topics for discussion 
included: whether language would be negotiated in full subcommittee plenary or in 
break-out groups; and whether non-governmental stakeholders were permitted in the 
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room during these breakout groups. If so, there were further debates over whether non-
governmental stakeholders would be permitted to give statements to these negotiating 
sessions before being required to leave, whether they would be permitted to stay as 
observers, or alternatively whether they would be active parties to the negotiations. A 
related larger debate was over who was and was not accredited to the Summit. There 
were also points of order raised relating to missing or inaccurate translation of documents 
and statements. The WSIS was, in many respects, forging new ground for the inclusion of 
non-governmental stakeholders in UN processes (c.f. Raboy and Landry 2005), and a 
certain amount of this processional discussion can be explained by the ambiguity caused 
by situations that largely lacked precedent. Regardless, the volume of discussion time 
during the WSIS that was devoted to process over substance reflects a broader thematic 
point that has been raised by other commentators (c.f. Mayer-Schonberger and Ziewitz 
2007). The WSIS IG negotiation that occurred within this oft-contested framework itself 
was largely devoted to debate over the institutional processes of other organizations 
involved in internet governance. From roles and responsibilities of governments and 
other stakeholders, to the question of ICANN oversight and the discussion of the IGF, the 
WSIS debate was largely- though not exclusively- a debate about what could be 
described as the institutional process in which internet governance occurs.  
 Interviews conducted with WSIS delegates for this study reinforced this point. 
After listening to the critiques of the reform-minded governments over the first phases of 
the WSIS debate, one delegate confessed to being tempted to respond:   
what’s the problem? How did it affect your CCTLD? What actually went wrong?   
I mean was there a time when you asked for addressing blocks and were not given 
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them? Or, was there a time when the master root was used to obfuscate a request 
that you made?161 
But this delegate eventually came to the conclusion that the calls for reform were based 
more on the potential for abuse endemic to a system in which only a few stakeholders 
have a direct role in the management of the master root rather than on the existence of 
clear evidence that the current system was actively being abused. Given that an ever 
increasing segment of global internet users live in countries without a say in the 
management of the root, this delegation came to understand how this potential for abuse 
emerged as a geo-political issue:  
When countries say ‘I want the UN involved’, what they are really saying is: ‘I 
want more of a voice’ , what they are really saying is ‘I want a more transparent 
and participative structure’ and what I assume they are really saying is: ‘I want to 
be a coequal just as any other country’.162 
In this sense, just as the WSIS was more about process than substance, the debate was 
less about the decisions that are, and have been, taken by the governors of the internet 
and more about the process through which those governors are selected and the decisions 
that they arrive at are reached. In particular, this debate was about the power of 
governments within these processes relative to other broad categories of actors.  
 Much of the WSIS debate focused on the roles of the private sector, civil 
society and governments within the institutional arrangements for internet governance. 
Of these three actors, governments are, in principle, unique in their ability to claim the 
                                                
161 Valerie D’Costa, (Government of Singapore), in conversation with author, Nov. 2006. 
 
162 Valerie D’Costa, (Government of Singapore), in conversation with author, Nov. 2006. 
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authority and legitimacy of representing broadly-based constituencies. However, just as 
in previous debates over communication and information at the intergovernmental level 
(see chapter 1), the WSIS internet governance negotiations centred on the jurisdiction of 
states over mass communication rather than the rights of the individual citizen to 
communicate.163 Through its focus on process rather than end results and substance, the 
global internet governance debate is more closely associated with a fight over the 
sovereignty divide created by the internet than it is over the digital divide.  
 
Chapter Conclusion: Global Internet Governance as Multi-Leveled, Multi--Sectoral  
Global governance of the internet is complex and controversial. The decisions that 
are made within it are shaped by these characteristics. Analysis of the normative value 
and potential impact of these decisions must crucially be informed by sophisticated 
understandings of how decisions are arrived at, who participates in decision making and 
what ends are being pursued by various actors.  
This chapter underlined the extent to which global internet governance is what 
Raboy and Padovani (2008) describe as multi-level and multi-sectoral.  It is multi-leveled 
in the sense that it involves a dynamic policy development processes in which issues and 
delegations navigate seamlessly between the national and global levels as well as through 
regional bodies and club-type organizations.  Global internet governance is multi-sectoral 
in the sense that it directly implicates stakeholders from government, civil society and the 
private sector. The so-called ‘internet technical community’ is also a fundamentally 
                                                
163 See Raboy and Shtern 2010a: Chapter 2 for an overview of the history of intergovernmental debates of 
communication issues dating back to the drafting of article 19 of the UNDHR and Chapter 2 and 11 for 
discussion of the tendency for state sovergnity concerns to monopolize these discussions at the expense of 
the rights of individuals within society.  
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embedded group of actors whose interests and perspectives do not directly overlap with 
any of the three classic stakeholder categories. There are no hard and fast rules about who 
states send to represent them in global governance institutions and how they attribute the 
positions adopted to domestic policies or the views of their citizenship. Understanding 
global internet governance as multi-sectoral thus involves unpackaging the internal 
transformations of the state and the overlaps that exist between various policy spheres.  
 The extent to which global internet governance is a multi-leveled and multi-
sectoral policy field has only been reinforced since the WSIS.   Consider, for example, 
what is involved in the emerging global regulatory framework for online child protection. 
Online child protection is often pointed to as one of the areas on which the most 
significant progress has been made by the emerging global internet governance regime.164 
 
Problems related to online child protection were identified by the WGIG165 and 
prevention of cyber-crime and online child protection issue were discussed in the final 
                                                
164 For example, participants at the 2008 IGF underlined how their discussions of online child protection 
illustrate the utility of the IGF format. Brazilian government delegate Everton Lucero, for example, 
suggested that “it seems that discussion has matured enough in this area so that now we perhaps could think 
of creating a common environment where all relevant stakeholders could build trust and work together”. 
See IGF, “Internet Governance Forum Hyderabad, India Open Dialogue December 4, 2008”, IGF,  
 http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/hyderabad_prog/Open%20Dialogue.html 
 
165 Including: tensions between efforts to investigate missue of the internet and the privacy rights of internet 
users; between criminal law approaches to combating internet missue and fundamental rights such as 
freedom of expression.  As well as questions about: whether individuals should be required to identify 
themselves when using the internet, or whether the information necessary to track them ex post should be 
mandatorily recorded and kept by ISPs and service operators, and to what extent; whether services that 
increase the degree of privacy or fully anonymize the usage of the internet should be allowed, encouraged, 
or forbidden; to which extent applications installed on a personal computer (including so-called spyware) 
should be allowed to monitor its usage, report information back to the software supplier or vendor, or take 
control of the content and capabilities of the personal computer .   Also, the point is raised that “to avoid the 
creation of ‘cybercrime havens’, it will be necessary to ensure that criminalization of specific conduct 
committed in cyberspace, should be put in place on a global level, respecting the diversity of cultures and 
legal systems”. (WGIG 2005). 
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agreements and documents produced by the WSIS166 as well as in the parallel civil 
society declaration produced for the Geneva phase of the summit167 and  have emerged as 
                                                
 
166 Geneva Phase: (see http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|1160)  
 
Declaration of Principles  
(A11) We are also committed to ensuring that the development of ICT applications and operation of 
services respects the rights of children as well as their protection and well-being; (B10) All actors in the 
Information Society should take appropriate actions and preventive measures, as determined by law, 
against abusive uses of ICTs, such as illegal and other acts motivated by… violence, all forms of child 
abuse (also 25b of Plan of Action)  
 
Plan of Action  
12b Governments, in cooperation with the private sector, should prevent, detect and respond to cyber-crime 
and misuse of ICTs by: developing guidelines that take into account ongoing efforts in these areas; 
considering legislation that allows for effective investigation and prosecution of misuse; promoting 
effective mutual assistance efforts; strengthening institutional support at the international level for 
preventing, detecting and recovering from such incidents; and encouraging education and raising 
awareness. 
 
Tunis Phase: (http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266|2267) 
 
 
Tunis Agenda  
 
90q  incorporating regulatory, self-regulatory, and other effective policies and frameworks to protect 
children and young people from abuse and exploitation through ICTs into national plans of action and e-
strategies. 
 
92. We encourage countries, and all other interested parties, to make available child helplines, taking into 
account the need for mobilization of appropriate resources. For this purpose, easy-to-remember numbers, 
accessible from all phones and free of charge, should be made available. 
 
40. We underline the importance of the prosecution of cybercrime, including cybercrime committed in one 
jurisdiction, but having effects in another. We further underline the necessity of effective and efficient tools 
and actions, at national and international levels, to promote international cooperation among, inter alia, 
law-enforcement agencies on cybercrime. We call upon governments in cooperation with other 
stakeholders to develop necessary legislation for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting 
existing frameworks, for example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on "Combating the criminal 
misuse of information technologies" and regional initiatives including, but not limited to, the Council of 
Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. 
 
42. We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek, receive, impart and use information, in particular, 
for the creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. We affirm that measures undertaken to 
ensure internet stability and security, to fight cybercrime and to counter spam, must protect and respect the 
provisions for privacy and freedom of expression as contained in the relevant parts of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Declaration of Principles. 
 
Tunis Commitment  
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one of the primary issues of discussion as well as areas of progress at the IGF.168 Online 
child protection issues are also treated by the activities of various other organizations 
including: the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime169 and Internet Literacy 
Handbook
170
; the European Commission (EC) Safer Internet Programmes171 and public 
                                                                                                                                            
24. We recognize the role of ICTs in the protection of children and in enhancing the development of 
children. We will strengthen action to protect children from abuse and defend their rights in the context of 
ICTs. In that context, we emphasize that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration. 
 
 
167 2.1.4 Importance of Youth 
we commit to develop and use only those ICTs that ensure the well-being, 
protection, and harmonious development of all children. 
 
 
2.2.7 Rights of the Child 
Information and communication societies must respect and promote the principles of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Every child is entitled to a happy childhood and to enjoy the rights and freedoms 
available to all persons under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All persons, civil society, private 
sector and governments should commit to uphold the Rights of the Child in information and 
communication societies. 
 
168 A dynamic collation on child online safety was created during the 2007 IGF in Rio with the aim of 
creating: “a permanent, open platform for discussion on fundamental and practical issues related to child 
online safety within the agenda of the Internet Governance Forum, ensuring dialogue among 
representatives from children’s organizations, government, industry, academia and other civil society 
groups”. At the 2008 IGF in Hyderabad, India, online child protection issues were topics of frequent 
discussion. Workshops were organized with titles such as “Child Safety Online: measures to protect 
children from exploitation – the challenge of keeping pace with technological developments”; “Dignity, 
security and privacy of children on the internet – applying international law to protect their best interests”; 
“Strategies to prevent and fight child pornography in Developing Countries”; “The internet goes mobile - 
child protection in the always connected age” and “An Interpol for the Internet?”.  British online child 
advocate John Carr was given a high profile speaking slot in one plenary session. 
 
169 The Cybercrime Convention represents an effort to establish a common criminal policy aimed at the 
protection of society against cybercrime by obligating ratifying states to adopting a set of prescribed 
legislation and to participate in a framework aimed at promoting international co-operation in preventing, 
investigating and prosecuting cybercrime. Article 9:  “Offences related to child pornography” as well is in 
the additional protocol that criminalizes racist and xenophobic propaganda spread via computer networks. 
When taken in combination with the data interception powers granted to law enforcement agencies by 
Article 21 and the “General Principles Related to International Cooperation” outlined in Article 23, the 
CoE Convention on Cybercrime approach establishes a framework for placing and enforcing an embargo 
on a particular undesirable category of internet-mediated speech in the aim of protecting children (Council 
of Europe 2004).  
  
 
170 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/StandardSetting/InternetLiteracy/hbk_en.asp 
 
171 For example, The “New Safer Internet Program” has been launched for 2009-2013 and addresses issues 
such as “grooming” (where a person befriends a child for sexual abuse), cyber-bullying  and “Reducing 
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consultations on related issues172; the ITU’s Child Online Protection (COP) initiative as 
part of the ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA)173. The .xxx episode at ICANN was 
centred around child protection issues. The need to protect children online has been a 
prominent justification for various intrusive national cybersecurity laws (see chapter 4).  
Thus, there is no one-stop shop for global internet governance of the issue of child 
protection. The response involves a range of organizations: domestic governments; 
international organizations; multi-stakeholder assemblages; broad-based 
intergovernmental organizations; and exclusive governmental clubs. It also involves a 
variety of stakeholders including various levels of government and government 
ministries, civil society and the private sector. Looking at these different institutions and 
policy frameworks together, we can also identify at least four distinct forms of regulatory 
response to children online: technological fixes; criminal law; victim rights-based speech 
regulation and what could be described as multi-stakeholder cooperation (Raboy and 
Shtern 2010b). 
                                                                                                                                            
illegal content and tackling harmful conduct online” by increasing understanding, awareness, cooperation 
and accountability amongst all stakeholders in regard to the illicit conduct. Activities planned range from 
establishing points where members of the public can report concerns and awareness raising campaigns to 
efforts to promote research into the effects of harmful online conduct and share best practice solutions. See: 
Council of Europe, “Safer Internet Programme: Empowering and Protecting Children Online”, CoE, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/index_en.htm 
  
172 Including: “Safer Internet and online technologies for children”; “Child safety and mobile phone 
services” and the recently concluded consultation on “Age Verification, Cross Media Rating and Social 
Networking”. 
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/public_consultation/index_en.htm 
 
173 The key objectives of the initiative are to: Identify the key risks and vulnerabilities to children in 
cyberspace; Create awareness of the risks and issues through multiple channels; Develop practical tools to 
help governments, organizations and educators minimize risk; Share knowledge and experience while 
facilitating international strategic partnerships to define and implement concrete initiatives. See: ITU, 
“Protecting Children Online”, ITU, http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/cop/index.html 
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These dynamics do not lend themselves to oversimplifications or generalizations. 
The unpackaging of global internet governance called for in Chapter 1 requires context 
specific understanding of how the perspectives of various actors are developed and 
restructured over the course of negotiations and emerging institutional practices. 
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-CHAPTER 6- 
The Public Interest in Communication: Conclusions and Research Agenda 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 The case study of this thesis, the WSIS negotiations of internet governance, has 
defined the issues, set the agenda for a global debate on internet governance and 
incubated the competing positions that continue to define it. In this sense, while it is 
tempting to dismiss the WSIS due to the fact that it did not produce fundamental change 
within the system, this case study has revealed the extent to which an in-depth accounting 
of the WSIS is in fact crucial to understanding the parameters of the ongoing debate over 
global internet governance and, by extension, the public interest in communication. 
 The WSIS focused on governments, existing internet users, technology and 
process rather than citizens, the entire public of the information society and the place of 
communication in society. But, a series of cross-cutting observations about the public 
interest implications of the case study of the WSIS apply to the ongoing debate over 
internet governance and, more broadly speaking, fill in crucial knowledge gaps in our 
understanding of global media governance and the central role that the governance of 
digital networks plays within it.   
 
Summary of Key Conclusions from Case Study 
 Contrary to notions that the sort of borderless communication facilitated by the 
internet somehow diminishes the political significance of territory, the WSIS case study 
suggests that geography still matters to the regulation of communication.  From the 
location of root servers and the headquarters of governing bodies, to the architecture of 
international interconnection arrangements, the WSIS underlined the importance of the 
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physical location of the components of internet governance. Symbolically, considerable 
significance was attached to the disconnect between the internet’s status as a global 
medium of communication and the clustering of internet governance resources within 
American territory.  
 For instance, the original creation of thirteen root servers was intended to 
provide duplication that would preclude the possibility of all copies of the root being 
disabled at once. Eleven of these thirteen root servers are physically located within the 
borders of the US and none of them were placed in non-OECD countries (see Appendix I 
for more details). This should not matter to cyberspace; the system was designed only to 
ensure redundancy.  But the optics of the exclusion of the Global South and American 
domination of resources did matter; the issue was a point of contention during the WSIS. 
It was resolved through a technique called ‘anycasting’ that, according to Peake (2004: 
10) means that “since the beginning of 2003, ‘cloned’ root servers have appeared on 
every continent, [and, as of 2004], in 22 countries and territories”. Establishing additional 
clones of the mirror root servers in various non-OECD countries obviously increases the 
degree of redundancy to this system. But given the improbability that all thirteen original 
root servers could ever be disabled simultaneously, a much more significant impact of the 
existence of the cloned mirror root servers is the extent to which it enrolls non-OECD 
countries into the DNS management system and enables a more globally-constituted 
notion of internet governance. Cloned root servers, in this sense, matter more for 
geographic reasons rather than for technical ones.  
 Practically, the issue of internet interconnection costs underlined the extent to 
which the internet is not entirely virtual in the sense that the physical location of crucial 
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network nodes differentiates the cost of accessing cyberspace from one location as 
opposed to another. Social norms and concern for linguistic and cultural diversity were 
linked in meaningful ways to the manner in which the geographic location of certain 
resources and institutions shapes the decisions that are made in the governance of the 
internet and the perception of their legitimacy.  
 Most fundamentally, geography mattered during the internet governance 
negotiations at the WSIS through the extent to which governments defended their 
sovereignty in relation to borderless communication. As an extension of this, the debate 
over internet governance is preoccupied with questions about the rules and processes that 
define how decisions are made. Concern that government sovereignty is not adequately 
embedded within the institutional/structural framework of global internet governance is 
driving this debate. Through the push to create multi-stakeholder global governance, 
important actors in civil society, the internet technical community and the private sector 
are also fundamentally concerned with processes and their roles and responsibilities 
within them. 
 This focus on process simultaneously reflects and reinforces the extent to which 
power within the global internet governance regime is being defined as the ability to 
control technical switches and mandates for institutional oversight. The question of the 
extent of government involvement in ICANN decision making dominated the WSIS and 
has remained a pre-occupation since. This reflects Lessig’s (2006: 78) view that the 
configuration of the architecture of the internet and its contingency for being otherwise is 
power. The WSIS process has clearly demonstrated that, when understood, the technical 
functioning of the internet can be engaged, interrogated, and even changed to conform 
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with political directives. In effect, the paradigm has shifted from questioning ‘if the 
internet can be controlled’, to asking ‘how should it be controlled and in whose 
interests?’. Lessig (2006, 79) writes that “how the code regulates, who the code writers 
are and who controls the code writers” are the essential “questions on which any practice 
of justice must focus in the age of cyberspace”.  However, the tendency for issues that do 
not relate directly to recognizable institutional choking points or technical switches to be 
easily marginalized has combined with preoccupations about decision making process 
and sovereignty to focus the global internet governance debate on the questions of “who 
the code writers are and who controls the code writers” at the expense of concern for the 
end result of “how the code regulates”. Global internet governance is largely focused on 
means, that is to say, rather than ends.  
Internet governance is increasingly seen to take place within what Drake (2004, 
257) calls a “highly distributed governance architecture compromising a heterogeneous 
array of public and private sector arrangements”. In this sense, global internet 
governance is multi-leveled and multi-sectoral.  It involves a cross-cutting look at 
internet policy emanating from national governments, intergovernmental organizations, 
and multi-stakeholder global assemblages which engage a range of actors including 
governments, the private sector, civil society and non-governmental organizations, and 
the internet technical community. Specific internet governance issues are often treated by 
various organizations through a range of regulatory approaches.  Stakeholders themselves 
are similarly multi-leveled and multi-sectoral.  
Different governments are organizing internal policy responses to the problems of 
global internet governance in dramatically different ways. Some government delegations 
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to the WSIS were dominated by ICT specialists, others were lead by Foreign Affairs 
departments or even generalist diplomatic staff. Consultation with domestic 
constituencies varied. Certain governments are engaged in parallel internet governance 
policy development through domestic lawmaking, regional institutions and club-type 
intergovernmental organizations such as the OECD. Others participate only in global 
bodies such as the IGF or ITU and even venue shop their agendas between them. Non-
governmental stakeholder categories are similarly heterogeneous and subject to internal 
transformation. Within civil society participants to the IGF process, for example, 
opinions are starkly divided between privacy activists and child protection activists as to 
the desirability of emerging efforts to protect children in the online environment (cf. 
Raboy and Shtern 2010b).  
Drake underlines the importance of assessments of global internet governance that 
address this distributed architecture in what he calls a “holistic or horizontally cross-
cutting manner” (2004, 258).  But, attempts to even identify all of the organizations that 
shape the distributed architecture of the global internet governance regime offer 
competing accounts, ranging from many (c.f. MacLean 2004, 85-99) to many dozen 
organizations.174  
The limited capacity of many governments to follow, participate in and 
meaningfully influence all of these organizations simultaneously was a topic of much 
discussion during the WSIS. Whereas broad substantive concern for the normative values 
                                                
174 c.f. The International Chamber of Commerce, “The ICC Compendium of ICC Internet governance 
related policy and practice tools”, ICC, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASIS/Compendium_FINAL_IGF(1).pdf 
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embedded in global internet governance requires simultaneous engagement in a multitude 
of initiatives and forums, the achievement of political welfare goals through processional 
means can be accomplished within one organization. This practicality both reflects and 
reinforces the push from governments and, to a certain extent, the private sector and civil 
society activists, to set political agendas around narrow concern for reforming the 
processes of a specific organization so that political power and oversight of key network 
choking points are redistributed. It reflects them in the sense that, within the distributed 
multi-leveled, multi-sectoral architecture of global internet governance, working 
vertically within one or more organizations on process rather than horizontally or 
holistically on more substantive issues that span many organizations is more feasible and 
realistic. It reinforces these tendencies in the sense that the inability of stakeholders with 
less capacity to meaningfully participate more broadly in global internet governance 
underlines the need for the establishment of a more formal one-stop intergovernmental 
internet governance organization. 
 The debate on global internet governance is, this case study suggests, 
preoccupied with switches, who controls them and the modalities through which 
decisions made about the manner in which they are used are arrived at. The extent to 
which decisions made in global internet governance are justified by, and assessed for, 
their impact on the public interest emerges from within these relatively narrow 
parameters.  
The Public Interest in Global Internet Governance 
The typology of various approaches to defining the public interest that was 
presented in Chapter 1 suggests that efforts at pre-WSIS internet governance tended to be 
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justified and assessed against the normative principle that the internet was unregulatable. 
Alternatively, the public interest was attributed to the decisions that were being made by 
the internet technical community, regardless of what was decided.  In this sense, a case 
can be made that pre-WSIS internet governance was based on some combination of a 
unitary theory of the public interest, (defined as an assertion of some absolute normative 
principle), and a results-focused or pragmatic approach to the public interest (the view 
that the public interest is whatever those charged with making decisions in the public 
interest decide). Pre-WSIS internet governance was cloaked in rhetoric about community 
and democratic values but was ultimately largely captured by the economic welfare 
concerns of powerful actors (c.f. Mueller 2002). It is clear however, that the WSIS 
became the site of a significant shift in thinking about the regulation of the internet as a 
series of constituencies challenged these assumptions. How can this be conceptualized in 
terms of the public interest?  
The case study that is central to this thesis suggests that the global internet 
governance regime that has emerged over the course of the WSIS internet governance 
negotiations and since is defined by a process-based approach to the public interest in 
which political welfare is the ultimate priority. Where the public interest was relevant to 
legitimizing the contested claims being forwarded, it was attributed to process-oriented 
terms, through the representative apparatus of the state and through the involvement of 
civil society in the negotiations.  
 
Public Interest in Communication  
 Thus, this was not a debate over the global public’s interest in internet mediated 
communication but a discussion of the extent to which governments should have a say in 
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the processes by which regulatory decisions (mostly technical rather than normative 
regulatory decisions at that) are made on behalf of internet users. How then, does the 
global debate on internet governance influence the public interest in communication? 
 There are obvious and direct linkages between the debate on global internet 
governance and the manner in which communication as a larger area of social activity 
will be regulated in the future. Transnational and national policymaking bodies such as 
the CoE and the CRTC, for example, have already made moves- since the WSIS- to 
consider media in the internet governance debate and vice versa. In light of the extent to 
which the WSIS ultimately and publicly discredited the logic that the internet is immune 
to regulation, we can likely expect other organizations to undertake similar initiatives in 
the years to come. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the internet has been something of a 
standard bearer in regard to regulatory approaches to convergence. The extent to which 
market reliance and self-regulation are perceived to work in regard to the internet will 
affect the regulatory status of other ICTs, in particular if the fundamental challenges that 
are being made within the global internet governance debate prove to be successful. 
 More significant however is the extent to which process-focused, political 
welfare notions of the public interest in global internet governance impacts the public 
interest in global communication indirectly. 
 
Indirect Regulation 
 I suggested earlier that this focus on process and on political welfare defines 
power within the global internet governance regime as the ability to control technical 
switches and mandates for institutional oversight rather than the capacity to influence the 
normative character of communication in any meaningful way. But is this all that is really 
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at stake?   
The case study at the centre of this thesis reviewed how controversy over the 
domain name system and ICANN emerged alongside other issues such as the role of 
human rights in the information society, bridging the digital divide, etc. at the beginning 
of the WSIS (see Figure 1 in chapter 3). All the constituencies and interest groups fought 
to broaden the boundaries to force their issues onto the internet governance agenda and 
lines were drawn.  
Over the course of the first phase of the summit, many of the higher order, more 
abstract calls that would have contributed to the formation of an expanded legal 
framework for regulating mass communication in the information society were gradually 
massaged out of the WSIS documents or diluted past the point of having a substantive 
effect.  
 “Something had to be done”, one of this study’s interview subjects put it, about a 
whole series of issues, of which the status and mandate of ICANN was but one. However, 
the first phase of the WSIS proved that it can be very easy to counter calls for reform on 
issues that are not framed explicitly around a switch that could be pulled to institute 
proposed changes, in particular in a process defined by the need for unanimously 
approved resolutions (see Chapter 5).  
As one of the only clear institutional interfaces with communication on the 
internet, the DNS/ICANN issue emerged as a logical focal point for the WSIS debate, 
even if much of what was really at issue had little to do with ICANN’s mandate. In 2004, 
MacLean described internet governance as a “wedge issue” that many governments 
viewed “as the standard bearer for a much broader governance reform agenda, both 
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positively and negatively” (p.78).  ICANN was, in other words, one of the most easily 
identifiable switches not only in the internet governance system, but arguably in the 
information society as well. In this respect, the broad calls for reform of the political and 
economic structure of the information society and the internet’s place within it were 
essentially collapsed into the struggle to enlarge the role played by law in the regulation 
of the ICANN and  DNS systems.  
 The institutional learning that surrounded the WGIG process and its report 
allowed all WSIS delegations to: consider where the existing switches in the system are; 
consider what public policy issues attach to the various switches; and develop a more 
realistic view of the possibilities for dealing with public policy issues to the satisfaction 
of all governments within the system as it is currently configured.  
 I see a parallel institutional learning process in which delegations learned the hard 
way about the importance of attaching calls for reform to recognizable institutional 
choking points as more significant however. Delegations becoming aware that the DNS 
system is not entirely the appropriate venue for “something to do be done” about the 
issues driving calls for reform during the first phase should have diverted the tension 
away from the DNS issue and into discussion of the various “public policy” issues that 
the WGIG report disaggregated from it. Yet, as we have seen, something was done (or at 
least said) about a variety of public policy issues including interconnection costs, the 
sovereignty of CCTLDs, etc. But the level of political contentiousness in the debate over 
the DNS system arguably increased over the course of the WSIS to the point where the 
international press and the top diplomats of the US and UK were drawn into it.   
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 The reform-minded delegations in other words, having been made aware as to the 
narrow scope of the DNS system within a broadly re-defined sphere of internet 
governance, and educated as to what things can and cannot be done through ICANN and 
the DNS system, still wanted to be able to get their hands on the switch. Code, after all, 
Lessig reminds us, can be regulated to increase regulatablity. While the current 
configuration of the DNS system might valorize free market principles and largely 
restrict opportunities for politics and governments to intervene, the devolution of 
regulation to code contains the built-in possibility for code to be reconfigured in a way 
that makes the space more regulatable;  even extremely regulatable. 
 In other words, the current iteration of the global internet governance debate was 
not born preoccupied with switches, questions about who controls them and the 
modalities through which decisions made as to the manner in which they are used are 
arrived at.  But it has become so. This case study reveals how the issue of DNS oversight 
emerged as a narrow part of a broad discussion of the regulation of communication in the 
context of globalization and digital technologies. Do rhetorical efforts to establish a 
process-based definition of the public interest actually reflect changing ambitions on the 
parts of stakeholders? Or, at least where governments are concerned, is the direct focus 
on the DNS part of a strategic move to use control of such important technical switches 
with the objective of using them to regulate the normative characteristics of 
communication over the internet?   
 Calls for greater governmental involvement in the name of legitimacy, 
transparency and democratic accountability emanate from governments such as China, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia who are notorious for their censorship of mass communication (c.f. 
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Goldsmith and Wu 2006). At the same time, while industry lobbies and technologists 
may not be accountable, legitimate actors in global governance or be entitled to forward 
political welfare claims in any normatively established sense, they do at least have 
undeniable stakes in the continued stability and functioning of the internet. In contrast, 
indications are that many of the governments that are cloaking their calls for potentially 
cumbersome and gear-grinding intergovernmental bureaucracy in the language of 
accountability, transparency and political welfare, may see communication networks they 
cannot control as causing more harm than benefit. China’s post-WSIS steps to fracture 
the global root server system for instance illustrate that the interests of the global internet-
using public may at times be contrary to the political welfare of various states, in 
particular to many of the same states justifying that the public interest requires them to be 
more involved in the processes of global internet governance. We also saw how various 
governments might have been using internet governance to register protest against 
American policies and Western ideologies without broad concern for the implications of 
such proposals on the functioning of the internet itself. 
 In this sense, despite the tendency for debates to be framed in narrow, 
instrumental terms, global internet governance should be seen as affecting the regulation 
of communication and the public’s interest in it, but through indirect regulation.  Lessig 
(2006, 133) defines indirect regulation as occurring when a public authority “uses other 
structures of constraint to impose a constraint it could impose directly”. Indirection 
“undermines political accountability” and “confuses responsibility, hence confuses 
politics”.  Control of key internet technical resources, in the absence of overarching legal 
frameworks, creates a situation in which: 
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Indirectly, by regulating code, the government can achieve regulatory ends, often 
without suffering the political consequences that the same ends, pursued directly, 
would yield (Lessig 2006, 136).  
Lessig suggests that, in principle, we should worry about this. On the basis of this 
case study of the emergence of a global internet governance debate that defines the public 
interest in process terms and in relation to the political welfare of states, and remains 
preoccupied with control over technical switches, we should, in practice, worry about 
what the likes of China and Iran want to do with these switches. 
 “The internet is a revolutionary medium of communication and communication is 
speech”, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu (2006, 150) remind us in their important book Who 
Controls the Internet: Illusions of a Borderless World. “In that sense”, they continue, 
“just about every debate about internet governance is at bottom a debate about speech 
governance”. The global internet governance regime is, in a larger sense, the venue in 
which the fundamental dilemma at the base of all forms of communication policy making 
is, right now, being interrogated anew: what are the acceptable limits on free expression 
in mass communication? 
The balance between free speech and the need to protect the values that are made 
vulnerable by internet mediated communication is being questioned, established and 
challenged within the global internet governance regime; just as communication 
regulation has always been used to establish what limits a democratic society can justify 
on free expression.  
The decisions made in global internet governance do, in this sense, pass 
normative judgements about the public interest in communication. These judgements are 
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highly distributed and are often embedded in discussion of technological regulation. 
Regardless, broader awareness that the internet can and is being governed necessitates 
more analysis of these decisions and a greater focus on how they are being justified.  
 
Political Welfare: Stakeholderism in Global Internet Governance 
 Within the multi-stakeholder governance discourse that emerged from WSIS 
and has been operationalized through the IGF process and elsewhere, the public interest 
implications have become crucially bound up in the participation of civil society and 
governments in the institutional arrangements under discussion. 
Consistent with the reduction of the issue of internet governance into a debate 
over who gets which seats at the decision making table, substantive concern for the 
public interest in the decisions that are made through internet governance has emerged as 
a secondary concern in relation to the drive to embed civil society delegations within the 
institutional structures of internet governance as presumptive checks on the power of 
governments and industry.  
 With respect to civil society, this approach contains many normatively 
troubling features, including:  
• the lack of accountability and legitimacy of civil society actors;  
• the porous boundaries between stakeholders that can allow anyone- ICANN 
representatives and Tunisian government sponsored agitators included- to present 
themselves as representatives of civil society;  
• the tendency for process-focused discussion to valorize individuals who are adept 
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at, and experienced in, questions of process technicalities and create high barriers 
of entry to potentially influential and innovative voices who have little familiarity 
with (nor interest in) the relevant processes; 
• the absence of meaningful consideration of how the voices of non-users of the 
internet might be made more integral in the discussion of its governance. A 
defining characteristic of the term stakeholder that is at the core of the idea of 
multi-stakeholder governance is the notion that those who possess eligibility to 
participate in internet governance are those who have a demonstrable stake in its 
use. 
In spite of the focus on processes in the global internet governance debate, 
establishing the normative value of one set of processes in relation to alternative ones 
remains a challenge. For example, progressive politics tend to valorize “bottom-up” over 
“top-down” policy making for the perceived ability of grass-roots social movements and 
the disenfranchised to use “bottom-up” politics to challenge political elites. However, the 
“bottom-up” processes of internet governance have tended to be captured by technical 
community and business elites at the expense of governmental voices that legitimately 
represent broader constituencies. Calls for greater accountability, transparency and 
legitimacy thus suppose the top-down imposition of a more formal framework with a 
greater focus on broad-based rule making, oversight and an apparatus of representivity. 
However, this in turn leads back to the impact that global internet governance processes 
have on the political welfare of states and to the related conundrums for the global 
internet public outlined above.  
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Furthermore, the tendency for global internet governance to be addressed to 
processes that function vertically within organizations has a number of knock-on effects 
relevant to the consideration of the public interest in communication.  
 In the first place, it encourages venue-shopping: different constellations of actors 
have, since WSIS, sought to raise internet policy issues in different institutions in the 
effort to target the ones that are most likely to favor their vision over the others. A 
balkanization of the global community on internet governance is arguably in progress as 
pro-intergovernmental oversight governments coalesce within the ITU and are becoming 
progressively disengaged in the IGF process. Conversely, the threat of institutional 
competition also pushes reform of existing bodies. From ICANN reforms, to moves from 
the ITU to incorporate civil society participation, and from the OECD and Council of 
Europe to expand their engagement with internet governance, existing organizations 
have, since WSIS, broadened their mandates, memberships and practices in light of the 
emergence of these much wider parameters.  
The public interest in global communication governance is being defined through 
global internet governance, in other words, by an emerging set of institutions, but most 
prominently by the cross-cutting normative issues that slip into the gaps between them. 
This sort of architecture does not lend itself to broad, over-simplistic normative 
evaluations. The question is, do we possess the conceptual tools to analyse, engage and 
contribute to this process?  
What is required is close monitoring of the actors, institutions and agendas that 
are shaping global internet governance as a policy field. The public interest in 
communication needs to be injected in a more meaningful way into this debate. Doing so 
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requires a horizontal or cross-cutting view of the multi-level, multi-sectoral architecture 
of global internet governance that is informed by the dynamics involved in these 
processes and by the extent to which decisions tend to be justified on processional public 
interest grounds and pursuant to political welfare goals. 
The public interest in communication governance has always been a central 
preoccupation to communication and media studies, in particular to the political economy 
programme. In conclusion, I will argue that the shifts in the public interest in 
communication that are evident in this case study of global internet governance suggest 
that certain normative, conceptual and methodological priorities of the PEC may need to 
be rethought.  
 
Rethinking the PEC and critical media studies public interest research agenda 
  With the internet being the offspring of collaboration between the US military 
and multinational corporations and inexorably linked to globalization, assessment of the 
political economy of internet governance lends itself too easily to broad stroke treatments 
and straw man arguments that the global internet is simply not governed in the public’s 
interest. Deeper, context-specific investigations are required that underline power 
dynamics and the range of alternatives that are available.   
By foregrounding the extent to which the values that define the public interest in 
internet governance are, at present, being contested and open to negotiation, and 
analyzing how power is exercised in establishing policies around certain interests over 
others, research on the public interest in global internet governance can respond to 
Melody’s (1990) challenge to steer the attention of policy makers and activists towards 
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the very existence of such debates, even when rhetoric and conventional wisdom 
consigns them to the margins.  
The insights of this thesis’ empirical study of the communication policy-making 
process in the context of globalization and digital technologies suggest that responses to 
programmatic calls to refocus on questions of power in new media (c.f. Mansell 2004) 
should draw on a variety of academic disciplinary perspectives. Importing insights from 
the work of Lessig and other legal scholars into the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation allowed it to understand and expand upon some of the ways in which 
technologies, and discourses around them, constitute power in the new media domain. 
Drawing on insights from scholars in globalization and global governance has provided a 
frame of reference for understanding and explaining how power is contested and 
stratified through global internet governance. In this sense, it underlines the importance 
of the emerging critical media and communication studies subfield of global media 
policy.  
PEC should be influential within the framework of such projects, in particular 
where theorizations of power and the broader role of communication in society are 
concerned. But such influence demands from the PEC greater conceptual and empirical 
recognition of the transformative impact of digital technologies and globalization on 
communication policy making and the public interest in it.   
Reflecting programmatic calls from Mansell (2004), McChesney (2007) and, 
indeed, those embedded in the framework of the global media policy research programme 
(c.f. Raboy and Padovani 2008), this thesis underscores the contribution to be made by 
foregoing broad normative analysis in favour of this sort of empirical investigation of 
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policy making dynamics. Attentiveness to the need to engage actually-existing policy 
making processes should not readily be sacrificed, in other words, in favour of more 
abstract critiques.  Such an approach has allowed this thesis to view the public interest as 
contingent upon the decisions made in global communication governance rather than as 
external to them.  
In this sense, I suggest that this thesis underlines the value of the programmatic 
call from McChesney for PEC research to coalesce around the objective of “a much 
richer understanding of the policy making process”.  “We need”, McChesney (2007, 203) 
continues:  
a detailed empirical and possibly ethnographic examination of the policy making 
process today. We need to develop theoretical understanding of policy making 
and we need hard empirical analysis of how people influence policy making.  
The insights of this policy program can contribute to Mansell’s (2004) “revitalization of 
research on the new media in the tradition of political economy”.  Following Mansell, we 
must insist that this policy program reflect a critical, rather than mainstream research 
agenda. But, this thesis illustrates that- within its case study of global internet governance 
at least- the transformations in the public interest in communication associated with the 
emergence of digital technologies and globalization demand that many core critical 
assumptions be re-evaluated in light of empirical realities.  
Much more is required toward these ends, in particular, in regard to more detailed 
theorizations of global communication governance and the internet as a mass medium of 
communication. The implications of the emerging global internet governance regime on 
the orientation of other frameworks of communication governance around the world are 
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seldom discussed but important. The role of intellectual property law in fundamentally 
determining the normative regulation of mass communication is the subject of 
provocative discussion in various literatures (c.f. Benkler 2006; Murray 2010). 
Empirically-informed understandings of the multi-leveled, multi-sectoral basis of the 
global governance of intellectual property and of its broader impacts on the public 
interest in communication are required.  
Finally, the knowledge gaps associated with emerging issues such as global 
internet governance enable the voices of critical researchers to intervene and influence 
ongoing policy processes. This disposition is only enhanced by the emergence of multi-
stakeholder models of governance and their openness to observation and intervention. 
Meaningfully capitalizing on such opportunities however, necessitates a close proximity 
between critical perspectives and the empirical situation of on the ground governance 
issues and institutions. 
 To return, in conclusion, to the episode that I used to introduce this thesis: from 
my vantage point at the back of the amphitheatre in the Palais des Nations, observing as 
the governments of the world- once brushed aside as “weary giants of flesh and steel” 
that are “unwelcome” and “have no sovereignty” over affairs of the internet (Barlow 
1996) - not only discussed internet governance under the aegis of the United Nations, but 
belaboured questions of processional minutia in the finest rhetorical traditions of 
professional international diplomacy, it was very clear that global internet governance is 
no longer an exclusive and impenetrable static function that can be consigned to some 
broad neoliberal project. Global internet governance is a dynamic and politically 
controversial issue. The public interest intervenes in, and is affected by, these debates, 
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even if in a very partial and narrow respect. The presence of significant knowledge gaps 
within these debates only reinforces the power of dominant actors. There are 
opportunities for critical research to help build the capacity of important voices to 
participate, and for critical researchers themselves to intervene. More fundamentally, the 
steps that are taken to resolve these controversies will provide precedents that will 
fundamentally impact the direction of communication governance in the information 
society. The core concerns of critical communication studies are in play and it is time for 
programmatic reflection about how the normative principles that have defined the PEC 
can be integrated into a new policy research programme that steers PEC from the 
sidelines and into the global internet governance debate.  
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-APPENDIX I- 
A Brief History and Overview of the Internet Domain Name System 
 
 
There are a series of names and numbers that allow one computer to identify and 
connect to another. The internet effectively facilitates global communication because 
these numbers are unique:  type in www.umontreal.ca (or 132.204.5.67, the domain name 
number that it represents) from any computer anywhere in the world and you are routed 
to the same website. In order to support this crucial element of internet mediated 
communication, a system was devised in which one master list of internet names and 
numbers would be kept. In order to ensure that the master list is non-duplicative, the 
authority to update this list must be highly restricted. Such authority is the basis of the 
root server system which Milton Mueller (2002, 6) describes as “the point of 
centralization in the internet’s otherwise thoroughly decentralized architecture” 
[emphasis added]. The history of the root server system encapsulates the changing 
politics around internet regulation.i The DNS can be said to consist of the following 
elements:  
• IP addresses: each node on the internet is assigned a unique number.  Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses provide organization to nodes within different networks 
without reducing their interoperability by including one series of numbers that 
identifies the network number and another that identifies the number of the node 
within that network;ii  
                                                
i This is the pre-history to this study’s case study. This period of DNS controversies have been extensively 
covered in the literature. My treatment of it is consciously synthetic rather than investigative or analytical. 
For well-written summaries, see Paré (2003) and Goldsmith and Wu (2006). For the definitive, full-length 
narrative account of the DNS wars from the creation of the internet to the founding of ICANN, see Mueller 
(2002).  
ii See Paré 2003 (9-10) for a more detailed overview of IP addressing.  
 vi 
• Domain names: IP numbers are coupled to relatively simple alphanumeric 
character strings that users can input in place of the string of numbers. The DNS 
system matches the names with the corresponding IP addresses and seamlessly 
facilitates communication between the two computers without the user having to 
input the IP address or even know it;  
• The Root Zone File: a non-duplicative database that, when queried, allows 
computers to match the domain names that the user enters with the IP addresses 
that the computers require in order to establish a connection over the network 
with the desired location. The Root Zone’s defining characteristics are its 
hierarchal structure and its distributed architecture;  
• Top Level Domain Names (TLDs): The root is divided into a series of top level 
domains. There are two types of top level domains: generic top level domains 
(GTLDs) such as .com, .gov, .mil, .edu etc. and country code top level domains 
(CCTLDs) such as .ca for Canada or .fr for France. Each of these TLDs is further 
categorized into subdomains;  
• Subdomains: The DNS hierarchically differentiates between various levels of the 
network on the basis of a node.host.domain model. For example, the domain 
name http://www.com.umontreal.ca/ refers to the department of communication 
(node) dot Université de Montréal (host) dot Canada (domain name). The 
hierarchy is not just semantic, it reflects jurisdiction or what could be described as 
a chain of command. In this case, the department of communication would have 
received an IP address allocation and been assigned a name by the network 
administrators of the Université de Montréal who would have in turn received IP 
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and name allocations for the managers of the “.ca” domain name. The Université 
de Montréal would be responsible for registering how they had allocated their IP 
addresses and for identifying and ensuring the uniqueness of the corresponding 
domain names and for making this information available to the managers of “.ca” 
who, in turn, would be responsible for ensuring that this information is contained 
in the root. This structure implies that, although the root sits atop the hierarchy, 
the root itself is simply a database of all domains and not directly responsible for 
the operation of any of them. This is one respect in which the DNS was structured 
as a distributed mechanism. A second, more direct respect is in the architecture of 
the root servers themselves;  
• Root Servers: While “the” root is often discussed as a singular object, there are in 
fact multiple copies of the complete database of names and numbers. According 
to Paré (2003, 12)  
each individual root server contains information about all the domains below 
the root and the location of name servers containing additional data about the 
contents of specific domains.    
As of the beginning of the WSIS process in 2001 there were thirteen root servers 
identified with the letters “A” to “M”. All but the “K” (United Kingdom), “I” 
(Sweden) and “M” (Japan) servers were physically located in the United States. 
While all root severs contain the same data, the “A” root server is considered to 
be the authoritative version of the root zone file. Modifications to the root zone 
file are made on the “A” server and the other 12 root severs are updated through 
routine downloads of the “A” server data. The distributed architecture of the root 
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server system is designed to ensure contingency; if the “A” root server were to be 
compromised, or put out of service (for example by being hacked or if there were 
a natural disaster or military strike in the physical area of the server’s location) the 
system is designed to be easily reconfigured to acknowledge any of the other 
versions as the authoritative version of the root zone file (Paré 2003). Despite this 
decentralized architecture, the authority of the  “A” root server represents an 
obvious central choking point;  
• The IANA function: Mueller (2002, 6), describes this choking point as a conflux 
of three functions: 
o  authority to set policy for an allocate IP addresses; 
o  authority to define the root zone by creating new top level domain names; 
and to assign management authority over top level domain names; 
o authority over the operation of the root server system.  
This choking point goes by various names, Mueller calls it simply “the root” and 
Goldsmith and Wu (2006, 30-31) call it “root authority” or “internet naming and 
numbering authority”.  It had no official title until 1988 when prominent internet engineer 
Jon Postel proposed the label “Internet Assigned Numbers Authority” (IANA) to describe 
the series of naming and numbering related task that had informally been made his 
responsibility over the course of the design and evolution of the DNS. 
 
The DNS From ARPANET to ICANN 
As of 1971, the responsibility for assigning and keeping track of which computer 
names corresponded with what network node numbers on the ARPANET was a service 
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provided by The University of Southern California based Information Sciences Institute 
(ISI), under contract to the USG Defense Communications Agency.iii This process 
involved the maintaining, updating and sharing (and version control protection) of one 
file called “hosts.txt”. As of 1977 a UCLA PhD working at the ISI named John Postel 
assumed responsibility for “hosts.txt” (Goldsmith and Wu 2006).  
Later renamed DARPA, the government and military backers became interested in 
making the ARPANET interoperable with its other packet-based networks, many of the 
scientists and engineers who had been instrumental to the functioning of the ARPANET 
turned their attention to internetworking. Jon Postel worked closely with Vinton Cerf and 
others on the development of the TCP/IP protocol that effectively launched the internet. 
The principles of the modern domain name system were proposed in 1982 by Postel 
colleagues and it was developed over the course of the 1980s under Postel’s direction and 
according to his plans. The successful implementation of the DNS only increased Postel’s 
stature as a “father of the internet” and his authority over internet naming and numbering 
went unquestioned to the extent that his role could be described as “benevolent dictator” 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 34).  
Between 1991 and 1993 the US Defense Department and the (now involved) National 
Science Foundation ran a series of procurement competitions that opened ISI’s contracts 
to manage the root to bids from private sector government service firms. The big winner 
was a private firm called Network Solutions Inc. (NSI) which was granted effective 
responsibility for executing the day to day management of the root server system but a 
crucial stipulation summarized by Paré (2003, 19) emphasized that “the continued role of 
                                                
iii This function was labeled: Defense Data Network- Network Information Center (DDN-NIC) see Mueller 
2002: 82. 
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IANA in overseeing the administration of the DNS and implied to that NSI’s activities in 
this realm were to be guided by IANA”. Postel, in other words, maintained the authority 
to make decisions about new top-level domains and define the root zone accordingly 
(Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 65).  The concrete institutional mechanics from which the 
legitimacy and jurisdiction of this power-sharing agreement extended were seldom 
discussed and left strategically vague (Mueller 2002). However, both the number of 
computers connected to the network (see Paré 2003, 20) and the demand for domain 
name registrations were escalating exponentially over the course of the early 1990s.  
By 1995 the World Wide Web was taking off and the launch of a series of web 
browsers including Netscape and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer increased the visibility of, 
and demand for domain names. Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), the Web standard 
addressing format, adopted the convention that website addresses would begin with the 
domain name and follow, in a descending hierarchy delineated by “/”, with details on the 
directory and subdirectory on that computer where the information was located (for 
example: http://www.umontreal.ca/employeurs/stages_disciplines.html is “http//www. 
(domain name) umontreal.ca (slash directory) employeurs (slash subdirectory) 
stages….etc).  
The emergence of the World Wide Web fundamentally altered how the DNS was 
understood and managed by people who had not been involved in its creation. Mueller 
(2002, 108) writes that domain names “were originally conceived of as locators of IP 
addresses or other resources of interest to the network , not of things that people would be 
interested in seeing”. While web addresses are, in contrast, “names for resources which 
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meant any kind of object that might be placed on the web […] URLs were not just 
addresses but locators of content”. 
Viewed restrictively as text-based stand ins for numerical addresses, Postel’s 
assumption was that internet users would of course have preferences, but would not put 
much stock in which domain name they were given or not given and thus, that the stakes 
in domain name allocation would be relatively low. However, by linking domain names 
more directly to content, the meteoric rise of URL browsing on the World Wide Web 
grafted an expressive function onto the instrumental logic underlining the domain system. 
As such, the preferences of certain users for specific domains grew stronger and the 
stakes in domain name allocation increased dramatically.  
The stakes were only magnified as more firms sought to develop a web presence and 
entrepreneurs began experimenting with various e-commerce business models.iv In 
addition, Mueller (2002, 80) also points out that, shorter URLs are more user friendly 
(and marketable) and that the shortest URL is simply a domain name (www.umontreal.ca 
for example, is both domain name and URL). Coming to terms with these logics led 
many users to point multiple domain names to the same computer. This practice was seen 
to make more sense than registering one domain name and differentiating content hosted 
on the computer it identified with complicated URLs featuring numerous levels of 
subdirectories.v The sum result was that the demand for domain name registrations 
                                                
iv Including the business model of “cybersquatting” or registering domain names that would be useful to 
prominent people or corporations with no intent to develop websites and in the hope that the affected 
parties would pay significantly to have the right to the domain name transferred to them (see Mueller 2002 
for an overview of various forms of cybersquatting). 
v For example, the URL of under-utilized website of the Montréal Joint PhD in Communication Program is 
the rather unwieldy  http://artsandscience.concordia.ca/phdcom/index_en.html. Without moving the files 
themselves out of their subdirectory on the server of the faculty of arts and science at Concordia University, 
a more concise and easier to remember one-level domain name-based URL- for example 
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increased dramatically in the mid 1990s and that controversies emerged in the decisions 
that were being made in the allocation of domain names.vi 
An overwhelmed NSI responded by automating the registration processvii, by 
introducing fees for domain name registrationsviii and by instituting a dispute resolution 
policy to adjudicate between competing domain name claims (see Paré 2003, 22).  The 
DNS that Jon Postel and his contemporaries had envisioned was a public service that 
would treat the assignment of domain names as a utilitarian and pragmatic task. The 
move by NSI to start charging for registrations in effect put an official seal of approval on 
the public’s perception that the domain names had not only use value, but exchange value 
as well. The high price and continued growth of registrations meant that NSI was quickly 
taking in revenues from domain names that far exceeded their cost-recovery point (Paré 
2003).  The NSI dispute resolution recognized rights claims related to registrations (ibid) 
and effectively legitimized the view that domain names were property that could be 
owned and debated. Thus, the NSI dispute resolution policy was at odds with Postel’s 
view that domain names were immaterial labels and that registrars should pass them out 
on a first come, first serve basis, with concern over nothing more than the question of 
whether or not they are unique. Postel and the internet community sought to resolve this 
culture clash by effectively sidelining their commercial partner NSI through the creation 
                                                                                                                                            
“montrealjointphd.com” could simply be “pointed” to the same content. As could a mirror URL that would 
appeal to the French-speaking students and faculty such as “phdconjointemontreal.com”.  
  
vi For a detailed general typology of different kinds of domain name disputes see Mueller 2002 at section 
6.2.  
 
vii Meaning that the rules that had been applied by the NSI analysts who had previously  considered every 
domain name application were no longer enforced. Individuals could easily register more than one domain 
and that distinctions between .net, .com, and .org ceased to be relevant (Mueller 2002, 112) 
 
viii NSI requested permission from its government partners to do so and, upon receiving it, was purchased 
by Science Applications International Corp. (SIAC) which Mueller (2002, 11) describes as “ a multi-billion 
dollar Washington-area defense contractor”.   
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of 150 new top level domains assigned to 50 different registrars that would compete with 
the NSI and thereby constrain their monopolistic behavior. What followed was a chain of 
events that forced the competing interests and values of the internet technical community, 
the US Government and NSI to converge on the jurisdictional grey zone at the centre of 
the entire root server system. 
Simply put, nobody was sure that Postel and the IANA function had the authority to 
update the root zone file so that it would recognize these new top-level domains; not even 
Postel himself (see Mueller 2002, 134). IANA after all, had no legal or charter status as 
an institution and was more or less a term “coined” (Paré 2003, 17) or “invented” 
(Mueller 2002, 93) by Postel to describe what he did in the DNS space.  But, in 1995, 
Postel decided to take steps to formalize IANA’s claim to root authority by repatriating 
the IANA function to the charter of the Internet Society (ISOC). Despite immediate US 
Government queries about how such claims could be justified (c.f. Goldmsith and Wu 
2006, 37), ISOC set on a course that aimed to operationally demonstrate their theoretical 
authority in 1997.  
Anticipating the 1998 expiration of NSI’s contract with the USG, the ISOC brought 
together a coalition of internet stakeholders that included trademark and intellectual 
property interests, large multi-national communications firms and the ITU and 
established the “Generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding” or gTLD-
MoU as the presumptive successor to the NSI contract with USG. The US Government 
was concerned: concerned about the revenues that would be lost by the move of internet 
governance off-shore; concerned about the proximity of the root to interventionist 
European governments; concerned, in general, for the impacts that the gTLD-MoU might 
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have on the “predictably and security” of the internet and in turn on the trust and 
confidence levels of would be commercial investors in internet infrastructure 
development. These analytical concerns were magnified when politicians and lobbyists 
turned their attention to the issue by accentuating its nationalistic overtones. Over the 
course of 1997, in discussions with internet community luminaries including Cerf and 
Postel, Clinton’s Internet Czar Ira Magaziner delivered the message that the US 
Government had paid for and contracted out development of the DNS system and would 
not allow the “A” root server hosted and maintained by NSI in Hendon Virginia to 
recognize authority of the gTLD-MoU over the root.  
Nothing happened to change the root on Jan. 1, 1998, what had been proposed as the 
first operational day of the gTLD-MoU regime (Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 40-42). 
Instead, the USG moved forward with plans first described in a July 1, 1997, Executive 
Memorandum directing the Secretary of Commerce to “privatize the internet’s domain 
name and addressing system (DNS) in a manner that increases competition and facilitates 
international participation in its management”. On Jan. 28th, 1998 the first step in this 
direction was made through the release of a USG Green Paper that publicly outlined 
plans for domain name privatization while asserting USG authority over the root and 
failing to mention the gTLD-MoU process or the linkages between IANA and ISOC. On 
the same day, John Postel instructed the managers of all but the military-controlled root 
servers to recognize his computer as the authorative “A” root server instead of the one 
hosted by NSI in Hendon. Though all parties agreed to calling it a “test” after the fact, 
this event has come to be seen as an effort by Postel to assert the extent to which the 
internet community could use technical means to assert defacto authority over the root, 
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regardless of how legal jurisdiction was conceived (See Goldsmith and Wu 2006, at 
chapter 3).  
In the aftermath of this episode, the gap between the internet community and the USG 
closed significantly and Postel, Cerf and others were enrolled in the task of helping the 
USG define the process through which the DNS system would be privatized. (see Mueller 
2002, chapter 8). A more detailed White Paper laid out the foundational principles of a 
new international organization for DNS management indicating that the Department of 
Commerce was “prepared to enter into an agreement with a new not–for–profit 
corporation formed by private sector internet stakeholders”. A process was launched that 
aimed to allow internet stakeholders from around the world to design this organization 
together. The so-called “International Forum on the White Paper” collapsed as the views 
of some participants diverged from the interests that the ISOC leadership had in the 
parallel backroom deals that were in the process of being brokered (Mueller 2002, 179).  
In the end, with support and funding from the multi-national communication industry 
lobby and token nods to internationalization, the internet technical community, in the 
guise of IANA, agreed to divide up the pie with NSI and the USG. In 1998 the 
Department of Commerce entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
ICANN under the following conditions: The MOU does not give the Department of 
Commerce the ability to exercise oversight in the traditional context of regulation and the 
Department of Commerce plays no role in the internal governance or day–to– day 
operations of ICANN.  
The details of the three-way bargain struck between the internet community, USG 
and NSI would not be finalized until after ICANN’s start-up date. In the end, the internet 
 xvi 
community was granted operational authority of the DNS. NSI relinquished its monopoly 
over the .com domain by agreeing to wholesale to other domain name suppliers and 
committed to making no changes to the root zone file located on the “A” root in its 
possession without written authorization from the USG but procured the renewal of (and 
eventually the presumptive renewal right for) its contract as the delegated manager of the 
.com domain name. Despite the gTLD-MoU process being founded in part around 
objections to for-profit registrars, in the bargain, NSI was able to enshrine its ability to 
continue to operate .com as a profit making enterprise. The US Government maintained 
the sole ultimate authority for updating the root zone file hosted on the  “A” root server. 
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e 
In
te
rn
et
 R
eg
io
na
l R
es
ou
rc
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
, T
he
 c
on
ti
nu
ed
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
za
tio
n 
of
 I
C
A
N
N
 a
nd
 it
s 
fu
nc
ti
on
s;
 T
he
 s
tr
en
gt
he
ni
ng
 
of
 th
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
in
 
sp
ec
ia
li
ze
d 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
 f
or
 th
e 
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 s
ta
nd
ar
di
za
ti
on
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
re
so
ur
ce
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
ze
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
, 
In
te
rn
et
. 
S
ho
ul
d:
 
-c
on
tr
ib
ut
e 
to
 th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bi
li
ty
, s
ta
bi
li
ty
 a
nd
 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 b
y 
ad
dr
es
si
ng
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
ly
 p
ub
li
c 
po
lic
y 
is
su
es
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
be
in
g 
ad
eq
ua
te
ly
 
ad
dr
es
se
d;
 
-b
e 
co
ns
ti
tu
te
d 
as
 a
 n
eu
tr
al
, 
no
n-
du
pl
ic
at
iv
e 
an
d 
no
n-
bi
nd
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
to
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
is
su
es
 a
nd
 m
ak
e 
kn
ow
n 
its
 
fi
nd
in
gs
, t
o 
en
ha
nc
e 
aw
ar
en
es
s 
an
d 
bu
ild
 c
on
se
ns
us
 a
nd
 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t;
 
-p
er
io
di
ca
ll
y 
be
 r
ev
ie
w
ed
 to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
ne
ed
 f
or
 i
ts
 
co
nt
in
ua
ti
on
. 
 
bo
di
es
. 
B
ra
zi
l 
 
n
ew
 s
p
a
ce
 f
o
r 
d
ia
lo
g
u
e 
fo
r 
a
ll
 
st
a
k
eh
o
ld
er
s 
L
in
ke
d 
to
 th
e 
U
N
: 
an
d 
sh
al
l a
ss
um
e,
 in
te
r 
al
ia
, t
he
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
fu
nc
ti
on
s:
  
- 
In
te
rf
ac
e 
w
it
h 
in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l b
od
ie
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 r
el
ev
an
t t
o 
In
te
rn
et
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
; 
 
 
 
-I
de
nt
if
y 
em
er
gi
ng
 is
su
es
, 
br
in
g 
to
 th
e 
at
te
nt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
bo
di
es
 a
nd
 m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
; 
 - 
A
dd
re
ss
 is
su
es
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 
be
in
g 
de
al
t w
it
h 
el
se
w
he
re
 a
nd
 
m
ak
e 
pr
op
os
al
s 
fo
r 
ac
ti
on
, a
s 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e;
 
- 
C
on
ne
ct
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 b
od
ie
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
 -C
on
tr
ib
ut
e 
to
 c
ap
ac
ity
 
bu
ild
in
g 
fo
r 
In
te
rn
et
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 f
or
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s,
 d
ra
w
in
g 
fu
lly
 o
n 
lo
ca
l s
ou
rc
es
 o
f 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
rt
is
e;
 
 -P
ro
m
ot
e 
an
d 
as
se
ss
 o
n 
an
 
on
go
in
g 
ba
si
s 
th
e 
em
bo
di
m
en
t 
of
 W
S
IS
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
in
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
 
C
an
ad
a 
 
 
E
n
h
a
n
ci
n
g
 t
h
e 
ca
p
a
ci
ty
 o
f 
a
ll
 
st
a
k
eh
o
ld
er
s 
C
on
st
itu
te
d:
 
 a
s 
a 
ne
ut
ra
l, 
no
n-
du
pl
ic
at
iv
e 
an
d 
no
n-
bi
nd
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
ch
ie
fl
y 
to
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
is
su
es
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
be
in
g 
ad
eq
ua
te
ly
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 
T
he
 f
or
um
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 s
ho
ul
d 
 
 
be
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 in
 a
 ti
m
el
y 
fa
sh
io
n 
to
: 
 -S
tr
en
gt
he
n 
an
d 
en
ha
nc
e 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
’ 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t i
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
 I
nt
er
ne
t 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s,
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 b
y 
th
os
e 
fr
om
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
; 
 -D
ev
el
op
 c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e 
in
 d
is
cu
ss
io
ns
 a
nd
 
de
ci
si
on
s 
on
 p
er
ti
ne
nt
 to
pi
cs
 
un
de
r 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 r
el
ev
an
t 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
; 
 -E
nc
ou
ra
ge
 th
e 
fu
ll
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t a
nd
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
tio
n 
of
 a
ll
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
an
d 
ex
pe
rt
s 
en
ga
ge
d 
in
 I
nt
er
ne
t g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
to
 b
en
ef
it
 f
ro
m
 th
ei
r 
ex
pe
rt
is
e,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
os
e 
of
 th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 a
nd
 s
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
co
m
m
un
it
ie
s,
 to
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
co
or
di
na
ti
on
 a
nd
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
ti
on
, 
an
d 
to
 a
vo
id
 d
up
li
ca
tio
n;
 
 -M
ak
e 
fu
ll
 u
se
 o
f 
th
e 
to
ol
s 
of
 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ci
et
y 
to
 
co
nd
uc
t c
ap
ac
ity
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
ac
tiv
it
ie
s,
 m
in
im
iz
in
g 
th
e 
ne
ed
 
fo
r 
co
nf
er
en
ce
s 
an
d 
fa
ce
-t
o-
fa
ce
 m
ee
tin
gs
; a
nd
 
 -E
st
ab
li
sh
 o
ng
oi
ng
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
fo
ru
m
s 
on
 p
er
ti
ne
nt
 to
pi
cs
 a
nd
, 
w
he
n 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e,
 c
re
at
e 
a 
pe
rm
an
en
t o
n-
li
ne
 r
ec
or
d 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 u
se
 in
 c
ap
ac
it
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
ct
iv
it
ie
s,
 a
nd
 to
 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 a
dd
 v
al
ue
 o
ve
r 
ti
m
e.
 
 
E
U
 
T
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
 t
o
 a
 N
e
w
 
C
o
o
p
er
a
ti
o
n
 M
o
d
el
 
T
he
 ta
sk
 o
f 
th
is
 F
or
um
 is
 to
 
ad
dr
es
s 
m
ul
tid
im
en
si
on
al
 a
nd
 
in
te
rr
el
at
ed
 p
ub
li
c 
po
li
cy
 
is
su
es
, t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
an
d 
sh
ar
in
g 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
go
od
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. I
t s
ha
ll
 w
or
k 
on
 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 a
 c
le
ar
 m
an
da
te
 f
or
 
a 
pr
ed
ef
in
ed
 p
er
io
d.
 I
t s
ho
ul
d 
w
or
k 
w
ith
 e
xi
st
in
g 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
or
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 n
ot
 tr
y 
to
 
do
m
in
at
e 
is
su
es
 a
lr
ea
dy
 d
ea
lt
 
w
ith
 e
ls
ew
he
re
. I
t s
ho
ul
d 
no
t 
pe
rf
or
m
 o
ve
rs
ig
ht
 ta
sk
s 
T
he
 n
ew
 c
oo
pe
ra
ti
on
 m
od
el
 
sh
ou
ld
 in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 g
lo
ba
ll
y 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
ub
li
c 
po
li
cy
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
an
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
le
ve
l o
f 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
na
m
in
g,
 n
um
be
ri
ng
 a
nd
 
ad
dr
es
si
ng
-r
el
at
ed
 m
at
te
rs
: 
a.
 
P
ro
vi
si
on
 f
or
 a
 
gl
ob
al
 a
llo
ca
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
IP
 n
um
be
r 
bl
oc
ks
, w
hi
ch
 is
 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
an
d 
ef
fi
ci
en
t; 
b.
 
P
ro
ce
du
re
s 
fo
r 
ch
an
gi
ng
 th
e 
ro
ot
 
zo
ne
 f
il
e,
 
sp
ec
if
ic
al
ly
 f
or
 th
e 
in
se
rt
io
n 
of
 n
ew
 to
p 
le
ve
l d
om
ai
ns
 in
 th
e 
ro
ot
 s
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 
ch
an
ge
s 
of
 c
cT
L
D
 
m
an
ag
er
s;
 
c.
 
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
co
nt
in
ge
nc
y 
pl
an
s 
to
 
en
su
re
 th
e 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 
of
 c
ru
ci
al
 D
N
S
 
fu
nc
tio
ns
; 
d.
 
E
st
ab
li
sh
m
en
t o
f 
an
 
T
he
 n
ew
 m
od
el
 f
or
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
oo
pe
ra
ti
on
 
sh
ou
ld
 a
dh
er
e,
 b
es
id
es
 th
e 
G
en
ev
a 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
, t
o 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
gu
id
in
g 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
: 
- 
it
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t r
ep
la
ce
 e
xi
st
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
or
 in
st
it
ut
io
ns
, b
ut
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
ui
ld
 o
n 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 o
f 
In
te
rn
et
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 
w
ith
 a
 s
pe
ci
al
 e
m
ph
as
is
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ri
ty
 b
et
w
ee
n 
al
l t
he
 
ac
to
rs
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
is
 p
ro
ce
ss
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
, t
he
 p
ri
va
te
 
se
ct
or
, c
iv
il
 s
oc
ie
ty
 a
nd
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 e
ac
h 
of
 
th
em
 in
 it
s 
fi
el
d 
of
 c
om
pe
te
nc
e;
 
- 
th
is
 n
ew
 p
ub
li
c-
pr
iv
at
e 
co
-
op
er
at
io
n 
m
od
el
 s
ho
ul
d 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 
to
 th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
st
ab
il
it
y 
an
d 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
In
te
rn
et
 b
y 
ad
dr
es
si
ng
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
ly
 p
ub
li
c 
po
lic
y 
is
su
es
 r
el
at
ed
 to
 k
ey
 
el
em
en
ts
 o
f 
In
te
rn
et
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e;
 
- 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ne
w
 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
m
od
el
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
m
ai
nl
y 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
 is
su
es
 
of
 p
ub
lic
 p
ol
ic
y,
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 a
ny
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 
op
er
at
io
ns
; 
- 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
re
sp
ec
ti
ng
 th
e 
ar
ch
it
ec
tu
ra
l p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rn
et
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
ar
bi
tr
at
io
n 
an
d 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
ti
on
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 in
 
ca
se
 o
f 
di
sp
ut
es
; 
e.
 
R
ul
es
 a
pp
li
ca
bl
e 
to
 
D
N
S
 s
ys
te
m
.  
 
in
te
ro
pe
ra
bi
li
ty
, o
pe
nn
es
s 
an
d 
th
e 
en
d-
to
-e
nd
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
. 
 
Ir
an
 
In
te
rg
o
v
er
n
m
en
ta
l 
C
o
u
n
ci
l 
fo
r 
G
lo
b
a
l 
P
u
b
li
c 
P
o
li
c
y 
a
n
d
 
O
ve
rs
ig
h
t 
 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
an
 in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l 
C
ou
nc
il
 f
or
 G
lo
ba
l P
ub
li
c 
P
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
O
ve
rs
ig
ht
  
 ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 a
nd
 d
em
oc
ra
cy
 w
ith
 
th
e 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t, 
in
 a
n 
ad
vi
so
ry
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
, o
f 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
, 
ci
vi
l s
oc
ie
ty
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 
in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l a
nd
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
.  
 T
he
 C
ou
nc
il
 s
ha
ll
 b
e 
an
ch
or
ed
 in
 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 h
av
e,
 in
te
r 
al
ia
, t
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
fu
nc
ti
on
s:
 
 
-S
et
tin
g 
of
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l I
nt
er
ne
t 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ov
er
si
gh
t r
el
at
in
g 
to
 
In
te
rn
et
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 th
e 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
IC
A
N
N
/I
A
N
A
 c
om
pe
te
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
ar
ea
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
ad
di
ti
on
s 
or
 
de
le
ti
on
s 
to
 th
e 
ro
ot
 z
on
e 
fi
le
, 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
IP
 a
dd
re
ss
es
, 
in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
G
lo
ba
l T
op
 le
ve
l 
D
om
ai
ns
 (
gT
L
D
s)
, d
el
eg
at
io
n 
an
d 
re
de
le
ga
tio
n 
of
 C
ou
nt
ry
 C
od
e 
T
o 
 
L
ev
el
 D
om
ai
n 
(c
cT
L
D
s)
. T
he
 
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
ou
nc
il
 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
ca
l a
nd
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 
In
te
rn
et
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
, s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
re
fo
rm
ed
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
ze
d 
IC
A
N
N
/I
A
N
A
, s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
fo
rm
al
iz
ed
. I
n 
th
is
 m
od
el
, t
he
 
re
fo
rm
ed
 I
C
A
N
N
/I
A
N
A
 w
il
l b
e 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il
. T
hi
s 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
za
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ac
co
m
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
an
 a
de
qu
at
e 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 li
ke
 h
os
t-
co
un
tr
y 
ag
re
em
en
t f
or
 r
ef
or
m
ed
 
IC
A
N
N
/I
A
N
A
.  
 
 -I
n 
ad
di
ti
on
, i
ts
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 m
ig
ht
 
in
cl
ud
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l p
ub
li
c 
po
li
cy
 
is
su
es
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 I
nt
er
ne
t r
es
ou
rc
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
is
su
es
 th
at
 d
o 
no
t 
fa
ll
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 o
th
er
 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l 
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
s.
  
 -F
ac
il
it
at
in
g 
ne
go
ti
at
io
n 
of
 
tr
ea
ti
es
, c
on
ve
nt
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 o
n 
In
te
rn
et
-r
el
at
ed
 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
ie
s.
   
 -F
os
te
ri
ng
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 c
er
ta
in
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l i
ss
ue
s 
in
 
th
e 
br
oa
de
r 
In
te
rn
et
 a
ge
nd
a,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
bu
t n
ot
 li
m
it
ed
 to
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
-b
ui
ld
in
g,
 
m
ul
ti
lin
gu
al
is
m
, e
qu
it
ab
le
 a
nd
 
co
st
-b
as
ed
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
co
st
s,
 a
nd
 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
ac
ce
ss
 f
or
 a
ll
.  
 
 -A
pp
ro
vi
ng
 r
ul
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
fo
r 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
so
lu
ti
on
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
an
d 
co
nd
uc
t a
rb
itr
at
io
n,
 a
s 
re
qu
ir
ed
.  
  
 
Ja
pa
n 
F
o
ru
m
 f
o
r 
D
ia
lo
g
u
e 
F
or
um
 w
il
l:
  
-a
dd
re
ss
 m
ul
tid
im
en
si
on
al
 
pu
bl
ic
 p
ol
ic
y 
is
su
es
, t
hr
ou
gh
 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 s
ha
ri
ng
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
  
-w
or
k 
w
ith
 e
xi
st
in
g 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
 
or
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
  
F
or
um
 w
il
l n
ot
:  
-t
ry
 to
 d
ea
l w
ith
 is
su
es
 a
lr
ea
dy
 
de
al
t b
y 
el
se
w
he
re
; 
-p
er
fo
rm
 o
ve
rs
ig
ht
 ta
sk
s 
ne
w
 m
od
el
s 
 s
ho
ul
d 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 
be
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 w
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TUNIS AGENDA FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
[…] 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
29. We reaffirm the principles enunciated in the Geneva phase 
of the WSIS, in December 2003, that the Internet has evolved 
into a global facility available to the public and its governance 
should constitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. 
The international management of the Internet should be 
multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full 
involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and 
international organizations. It should ensure an equitable 
distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a 
stable and secure functioning of the Internet, taking into account 
multilingualism. 
30. We acknowledge that the Internet, a central element of the 
infrastructure of the Information Society, has evolved from a 
research and academic facility into a global facility available to 
the public. 
31. We recognize that Internet governance, carried out 
according to the Geneva principles, is an essential element for a 
people-centred, inclusive, development-oriented and non-
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discriminatory Information Society. Furthermore, we commit 
ourselves to the stability and security of the Internet as a global 
facility and to ensuring the requisite legitimacy of its governance, 
based on the full participation of all stakeholders, from both 
developed and developing countries, within their respective roles 
and responsibilities. 
32. We thank the UN Secretary-General for establishing the 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). We commend 
the chairman, members and secretariat for their work and for 
their report. 
33. We take note of the WGIG’s report that has endeavoured to 
develop a working definition of Internet governance. It has 
helped identify a number of public policy issues that are relevant 
to Internet governance. The report has also enhanced our 
understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of 
governments, intergovernmental and international organizations 
and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society 
from both developing and developed countries. 
34. A working definition of Internet governance is the 
development and application by governments, the private sector 
and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that 
shape the evolution and use of the Internet. 
35. We reaffirm that the management of the Internet 
encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should 
involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and 
international organizations. In this respect it is recognized that: 
 Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is 
the sovereign right of States. They have rights and 
responsibilities for international Internet-related 
public policy issues. 
 The private sector has had, and should continue to have, 
an important role in the development of the Internet, 
both in the technical and economic fields. 
 Civil society has also played an important role on Internet 
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matters, especially at community level, and should 
continue to play such a role. 
 Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should 
continue to have, a facilitating role in the coordination 
of Internet-related public policy issues. 
 International organizations have also had and should 
continue to have an important role in the 
development of Internet-related technical standards 
and relevant policies. 
36. We recognize the valuable contribution by the academic 
and technical communities within those stakeholder groups 
mentioned in paragraph 35 to the evolution, functioning and 
development of the Internet. 
37. We seek to improve the coordination of the activities of 
international and intergovernmental organizations and other 
institutions concerned with Internet governance and the 
exchange of information among themselves. A multi-stakeholder 
approach should be adopted, as far as possible, at all levels. 
38. We call for the reinforcement of specialized regional Internet 
resource management institutions to guarantee the national 
interest and rights of countries in that particular region to 
manage their own Internet resources, while maintaining global 
coordination in this area. 
39. We seek to build confidence and security in the use of ICTs 
by strengthening the trust framework. We reaffirm the necessity 
to further promote, develop and implement in cooperation with 
all stakeholders a global culture of cybersecurity, as outlined in 
UNGA Resolution 57/239 and other relevant regional frameworks. 
This culture requires national action and increased international 
cooperation to strengthen security while enhancing the protection 
of personal information, privacy and data. Continued 
development of the culture of cybersecurity should enhance 
access and trade and must take into account the level of social 
and economic development of each country and respect the 
development-oriented aspects of the Information Society. 
 xxx 
40. We underline the importance of the prosecution of 
cybercrime, including cybercrime committed in one jurisdiction, 
but having effects in another. We further underline the 
necessity of effective and efficient tools and actions, at national 
and international levels, to promote international cooperation 
among, inter alia, law-enforcement agencies on cybercrime. We 
call upon governments in cooperation with other stakeholders 
to develop necessary legislation for the investigation and 
prosecution of cybercrime, noting existing frameworks, for 
example, UNGA Resolutions 55/63 and 56/121 on "Combating 
the criminal misuse of information technologies" and regional 
initiatives including, but not limited to, the Council of Europe's 
Convention on Cybercrime. 
41. We resolve to deal effectively with the significant and 
growing problem posed by spam. We take note of current 
multilateral, multi-stakeholder frameworks for regional and 
international cooperation on spam, for example, the APEC Anti-
Spam Strategy, the London Action Plan, the Seoul-Melbourne 
Anti–Spam Memorandum of Understanding and the relevant 
activities of OECD and ITU. We call upon all stakeholders to 
adopt a multi-pronged approach to counter spam that includes, 
inter alia, consumer and business education; appropriate 
legislation, law-enforcement authorities and tools; the continued 
development of technical and self-regulatory measures; best 
practices; and international cooperation. 
42. We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek, 
receive, impart and use information, in particular, for the 
creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. We 
affirm that measures undertaken to ensure Internet stability and 
security, to fight cybercrime and to counter spam, must protect 
and respect the provisions for privacy and freedom of expression 
as contained in the relevant parts of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Geneva Declaration of Principles. 
43. We reiterate our commitments to the positive uses of the 
Internet and other ICTs and to take appropriate actions and 
preventive measures, as determined by law, against abusive 
uses of ICTs as mentioned under the Ethical Dimensions of the 
Information Society of the Geneva Declaration of Principles and 
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Plan of Action. 
44. We also underline the importance of countering terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations on the Internet, while respecting 
human rights and in compliance with other obligations under 
international law, as outlined in UNGA A/60/L.1 with reference to 
Article 85 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. 
45. We underline the importance of the security, continuity and 
stability of the Internet, and the need to protect the Internet and 
other ICT networks from threats and vulnerabilities. We affirm 
the need for a common understanding of the issues of Internet 
security, and for further cooperation to facilitate outreach, the 
collection and dissemination of security-related information and 
exchange of good practice among all stakeholders on measures 
to combat security threats, at national and international levels. 
46. We call upon all stakeholders to ensure respect for privacy 
and the protection of personal information and data, whether via 
adoption of legislation, the implementation of collaborative 
frameworks, best practices and self-regulatory and technological 
measures by business and users. We encourage all 
stakeholders, in particular governments, to reaffirm the right of 
individuals to access information according to the Geneva 
Declaration of Principles and other mutually agreed relevant 
international instruments, and to coordinate internationally as 
appropriate. 
47. We recognize the increasing volume and value of all e-
business, both within and across national boundaries. We call 
for the development of national consumer-protection laws and 
practices, and enforcement mechanisms where necessary, to 
protect the right of consumers who purchase goods and services 
online, and for enhanced international cooperation to facilitate a 
further expansion, in a non-discriminatory way, under applicable 
national laws, of e-business as well as consumer confidence in it. 
48. We note with satisfaction the increasing use of ICT by 
governments to serve citizens and encourage countries that have 
not yet done so to develop national programmes and strategies 
for e-government. 
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49. We reaffirm our commitment to turning the digital divide 
into digital opportunity, and we commit to ensuring harmonious 
and equitable development for all. We commit to foster and 
provide guidance on development areas in the broader Internet 
governance arrangements, and to include, amongst other issues, 
international interconnection costs, capacity building and 
technology/know-how transfer. We encourage the realization of 
multilingualism in the Internet development environment, and 
we support the development of software that renders itself 
easily to localization, and enables users to choose appropriate 
solutions from different software models including open-source, 
free and proprietary software. 
50. We acknowledge that there are concerns, particularly 
amongst developing countries, that the charges for international 
Internet connectivity should be better balanced to enhance 
access. We therefore call for the development of strategies for 
increasing affordable global connectivity, thereby facilitating 
improved and equitable access for all, by: 
• Promoting Internet transit and interconnection costs that 
are commercially negotiated in a competitive 
environment and that should be oriented towards 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory 
parameters, taking into account ongoing work on this 
subject. 
• Setting up regional high-speed Internet backbone 
networks and the creation of national, sub-regional 
and regional Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). 
• Recommending donor programmes and developmental 
financing mechanisms to consider the need to provide 
funding for initiatives that advance connectivity, IXPs 
and local content for developing countries. 
• Encouraging ITU to continue the study of the question of 
International Internet Connectivity (IIC) as a matter 
of urgency, and to periodically provide output for 
consideration and possible implementation. We also 
encourage other relevant institutions to address this 
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issue. 
• Promoting the development and growth of low-cost 
terminal equipment, such as individual and collective 
user devices, especially for use in developing 
countries. 
• Encouraging Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other 
parties in the commercial negotiations to adopt 
practices towards attainment of fair and balanced 
interconnectivity costs. 
• Encouraging relevant parties to commercially negotiate 
reduced interconnection costs for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), taking into account the special 
constraints of LDCs. 
51. We encourage governments and other stakeholders, 
through partnerships where appropriate, to promote ICT 
education and training in developing countries, by establishing 
national strategies for ICT integration in education and workforce 
development and dedicating appropriate resources. Furthermore, 
international cooperation would be extended, on a voluntary 
basis, for capacity building in areas relevant to Internet 
governance. This may include, in particular, building centres of 
expertise and other institutions to facilitate know-how transfer 
and exchange of best practices, in order to enhance the 
participation of developing countries and all stakeholders in 
Internet governance mechanisms. 
52. In order to ensure effective participation in global Internet 
governance, we urge international organizations, including 
intergovernmental organizations, where relevant, to ensure that 
all stakeholders, particularly from developing countries, have the 
opportunity to participate in policy decision-making relating to 
Internet governance, and to promote and facilitate such 
participation. 
53. We commit to working earnestly towards 
multilingualization of the Internet, as part of a multilateral, 
transparent and democratic process, involving governments and 
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all stakeholders, in their respective roles. In this context, we 
also support local content development, translation and 
adaptation, digital archives, and diverse forms of digital and 
traditional media, and recognize that these activities can also 
strengthen local and indigenous communities. We would 
therefore underline the need to: 
 Advance the process for the introduction of 
multilingualism in a number of areas including domain 
names, e-mail addresses and keyword look-up. 
 Implement programmes that allow for the presence of 
multilingual domain names and content on the 
Internet and the use of various software models in 
order to fight against the linguistic digital divide and 
to ensure the participation of all in the emerging new 
society. 
 Strengthen cooperation between relevant bodies for the 
further development of technical standards and to 
foster their global deployment. 
54. We recognize that an enabling environment, at national 
and international levels, supportive of foreign direct investment, 
transfer of technology, and international cooperation, particularly 
in the areas of finance, debt and trade, is essential for the 
development of the Information Society, including for the 
development and diffusion of the Internet and its optimal use. In 
particular, the roles of the private sector and civil society as the 
drivers of innovation and private investment in the development 
of the Internet are critical. Value is added at the edges of the 
network in both developed and developing countries when the 
international and domestic policy environment encourages 
investment and innovation. 
55. We recognize that the existing arrangements for Internet 
governance have worked effectively to make the Internet the 
highly robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium that it 
is today, with the private sector taking the lead in day-to-day 
operations, and with innovation and value creation at the edges. 
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56. The Internet remains a highly dynamic medium and 
therefore any framework and mechanisms designed to deal with 
Internet governance should be inclusive and responsive to the 
exponential growth and fast evolution of the Internet as a 
common platform for the development of multiple applications. 
57. The security and stability of the Internet must be 
maintained. 
58. We recognize that Internet governance includes more than 
Internet naming and addressing. It also includes other significant 
public policy issues such as, inter alia, critical Internet resources, 
the security and safety of the Internet, and developmental 
aspects and issues pertaining to the use of the Internet. 
59. We recognize that Internet governance includes social, 
economic and technical issues including affordability, reliability 
and quality of service. 
60. We further recognize that there are many cross-cutting 
international public policy issues that require attention and are 
not adequately addressed by the current mechanisms. 
61. We are convinced that there is a need to initiate, and 
reinforce, as appropriate, a transparent, democratic, and 
multilateral process, with the participation of governments, 
private sector, civil society and international organizations, in 
their respective roles. This process could envisage creation of a 
suitable framework or mechanisms, where justified, thus spurring 
the ongoing and active evolution of the current arrangements in 
order to synergize the efforts in this regard. 
62. We emphasize that any Internet governance approach 
should be inclusive and responsive and should continue to 
promote an enabling environment for innovation, competition 
and investment. 
63. Countries should not be involved in decisions regarding 
another country’s country-code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD). 
Their legitimate interests, as expressed and defined by 
each country, in diverse ways, regarding decisions 
affecting their ccTLDs, need to be respected, upheld and 
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addressed via a flexible and improved framework and 
mechanisms. 
64. We recognize the need for further development of, and 
strengthened cooperation among, stakeholders for public policies 
for generic Top-Level Domain names (gTLDs). 
65. We underline the need to maximize the participation of 
developing countries in decisions regarding Internet governance, 
which should reflect their interests, as well as in development 
and capacity building. 
66. In view of the continuing internationalization of the Internet 
and the principle of universality, we agree to implement the 
Geneva Principles regarding Internet governance. 
67. We agree, inter alia, to invite the UN Secretary-General to 
convene a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue. 
68. We recognize that all governments should have an equal 
role and responsibility for international Internet governance and 
for ensuring the stability, security and continuity of the Internet. 
We also recognize the need for development of public policy by 
governments in consultation with all stakeholders. 
69. We further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in 
the future, to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry 
out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy 
issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day 
technical and operational matters, that do not impact on 
international public policy issues. 
70. Using relevant international organizations, such cooperation 
should include the development of globally-applicable principles 
on public policy issues associated with the coordination and 
management of critical Internet resources. In this regard, we 
call upon the organizations responsible for essential tasks 
associated with the Internet to contribute to creating an 
environment that facilitates this development of public policy 
principles. 
71. The process towards enhanced cooperation, to be started by 
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the UN Secretary-General, involving all relevant organizations by 
the end of the first quarter of 2006, will involve all stakeholders 
in their respective roles, will proceed as quickly as possible 
consistent with legal process, and will be responsive to 
innovation. Relevant organizations should commence a process 
towards enhanced cooperation involving all stakeholders, 
proceeding as quickly as possible and responsive to innovation. 
The same relevant organizations shall be requested to provide 
annual performance reports. 
72. We ask the UN Secretary-General, in an open and 
inclusive process, to convene, by the second quarter of 2006, a 
meeting of the new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue—
called the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The mandate of 
the Forum is to: 
 Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of 
Internet governance in order to foster the 
sustainability, robustness, security, stability and 
development of the Internet. 
 Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different 
cross-cutting international public policies regarding 
the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within 
the scope of any existing body. 
 Interface with appropriate intergovernmental 
organizations and other institutions on matters under 
their purview. 
 Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, 
and in this regard make full use of the expertise of the 
academic, scientific and technical communities. 
 Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to 
accelerate the availability and affordability of the 
Internet in the developing world. 
 Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders 
in existing and/or future Internet governance 
mechanisms, particularly those from developing 
 xxxviii 
countries. 
 Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of 
the relevant bodies and the general public, and, where 
appropriate, make recommendations. 
 Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance in 
developing countries, drawing fully on local sources of 
knowledge and expertise. 
 Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the 
embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet 
governance processes. 
 Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet 
resources. 
 Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use 
and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern to 
everyday users. 
 Publish its proceedings. 
73. The Internet Governance Forum, in its working and function, 
will be multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and 
transparent. To that end, the proposed IGF could: 
 Build on the existing structures of Internet governance, 
with special emphasis on the complementarity 
between all stakeholders involved in this process – 
governments, business entities, civil society and 
intergovernmental organizations. 
 Have a lightweight and decentralized structure that 
would be subject to periodic review. 
 Meet periodically, as required. IGF meetings, in principle, 
may be held in parallel with major relevant UN 
conferences, inter alia, to use logistical support. 
74. We encourage the UN Secretary-General to examine a 
range of options for the convening of the Forum, taking into 
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consideration the proven competencies of all stakeholders in 
Internet governance and the need to ensure their full 
involvement. 
75. The UN Secretary-General would report to UN Member States 
periodically on the operation of the Forum. 
76. We ask the UN Secretary-General to examine the 
desirability of the continuation of the Forum, in formal 
consultation with Forum participants, within five years of its 
creation, and to make recommendations to the UN Membership 
in this regard. 
77. The IGF would have no oversight function and would not 
replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or 
organizations, but would involve them and take advantage of 
their expertise. It would be constituted as a neutral, non-
duplicative and non-binding process. It would have no 
involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet. 
78. The UN Secretary-General should extend invitations to all 
stakeholders and relevant parties to participate at the inaugural 
meeting of the IGF, taking into consideration balanced 
geographical representation. The UN Secretary-General should 
also: 
 draw upon any appropriate resources from all interested 
stakeholders, including the proven expertise of ITU, as 
demonstrated during the WSIS process; and 
 establish an effective and cost-efficient bureau to 
support the IGF, ensuring multi-stakeholder 
participation. 
79. Diverse matters relating to Internet governance would 
continue to be addressed in other relevant fora. 
80. We encourage the development of multi-stakeholder 
processes at the national, regional and international levels to 
discuss and collaborate on the expansion and diffusion of the 
Internet as a means to support development efforts to achieve 
internationally agreed development goals and objectives, 
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including the Millennium Development Goals. 
81. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of 
the Geneva Principles. 
82. We welcome the generous offer of the Government of 
Greece to host the first meeting of the IGF in Athens no later 
than 2006 and we call upon the UN Secretary-General to extend 
invitations to all stakeholders and relevant parties to participate 
at the inaugural meeting of the IGF.  

